A STUDY OF INSTITUIONAL TRUST AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT IN NAGALAND

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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DECLARATION

I, Mr. Moayanger Ao bearing Ph.D. registration no. 807/2018 Dated: 7/10/15 do hereby declare that the subject matter of my Ph.D. thesis entitled ***"A Study of Institutional Trust and Democratic Support in Nagaland"*** is the record of original work done by me, and that the content of this thesis did not form the basis for award of any degree to me or to anybody else to the best of my knowledge. This thesis has not been submitted by me for any research degree in any other University/ Institute.

This is further certified that the Ph.D. thesis is submitted in compliance with the University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulation 2016 dated May 5, 2016 (Minimum Standard and Procedure for Award of M. Phil /Ph.D. Degree). Further it is certified that the content of this thesis is checked for 'Plagiarism' with licensed software 'Urkund' and satisfies with norms of UGC, Government of India. This thesis is being submitted to Nagaland University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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(Mr. Moayanger Ao)

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCION: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1: Introduction

Democracy appears to be a consensual phenomenon globally. Nobel laureate Amartya Sen asserted that democracy is the pre-eminent development that had occurred in the twentieth century and that when people look back at what had happened in that century, they will accord primacy to the emergence of democracy as the pre-eminently acceptable form of government.[1]As democracy becomes more consolidated and becomes the 'only game in town'[2] in more and more countries around the world, the idea of democracy has also acquired a currency that it may not have had at any other point in human history. Democratic regimes enjoy a high degree of legitimacy, not only among their own citizens' but in the world at large. This can be seen in the endorsement that democracy has been given by international and regional organisations and in the way in which non democratic countries try to claim the mantle of democracy for themselves and in the support for democracy that public opinion surveys find in every region of the world.[3] Amartya Sen commented:

"In any age and social climate, there are some sweeping beliefs that seem to command respect as a kind of general rule-like a "default" setting in a computer program: they are considered right unless their claim is somehow precisely negated. While democracy is not yet universally practised, nor indeed universally accepted, in

[1] Amartya Sen. (1999). Democracy as a universal value. *Journal of Democracy*, 10(3), pp. 3-4
[2] Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: JohnHopkins University Press, p. 5.
[3] Marc F. Plattner. (2010). Populism, plurasim, and liberal democracy, *Journal of democracy*, 21(1), p. 82

the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be generally right".[4]

The third wave of democratisation that began in 1974 with Portugal's 'Revolution of the Carnations' appeared to have marked a historical triumph for democracy and appeared to represent the endpoint of human history.[5] However after a period of extraordinary advances in the final quarter of the twentieth century, the overall spread of democracy came to a halt and there have been signs that an erosion of democracy might be getting underway. Since 2006 the expansion of freedom and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt. The world has been in a mild but protracted democratic recession since about 2006.[6]

Contemporary democracies are facing challenges today. According to Freedom House[7] Freedom in the World report 2019, democracy is under assault and in retreat around the world. The report found that the year 2018 was the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. The global average score has declined each year, and countries with net score declines have consistently outnumbered those with net improvements. Of the 195 countries assessed, 86 (44 per cent) were rated Free, 59 (30 per cent) Partly Free, and 50 (26 per cent) Not Free.[8]

In the last decade several democracies have experienced breakdown, deterioration and decay, indicating a global democratic recession. In Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia,

[4] Amartya Sen, Op. cit., p.5
[5] Francis Fukuyama. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press
[6] Larry Diamond. (2015). Facing up to the democratic recession.*Journal of Democracy*, 26(1), p.144
[7] The Freedom House is an international platform driven by activist orientation and engagement in evaluating democracy and ranking different countries.
[8] Freedom House. (2019).*Freedom in the World Report*. Retrieved from freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWeb-compressed.pdf

Thailand, Myanmar and Mongolia faced problems such as the ignoring of human rights, the lack of rule of law, military intervention, and electoral fraud. Latin American democracies such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are governed either by families, populist leaders or lack of balance of powers, weak institutions and no equality before the law despite holding elections. In other countries such as Bolivia, rules change as often as necessary to keep one leader in power, corruption in countries like Brazil and Mexico co-opt the state. Latin America suffers from semi sovereign democracies. In Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe find themselves trapped in political deadlock and electoral polarisation. Hope was rising after the Arab Spring, yet optimism toward the region's future receded soon as autocrats retook power. In Eurasia, ethnic conflict and political tension in Ukraine and Georgia are entangled with foreign relations and security concerns with Russia, while in Russia itself as well as Azerbaijan, Belarus and Central Asian states the well established systems of autocratic rule show no signs of liberalisation.[9]

In addition to internal problems of each country, two additional factors are reinforcing this democratic recession. The first is the loss of consensus in the European Union and the United States that liberal democracy is the only game in town produced by the re-birth and birth of the extreme right and populist movements that have diminished their moral high ground to defend and promote democratisation abroad. An increasing proportion of citizens' in Western democracies have grown critical of their political leaders and have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system and are more willing to express support for authoritarian

[9] Global Barometer Surveys. (2018).Exploring support for democracy across the globe: Report on key findings, p.13

alternatives.[10] The second trend is authoritarian resurgence, led by China which has embarked on a path of 'modernisation without democratisation' and has offered a formula for the survival of authoritarian regimes. In addition to the above mentioned two trends, around the world democratically elected governments elected through popular vote are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens' of basic rights and freedoms. This according to Fareed Zakaria, has given rise to a new disturbing phenomenon in international life called illiberal democracy.[11]

Though India has been designated as Free by Freedom in the World for almost 20 consecutive years, its democratic institutions are suffering from weaknesses that the government has done little to address it. In recent years the country has witnessed increasing religious vigilantism, censorship and sexual violence. India has also witnessed its vibrant civil society space begin to shrink, with crackdowns on foreign funding and public intellectuals who air dissenting views.[12] According to Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index[13], India slipped 10 places to 51st position in 2019 and cited 'erosion of civil liberties' in the country as the primary cause for the downtrend.[14] In 2019, India fell two spots to 140th on the World Press Freedom Index

[10] Foa & Mounk. (2016). The danger of deconsolidation. *Journal of Democracy*. 27(3), p. 7
[11] Fareed Zakaria. (1997). The rise of illiberal democracy. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), p. 2
[12] Rukmani Bhatia. (2017). *Challenges new and old expose cracks in India's democracy*. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/article/challenges-new-and-old-expose-cracks-indias-democracy
[13] The EIU Democracy Index provides a snapshot of the state of world democracy for 165 independent states and two territories. The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on 60 indicators within these categories, each country is then itself classified as one of four types of regime: full democracy; flawed democracy; hybrid regime; and authoritarian regime.
[14] Democracy Index 2019: India falls 10 places to 51st position on erosion of civil liberties. (2020, January 23). *Financial Express*

published by Reporters Without Borders.[15]According to the Index, one of the most striking features of the current state of press freedom in India is violence against journalists including police violence, attacks by Maoist fighters, criminal groups and corrupt politicians. The year 2018 also witnessed a surge in attacks against journalists by supporters of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the run-up to the General Elections 2019.[16]

Even more important than the assault on the press is the political pressure applied to the judiciary. In an unprecedented move, when four senior Supreme Court judges held a press conference in January 2018, it raised alarm bells regarding the independence of the judiciary. In an open revolt against the Chief Justice of India, the four judges listed out a plethora of problems afflicting the judiciary and warned that they could destroy Indian democracy.[17] Two months later, Justice Chelameswar in a letter to the Chief Justice criticised any tendency to cede 'our independence and our institutional integrity to the executive's incremental encroachment' and warned that 'bonhomie between the judiciary and the government in any state sounds the death knell to democracy'.[18]

Long celebrated for its strict nonpartisanship, the Election Commission of India (ECI) displayed signs of campaign-period bias in favour of the government during the 2019

[15] Based in Paris, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) is an independent NGO with consultative status with the United Nations, UNESCO, the Council of Europe and the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF).
[16] *Attacked online and physically*. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/india
[17] Supreme court crisis: All not okay, democracy at stake, say four senior-most judges. (2018, January 12). *Business Line*
[18] AK, Aditya. (2018). *Bonhomie between Judiciary and Government sounds the death knell to Democracy; Chelameswar J in letter to CJI [Read Letter].* Retrieved from https://www.barandbench.com/news/bonhomie-between-judiciary-and-government-sounds-the-death-knell-to-democracy-chelameswar-j-in-letter-to-cji

Lok Sabha election campaign. As many as 66 former bureaucrats had written to President Ram Nath Kovind expressing concern over the working of the Election Commission of India (ECI), which according to them was 'suffering from a crisis of credibility and endangering the integrity of the electoral process'. They commented that 'the weak-kneed conduct of the ECI has reduced the credibility of this constitutional body to an all-time low'.[19] Given the government's attempts to subvert Indian institutions, India's democratic machinery may to some, seem to be collapsing.[20]

Another sign that the government was weakening key institutions came after the resignation of Urjit Patel as Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor in December 2018 and subsequent appointment of Shaktikanta Das as governor. For the first time in nearly three decades, a person with no advance degree or high level professional background in economics has been entrusted with the responsibility of running the RBI.[21] Given his lack of required credentials and his role in carrying out dubious policy like demonetisation in November 2016 has cast aspersion on the autonomy of the RBI.

Perhaps the most disturbing action on the part of the government was the abrogation of Article 370 which gives special status to Jammu and Kashmir and declaring it a union territory. To be fair, the abrogation of Article 370 was one of the key agenda of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). However the manner in which it was

[19] EC suffering from credibility crisis: Over 66 Ex-Bureaucrats write to President, urge him to ensure fair elections. (2019, April 9). *India Today*
[20] Meghna Yadav. (2019). *Even under attack, India's democratic institutions are pushing back*. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/government/modi-government-pushback-democratic-institutions
[21] Prabhash K. Dutta. (2018). *MA in history, Shaktianta Das is first non-economist in 28 years to be RBI governor*. Retrieved from https://www.indiatoday.in/business/story/shaktikanta-das-non-economist-rbi-governor-1407702-2018-12-12

scrapped disregarding the fundamental nature of India as a federal republic has raised serious question about the future of Indian federalism. Moreover, the ruling government is encouraging violence in structural forms. Structural violence entails policies, which discriminate against the minorities. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) is one such policy. The CAA seeks to give accelerated citizenship to Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, Parsis and Christians refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh who have entered into India on or before 31 December, 2014. As it is evident Muslims are excluded from this Act.[22]

Though India's electoral vibrancy is in no doubt, scholars have cautioned that if the present trend intensifies, India's will become a majoritarian and illiberal democracy. India's claim to be a liberal democracy- a country of freedom of speech, robust check and balance institutions, and solid safeguards for rights and freedoms will become a thing of the past.[23]

A report by Lokniti-CSDS[24] titled Democracy in India: A Ctizens' Perspective[25] which is the outcome of the second round of State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA)[26] that took place in India found that support for democracy is not as widespread in 2013 as it was in 2005 (years in which field survey was conducted for

[22] Neha Dabhade. (2019). *Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019: A step towards undoing the Indian secular democracy.* Retrieved from https://in.boell.org/en/2019/12/23/citizenship-amendment-act-2019-step-towards-undoing-indian-secular-democracy

[23] see Sumit Ganguly. (2020). An illiberal India? *Journal of Democracy*, 31(1), pp. 193-202 and Ashutosh Varshney. (2019). Modi consolidates power: Electoral vibrancy, mounting liberal deficits. *Journal of Democracy*, 30(4), pp. 63-77

[24] The Centre for the Study of Developing Societies is an Indian research institute for the social sciences and humanities. It was founded in 1963 by Rajni Kothari. Lokniti is a research programme of the CSDS established in 1997.

[25] Lokniti. (2015). *Democracy in India: A citizens' perspective*. New Delhi: Lokniti-CSDS

[26] In 2004-5 a group of South Asian scholars came together to undertake a first ever study of the state of democracy panning five countries of South Asia. The survey was conducted in 2005 and based on it a report titled State of Democracy in South Asia was published by Oxford University Press in 2008. Lokniti- CSDS has been the main institutional anchor to both these studies in India.

both surveys). The report found that the number of respondents who support democracy has come done, satisfaction with democracy as a system of governance has also shown a downward trend and an increase with dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the country.[27] The report also found that though support for technocracy has decreased, support for other forms of governance such as that by an authoritarian leader who is above the limits of democratic structure and rule by army has registered a considerable rise.[28] This finding was also observed in SDSA whereby support for democracy as a form of governance amongst a large majority of the population does not lead to negation of its authoritarian values.[29] This, to them is indeed a worrisome fact considering that a popular magnetism for authoritarian values constantly lurks in the distance.[30]

With regard to institutional trust, SDSA argued that "while institutions did not suffer from an overall culture of distrust they were indeed the weak link in the entire democratic set up"[31] indicating that trust levels were at a crucial stage. Though they did not suggest a complete breakdown and distrust but when compared to similar regions across South Asia, Indians did indeed trust their institutions less than other democratic countries. This claim of SDSA is reaffirmed by Kapur and Mehta's observation "although an observer of contemporary India may be tempted to conclude that India's public institutions are severely stressed and weakening, in reality their performance has varied both across institutions and overtime".[32] The second report

[27] Lokniti, Op.cit., pp 13-14
[28] Lokniti, Op.cit., pp.13-15
[29] SDSA Team. (2008). *State of democracy in South Asia*. New Delhi: Oxford, pp. 12-14
[30] Lokniti, Op.cit., p. 106
[31] SDSA Team, Op.cit., p. 59
[32] Davesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta. (2005). Introduction. In Davesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta (Eds.), *Public institutions in India: Performance and design (*194-258). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p.4

found that though trust in institutions has risen marginally in the survey conducted in 2013 as compared in 2005; however the worrying aspect was that the elected institutions like the national government and political parties have fared worse than they did in 2005, while non elected institutions like the army have fared better than they did in 2005.[33]

For scholars of democracy some of the pertinent questions that arise out of such a situation are the assessment of overall political support for the political system. Does trust and confidence in political institutions reflect only a comparatively superficial and healthy scepticism about the performance of politicians and the normal rise and fall in popular fortunes expected of any party in government? Or on the other hand, do signs suggest more deep rooted loss of citizens' trust in core institutions of representative democracy, and ambivalence about fundamental democratic principle? Another important issue that is of concern is the relationship between the support for democratic ideals and practices. Especially, will public faith in democratic values gradually spread on a downward trajectory to promote trust and confidence in the core institutions of representative democracy? Or instead, will scepticism about the way democratic state function eventually diffuse on an upward trajectory to erode and undermine approval of democratic principles?

1.2: Concept of Political Support

Discourse on popular orientations towards politics often intermix different facets of citizens' evaluations, such as feelings of political alienation, cynicism or distrust. Sometimes the evidence of public dissatisfaction is no more than dissatisfaction with

[33] Lokniti, Op.cit., p. 56

the incumbents of office, even though this might be considered a normal and healthy aspect of the democratic process. The theoretical difference between different levels of support and different objects of political support are often blurred or ignored in the debate over public trust and confidence in democracy. In other instances, the theoretical significance of public opinion findings is uncertain because the wording of the survey questions is not clear.[34] Thus it becomes necessary to explain the conceptual framework for studying political support.

For this study David Easton's description (1965, 1975) of the various objects and types of political support has been used as a framework. The Eastonian framework for understanding components of political support in a political system provides the standard conceptual foundation for analysis. He defines the political system in terms of inputs (demands and support), conversion (decision-making structures), outputs (governmental policies and laws), feedback and environment. Of primary importance for this study is only the second type of input i.e, the political support.

According to Easton political support can be described as an attitude by which a person orients himself to an object either favourably or unfavourably, positively or negatively.[35] Easton developed a popular classification distinguishing three specific political objects to which support is directed: (1) the political community, (2) the political regime and (3) political authorities.

The political community refers to the nation or the political system in broad terms. Easton defined a political community as "a group of people who come together to

[34] Russell J Dalton. (2004). *Democratic challenges democratic choices*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5
[35] David Easton. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: Wiley, p. 436

draw up some kind of constitution to regulate their political relationship...the particular structure of the relationship may change, the members of the system may be ranked, subdivided and rearranged politically so that the structural patterns are fundamentally altered. But as long as the members continue to evince an attachment to the overall group in which the changing interrelationships prevail...they will be supporting the existence of the same and continuing community".[36]

Political regime refers to the constitutional order of a nation and it is usually considered the most important. Easton makes a distinction between different elements of the regime namely; principles, norms, and institutions. Regime principles define the broad parameters within which the political system should function. At the broadest level, this involves choices about whether political relationships should be organised as democratic, authoritarian or other political forms. A shared consensus on such values would seem to be a prerequisite for a stable political order. Secondly regime norms involve the specific rules or norms governing political action. The third component of the regime includes orientation towards the political institutions such as evaluation of governments, parliaments, political parties, the courts, police etc. The citizens' must accept the institutions of governance as legitimate and accept the decisions made by those who control these institutions. Distinction has been made between these different aspects of regime support for several reasons both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically regime support is a broad term that includes different elements. For instance, there are important distinctions between support for the norms of a regime and support for the specific institutions of a regime.

[36] David Easton, Op.cit., p. 178

Easton also defines a third object namely the political authorities. These are individuals who hold positions of political authority such as prime ministers, presidents or legislators and in a broad sense include the political leadership from which government leaders are drawn. Evaluation of political authorities is an important element of the political process and as Easton stated "if a system is to be able to deal with its daily affairs of converting demands into binding decisions, it is not enough for the members to support the political community and the regime. It is true, support for the structure of authority...would assure the perpetuation of the basic rules and structures through which demands might be processed".[37] In short, in a well functioning political system the citizens' support the incumbents of government who make authoritative political decisions, as well as endorsing the general principles of the political system.

Easton also makes a distinction between two kinds of political support namely 'diffuse support' and 'specific support'.[38] Specific support is directed towards the political authorities and refers to citizens' satisfaction with institutional outcomes of the political authorities. In addition, as Easton argues, this dimension of support is 'object-specific' in two senses: firstly "people are or can become aware of the political authorities-those who are responsible for the day-to-day actions taken in the name of a political system". Secondly specific support is directed to the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances or the general style of these authorities. Unless such behaviour is apparent to the members, this kind of support cannot be generated.[39] On the other hand diffuse support consists of a "reservoir of favourable attitudes or

[37] David Easton, Op.cit., p. 215
[38] David Easton. (1975). A reassessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), p. 436
[39] David Easton, Op.cit., pp. 437-38

goodwill that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants".[40] Of the three political objects mentioned above, the regime is the primary object of diffuse support. It is believed that citizens' are linked to the regime by diffuse support, which stems from their assessment of the fundamental principles, norms and institutions of the government. As Easton himself points out, citizens' support for the regime is "the single most effective device for regulating the flow of diffuse support".[41] Thus, diffuse support for the regime is also regarded as the 'belief in [the] legitimacy' of the political regime.

The difference between specific and diffuse support lies in its durability. The durability of diffuse support secures the system's stability in times of general disappointment, war or inflation. Although the two types of support have different causes and effects, they complement one another, because in the long run the diffuse support is based upon the past specific support. However, short term failures of governments to satisfy citizens' expectations are common and do not endanger the diffuse support and the stability of the political system.

Though the above mentioned Eastonian framework provides an essential starting point, scholars have emphasised the need to understand political support as a multidimensional concept. They argue that greater refinement of the categories is necessary since there are significant theoretical and empirical gradations within different parts of the regime. The classification of the 'regime' as defined by Easton, is a wide category that encompasses several elements, and it would be better to further

[40] David Easton, Op.cit., p. 444
[41] David Easton, Op. cit., p. 278

distinguish between different objects within the regime. According to Norris, "in Easton's conception the regime constituted the basic framework for governing the country. People could not pick and choose between different elements of the regime, approving some parts while rejecting others. Yet in practice citizens' do seem to distinguish between different elements of the regime".[42] For example people may strongly believe in democratic values while being critical of the way democratic government functions in practise. Moreover people also seem to make clear judgments concerning different institutions within the regime. People may express confidence in the courts while disapproving of police at the same time.

Thus as an answer to this problem, Norris and her colleagues expanded the classification into a fivefold framework, "distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors".[43] The political community is understood to mean a basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to cooperate together politically. Regime principles represent the values of the political system. Regime performance means support for how authoritarian or democratic political system functions in practise. This taps a 'middle-level' of support which is often difficult to gauge. Regime institutions include governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties and the military. Lastly political actors or authorities include particular leaders and politicians as a class.

[42] Pippa Norris. (1999). Introduction: The growth of critical citizens? In Pippa Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.6
[43] Pippa Norris (Ed.), Op.cit., pp. 6-7

The above discussed framework is important because citizens' orientations towards different objects of support carry different political implications. For example, public discontent with political authorities normally has limited systemic implications. Citizens' often become dissatisfied with political authorities and acting on these feelings elects new leaders during the next election. Dissatisfaction with authorities, within a democratic system, is not however an indicator for basic political change. Negative attitudes towards political authorities can exist with little loss in support for the office itself or the institutional structure encompassing the office. However the implication broadens when the object of dissatisfaction becomes more general and spreads to the regime or the political community. Thus a decline in support for the political process might engender a basic challenge to constitutional structures or calls for reforms of the procedures of government. Weakening link to the political community in a democratic system might forecast eventual revolution, civil war or the loss of democracy. Thus Easton observed "not all expressions of unfavourable orientations have the same degree of gravity for a political system. Some may be consistent with its maintenance; others may lead to fundamental change".[44]

1.3: Review of Literature

Social scientists are sometimes inconsistent in their use of terms political/institutional trust, and uses it synonymously/interchangeably in their studies. As such in the review of literature section, discussion on trust in political institutions will make use of the same term as done by the original author/s. Empirical studies of institutional trust began with Easton (1965, 1975) and Gamson (1968) concept of support for the political system. While Easton in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965) and *A*

[44] David Easton, Op.cit., p. 437

Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support (1975) introduced the influential distinction between diffuse support (i.e support for the system or regime) and specific support (i.e support for the incumbent authorities) Gamson in his book *Power and Discontent* (1968) provided a theory of political mobilisation and activism which treated political trust as a central organising concept. The debate between Miller (1974a, 1974b) and Citrin (1974) further catapulted research in this area. This debate primarily revolved around whether as Miller argued in his article *Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970* (1974a) and *Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?* (1974b), that the results measured by the American National Election Study (NES) Trust in Government Index[45] indicated a profound loss of diffuse support for the political system as a whole or whether as Citrin in his reply titled *Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government* (1974) suggested that it indicated more specific approval of the performance of political leaders.

The main problem from these works is the lack of a clear definition, where political trust was considered to be what was measured by the American National Election Study (NES) Political Trust Index. Several studies indeed showed that the result of the trust in government questions had a strong and partisan bias (Citrin, 1974). As mentioned by Levi and Stroker in *Political Trust and Trustworthiness* (2000) at present, there is still substantial debate on the trends in political trust, its causes and consequences due to disagreement and the lack of a clear definition.

[45] The items of Trust in Government Index are explained in Chapter 3.

Institutional and Cultural Explanation of Institutional Trust

There are two theoretical traditions which try to explain the origins of institutional trust namely the cultural theories and the institutional theories. Mishler and Rose in *What are the Origins of Political Trust?: Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies* (2001) suggest that both macro and micro levels of trust can be found under both the traditions. Explanations for differences in the levels of trust across countries as well as among individuals within one nation can be found.

In the cultural theories section review will emphasise on social capital and post materialism both of which are part of cultural paradigm. The basic assumption of cultural theories is that that it originates outside the political sphere from early life relations. Robert Dahl in *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (1971) posit trust to be heavily affected by the culture in which one has grown up and hypothesises that people decide to trust their political institutions as a response to trust experience with other people which is accumulated over the years. Almond and Verba (1963) argued in *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* that citizens' relate differently to the different objects of the political system, configuring the nation's political culture. They argued that a civic culture is a political culture suitable for democratic systems and which is characterised by a knowledgeable, trusting and participatory citizenry. Institutional trust in this sense then relates to the evaluations of the population of its political institutions.

Recent developments of the political culture arguments can be found in the theory of social capital as developed by Putnam (1993, 2000) and in the theory of cultural

change and post materialist values developed by Inglehart (1997, 1999). Both theories emphasise the role of trust in a democratic political culture, but their arguments, hypothesis and implications vary which will be discussed.

The concept of social capital did not gain wide attention until the publication of Putnam et al. *Making Democracy Work* in 1993. In the book Putnam argued that a major cause for the different rates of success of Italian regions both economic and political was due to the different levels of social capital observed on those communities. Moreover people who trust each other are more likely to cooperate with each other in forming both formal and informal institutions such as choirs, bowling leagues or community associations. While politically exogenous, interpersonal trust helps make political institutions work because it spills over as Putnam describes it, into cooperation with people in local civic associations and then spills up to create a nationwide network of institutions necessary for representative government. In this sense, interpersonal trust is projected onto political institutions creating a civic culture.

Although cultural theories both macro and micro has been challenged on a multiplicity of grounds by scholars, the relevance of it has been quickly incorporated into the study of patterns of support for democratic regimes. Fukuyama in *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (1999) notes that a degree of trust within face to face groups is common in all societies, but argues that the radius of trust by which he means the extension of interpersonal trust to increasingly large scale impersonal institutions, varies widely across cultures.

Moreover he argues that stable democracies can be found in both low trust as well as high trust cultures.

More generally, there is increasing scepticism about the linkage between interpersonal trust and institutional trust. According to Newton in *Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies* (1999) social and institutional trust are not necessarily related and both are conceptually distinct. The reasons for the differences seems to be that social and institutional trust are related to different sets of social, economic and political variables. Even if there is connection between institutional trust and interpersonal trust, the direction of this relationship has been brought into question by recent evidence such as the findings by Brehm and Rahn in *Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital* (1997) who posit that institutional trust or distrust can affect interpersonal relations as much or more than interpersonal trust affects confidence in political institutions. Muller and Seligson in *Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships* (1994) go even further arguing that interpersonal trust appears to be a product of democracy rather than a cause of it.

The same ambivalence can be found with respect to the impact of civic engagement on institutional trust. Brehm and Rahn (1997) argued that while membership in secondary organisations has been proposed as the first step on trusting others it has also been argued that it is not necessarily related to institutional trust. There are however, reasons to believe that civic engagement can be related to institutional trust. According to them, one should expect a negative relationship between membership in

associations and confidence in national institutions. They argue that these organisations create a civic space that is different and opposed to the political sphere.

Values are also expected to influence trust in political institutions because they are used as standards for the evaluation of political objects as observed by Dalton in *Value Change and Democracy* (2000). More specifically, a second version of the cultural theories of institutional trust can be found in Inglehart's work. According to Inglehart in *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (1997) contemporary societies are experiencing a fundamental change in their predominant values together with their change in political and economic conditions. Together with the changes in economic growth and societal conditions of post modern societies an important shift in terms of the preferences and values of the citizens' can be observed. He emphasises a new political culture which includes the rise of liberal or self expressed values which tend to reject authority and decrease confidence in public institutions. In terms of the relationship between post material values and trust in political institutions, Inglehart argues that the appearance and development of more postmaterial publics will tend to depress the levels of trust in public institutions because there is a growing scepticism and rejection of authority figures and structures. The post modern shift is a drift away from both traditional authority and state authority. It reflects a declining emphasis on authority in general. This leads to declining confidence in hierarchical institutions. At the same time however, Inglehart in *Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy* (1999) says that postmaterial values go together with interpersonal trust. Societies with higher percentages of people expressing post material priorities present higher levels of interpersonal trust.

Empirical research in developed societies has found evidence of this relationship. Dalton (2000) argues that there is clear evidence of a link between postmaterial values and a lack of confidence in political institutions for most Trilateral nations. More importantly, Dalton interprets this finding not as a challenge to political legitimacy but as a changing on the sources of legitimacy in all major institutions. To him legitimacy based on inclusion is replacing legitimacy based on hierarchical authority. This process, characterised by a growing emphasis on self expression and political participation is therefore a challenge to traditional and modern forms of authority and inherently conducive to democratisation.

According to institutional theories, institutional trust reflects the rational judgement of the citizenry based on its direct experience with the performance of the institutions. Similarly as conceptualised by Easton (1965) citizens' evaluation of the institutional performance has influence upon the political support through the feedback. Most social scientist agree that there is a lot of evidence proving the so called performance thesis, stating that trust depends on the evaluation of the performance of these institutions. Indeed it is known from sociological theories that people build their opinions and expectations on the basis of their prior experiences and their interpretation of these experiences. Thus, confidence in authorities depends on what people know about their actions and decisions. Catterberg and Moreno in *The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies* (2006) says that if citizens' are satisfied with the institutional output, see politicians as honest and responsive, the feelings of confidence will increase while under performance will lead to declining trust. Researchers have found that it is especially

important how successful the institutions are in dealing with such matters as promoting growth, governing effectively and avoiding corruption.

The so called performance hypothesis is well rooted in political science literature. In fact, there is so much evidence on the influence of performance and perceived corruption on institutional trust, that it allows Catterberg and Moreno (2006) to conclude that performance seems an inherent element of institutional trust. Russell Dalton in *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (2004), on the other hand argues that the currently available data do not provide a strong evidence for policy performance hypothesis at the aggregate level. As an argument he points to the fact that the rise in political negativity in advanced industrial democracies is not matched by public perceptions of national economic performance. Some other social scientist like Uslaner in *Trust, Democracy and Governance: Can Government Policies Influence Generalized Trust?* (2003) have questioned the causality of the linkage arguing that it is trust that leads to better institutions.

Arthur Miller and Ola Listaugh in *Political Performance and Institutional Trust* (1999) argue that low levels of political confidence are not so much related to the government's objective achievements as to the gap between actual performance and citizens' expectations. Recently several social scientists have introduced the hypothesis that decreasing rates of confidence in political institutions may be a result of an increasingly sophisticated and demanding citizenry, the critical citizens' who are dissatisfied because the institutions fall short of their democratic ideals. Norris in the introduction of *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (1999)

argues that long term economic development and affluence have given rise to critical citizens' who are less deferential to government authority and increasingly ready to challenge government through protest action. Although a little skepticism and criticism is normal and healthy for democracy, yet too much cynicism and skepticism can threaten the democratic process as mentioned by Dalton (2004). Ronald Inglehart (1997) sees declining trust in government as a part of a broader erosion of respect for authorities that is linked with processes of modernisation and post modernisation. It has been argued by scholars like Howard in *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (2003) that with regard to post-communist countries dissatisfaction arose as a result of unjustified expectations after establishing independence causing the so called 'post honeymoon' effect. There is some evidence that this might be true. For example Dalton (2004) found that in Germany, Italy and Japan political support grew in post war decades as democracy established itself, then the trend shifted and citizens' in those countries became more cynical of the government. Similarly Koroleva and Rungule in *Latvia: Democracy as an Abstract Value* (2006) found that in Latvia from 1992, the period of political activity was followed by a period of political apathy and depression. Also as observed by Mair in *Political Parties, Popular Legitimacy and Public Privilege* (1995) the distrust was fuelled by the fractional loss of autonomy to European Union that restricts the options available to local authorities.

In short from the institutional perspective, trust in political institutions is politically endogenous and based on rational evaluation of the performance of contemporary political institutions. It is rather seen as an outcome of the relations and interactions, a certain indicator of the quality of institutions.

Importance of Institutional Trust

According to social capital theory, trust is considered to be important as it fosters cooperation which in turn helps in the establishment of civil society at the grass root levels. Francis Fukuyama in his book *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1996) argues that without trust cooperation becomes expensive and indistinct. Since politics is also a social exchange in a similar way these principles can be attributed also to state-society relations. Research findings have shown to support the said claim and here some examples of the benefits provided by the complimentary state-society relations are presented.

Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer in *Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests using Alternative Institutional Measures* (1995) posit that most people are conditional cooperators who act cooperatively only when they have high expectations that others will reciprocate. Thus, just like in interpersonal relations at the horizontal level, institutional trust contributes to cooperative moral behavior which results in decreasing transaction cost as suggested by Fukuyama in *Social Capital, Civil Society and Development* (2001) leading to effective functioning of formal institutions and furthermore increasing prosperity. For example as mentioned by Rothstein and Stolle in *Social Capital, Impartiality and the Welfare State: An Institutional Approach* (2003) it makes no sense to pay taxes if a person thinks that the tax authorities are discriminating against you or are heavily corrupt. In the same vein as suggested by Hardin in *The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust* (1993) it also doesn't make sense if a person does not believe that others are contributing their fair share. It is simply rational and logical to keep as much money to oneself if the person feels that a corrupt state will not fairly distribute the taxes paid by the public. It has

been proven that institutional trust reduces cheating with taxes as shown by Rose and Sin in *Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-wave Democracies* (2001), decreases corruption as shown by Ulsaner in *Morality Plays: Social capital and Moral Behaviour in Anglo-American Democracies* (1999), improves accountability of the government as demonstrated by Knack in *Social Capital and the Quality of Government* (2002) and increase voluntary compliance with the government directives, rules, norms and laws in general. Trust is especially important for democratic governments because they cannot rely on coercion to the same extend as other regimes and should rely on the legitimacy of the system and the voluntary compliance of the public (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006). The consequence of low trust on state-society relations is that governments invests more money and time on enforcing laws and explaining their decisions to the public and assuring voters that their interest are being looked after.

Secondly complementarities between citizens' and the institutions of the state can provide informational benefits. As suggested by Pateman in *Participation and Democratic Theory* (1975) it enhances sharing of information, inputs of ideas from the civil groups, feedback about the efficiency of certain policies and ideas for innovations. Empirical evidence has shown that when citizens' demonstrate a greater sense of civic responsibility and participate in the democratic process actively, government performance increases (Putnam 2000). The informational benefits of complimentary state-society relations are especially important nowadays where the social and economical processes are getting increasingly complex. According to Stroker in *Explaining Political Disenchantment: Finding Pathways to Democratic Renewal* (2008) the most successful policies are those that are based on involving

respective society groups in the process of discussion and in a true democracy espousing one's interest or opinion is only the start of a more general challenge in politics-that of communication.

Thirdly in democratic regimes, institutional trust is a guarantee of political and economic stability. If citizens' do not trust people in the parliament they try to vote them out of the office and it results in high electoral volatility. As the study of Richard Rose *Mobilizing Demobilized Voters in Post-Communist Societies* (1995) shows, this has been the case in the post-communist new democracies. Trust in institutions is also important for getting people to accept and comply with the government decisions. This aspect has a particular importance especially during period of economic turmoil. The process of internal deflation involves a lot of unpopular decisions. In such cases securing peace and stability requires that the citizens' have sufficient trust in economic and political authorities to accept temporary economic difficulty in return for the promise of better conditions in some uncertain future (Catterberg & Moreno 2006). One can expect more unrest and destruction if the government is unsuccessful in gaining the society's confidence and trust in their policies.

Fourth, even if there are no direct economic benefits, institutional trust is an indicator of the legitimacy of power relations. Taking into account that in democracies political authorities are intended to represent the will of the people, legitimacy to Seligman in *The Problem of Trust* (1997) becomes a critical issue and especially so for new regimes (Mishler & Rose, 2001). A loss of legitimacy leads to avoiding obligations

and civic responsibilities, lower participation rates in the social and political processes and finally cause a crisis of democracy.

There is also strong evidence that institutional trust is important for political participation. Verba et al. in *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* (1987) shows that besides voting, a number of activities have emerged through which citizens' get involved in order to transmit their preferences and demands to governments. This has led to the distinction in the literature between conventional and non conventional types of political participation. Inglehart and Catterberg in *Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-honeymoon Decline* (2002) says that conventional forms of participation are produced through a process of elite directed mobilisation. These conventional forms of participation can be personal such as the act of voting, donating money for a campaign or collective types of participation such as membership in a political party and participating in campaigning.

On the other hand non conventional or protest types of participation are relatively new and have been developed most intensively in more developed democracies (Inglehart & Catterberg 2002). They are defined as all other activities used to present demands to governments other than conventional forms of participation. Non conventional types of participation occurs mostly outside of election settings, are somewhat more costly for the citizens' to engage in and usually appear only as a response to specific issues. Many studies have revealed a quite consistent and robust correlation between trust in political authorities and conventional political participation. A few scholars argue that it might also be that the lack of trust in authorities stimulates attempt to

vote the incumbents out of office and to take other actions which will result in the change of government (Dalton, 2004). However there is not much empirical evidence that would correspond with such claim. Some others like Denters et al. in *Political Confidence in Representative Democracies. Socio-Cultural vs. Political Explanations* (2007) found no direct correlation between trust in institutions and participation in voluntary associations. All in all most research has so far concluded that those who feel supportive are more likely to participate in conventional political activities and those who are disappointed with the authorities will participate less.

There have also been studies done in analysing the link between institutional trust and unconventional political activity. Most of them have come to the conclusion that if citizens' do not support the authorities, they will engage in mobilised unconventional activities (Norris 1999). This conclusion is extremely important for the democratic theory. Those people who are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy or performance of their authorities are expected to voice their concern by engaging in unconventional political activities. Yet some scholars like Craig and Maggioto in *Political Discontent and Political Action* (2009) argue that low political support produces unconventional behavior only when it is combined with other attitudes like political efficacy.

Impact of Corruption on Institutional Trust

Earlier research on corruption saw it as a 'necessary evil'. Based on 'efficient grease' and 'second best' theories, scholars like Huntington in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) argued that corruption was necessary in governments, especially to redistribute economic resources. Nye in *Corruption and Political Development: A*

Case- Benefit Analysis (1967) also argued that corruption was mainly viewed as the grease that gets the bureaucracy moving and in doing so increases citizens' loyalty. He says that bribery is an efficient way to reduce red tape and that corruption provides immediate, specific and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be alienated from society. Corruption may thus be important to boost economic and political development (Huntington 1968). For instance in political science, corruption is presented as facilitating the development of political parties and the emergence of a stable political environment. Becquart-Leclerq in *Paradoxes of Political Corruption: A French View* (1989) says that corruption could also increase citizens' loyalty and trust in their political institutions.

However since the 1990s this characterisation and interpretation of corruption has been changed though there is some research that still argues that corrupt governments can increase or, at least, maintain their level of support. Manzetti and Wilson in *Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?*(2007), for example, argue that corrupt governments can maintain their levels of citizens' support where government institutions are weak and patron-client relationships are strong. As a consequence, then, governments that can maintain their clientelistic networks will maintain their levels of trust.

However besides such arguments, critics has challenged the efficient grease theory and focus mainly on the origins of political trust and the hypothesis behind the efficient grease theory. Institutional theories posit that political trust is a consequence, not a cause, of institutional performance. Trust in institutions is rationally based, it hinges on citizens evaluation of institutional performance. Institutions that perform

better generate trust while untrustworthy institutions generate distrust and scepticism (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Therefore corruption seen as a symptom of ill functioning institutions can affect institutional trust either as suggested by Mauro in *Corruption and Growth* (1995) directly through the citizens' experience and perception of corruption or indirectly through its adverse affect on economic growth and development outcomes as shown by Kaufmann et al. in *Aggregating Governance Indicators* (1999).

Empirical studies done in different regions of the world confirm the negative impact of corruption on institutional trust. Della Porta in *Social Capital, Beliefs in Government, and Political Corruption* (2000) demonstrates a strong relationship in Western European countries between a high level of corruption and low satisfaction with democracy. Anderson and Tverdova in *Corruption, Political Allegiances and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies* (2003) study of 16 democracies of Eastern and Western Europe concluded that citizens' in high corrupt countries value and trust their political system less. Seligson in *The Impact of Corruption in Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries* (2002) presented similar findings based on household surveys in four Latin American democracies. Chang and Chu in *Corruption and Trust: Exceptionalism in Asian Democracies?* (2006) found the same negative relationship in four East Asian countries and thereby rejecting the Asian corruption exceptionalism hypothesis. Lastly Cho and Kirwin in *A Vicious Circle of Corruption and Mistrust in Institutions in sub Saharan Africa: A Micro-Level Analysis* (2007) finds a vicious circular relationship between mistrust in the state and experiences with corruption. Their

results showed that citizens' experience of corruption lowers their trust in political institutions and that low trust are likely to increase the experience of corruption.

Regime Support by Principles and Performance

Following Easton's works (1965, 1975) political support can be considered to be a multidimensional concept and distinguish between specific and diffuse regime support, where the former is citizens' attitudes and evaluation of outputs and performance of political authorities and the latter is more what an object is rather than what it does. In the case of a democratic regime, diffuse support implies endorsement as an abstract ideal and specific support implies people's positive perceptions of outcomes and performance of democracy. Scholars often treat the two dimensions of support as independent from each other (Dalton, 2004).

Easton overall theorisation of regime support has not remained unchallenged. In the context of support for democracy, Norris (1999) has conceptualised it as a 5-points continuum running from the most diffuse (feelings about belonging to a political community) to the most specific as exemplified by trust in specific political actors. A fundamental innovation of this literature is the argument that specific support is not only about the overall performance of the regime, but also about citizens' perception of the officeholder as suggested by Mishler and Rose in *Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-communist Societies* (1997). Consequently, specific support has measured not only of people's evaluation of whether authorities actions meet their needs and demands but also as confidence in specific political actors and institutions.

The regime support literature provides overwhelming backing to the notion that citizens' indeed engage with political regimes from both Eastonian perspectives, however as suggested by Dahlberg and Holmberg in *Democracy and Bureaucracy: How their Quality Matters for Popular Satisfaction* (2014) it often examines either only one of the support types or employs indicators of support that do not adequately differentiate between the different types. For example, many researchers and survey organisations use the 'satisfaction with the way democracy works' (SWD) item of mass survey as an indicator of support for democracy. However as indicated by Norris in *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (2011) a big question mark exist as to whether SWD is a valid indicator of support either for the principles of democracy or for the performance of democratic regime.

Support for Democracy: The Factor of Government Quality

Francis Fukuyama in *What is Governance?* (2013) says that the idea that quality of government may be an independent source of democratic support originates in the idea that governability is a variable among democracies. Charron and Lapuente in *Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government?* (2010) has empirically shown that democracies indeed do vary in terms of the quality of their government. Since democracies vary on the quality of government it is expected in accordance with the classical Easton take on specific and diffuse support as having different cause, that this variation would be reflected in citizens' evaluation of democratic performance and hence specific support for democracy. Indeed there is a growing literature that examines a link between real or perceived quality of government and satisfaction with democracy. However a more recent interpretation of a link between experience, specific and diffuse support suggests that it is reasonable to expect that quality of

government may also affect diffuse support. This notion has however been seldom subjected to empirical investigation and there is clearly visible gap when it comes to investigating the link between quality of government and diffuse support and also both types of support. A notable exception here are two papers that showed a positive link between both types of support on the one hand and government procedural fairness (Linde 2012) and government effectiveness (Magalhaes 2014) on the other. While dealing with the same topic they approached the issue of support rather differently. Magalhaes in *Government Effectiveness and Support for Democracy* (2014) attempts to empirically substantiate Easton's idea that diffuse support may derive from experience. He builds his argument in the traditional political science way by arguing that the ability of the sate to formulate and implement its goals facilitates citizens' valuation of the authorities as successfully addressing citizens' needs and demands, hence boosting first specific support and then diffuse support. On the other hand Linde in *Why Feed the Hand that Bites You? Perceptions of Procedural Fairness and System Support in post/Communist Democracies* (2012) argues that citizens' perception of being treated fairly by authorities in the implementation of democratically agreed policies and decisions generates legitimacy. The willingness of individuals to defer to the decisions and rules of impartial authorities ignites support for democracy in principle (specific) and satisfaction with the way democracy works simultaneously (diffuse). Thus Linde approaches the issue of support not through rational assessments by citizens' of the congruence between their needs and demands and the authorities actions but through the willingness of citizens' to accept authorities based on the impartiality in the policy implementation. In other words, he emphasises not so much on what democracies do but how do they do it as an independent source of support for democracy.

Support for Democracy by Economic and Political Factors

Herbert Kitschelt in *The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe* (1992) suggests that perception of change in individual and national economic circumstances are the most important factors influencing citizens' support for democracy. On the question about how people respond to and form attitudes about democracy, Adam Przeworski in *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (1991) stressed that the most important factor is the gap between subjective expectations and real economic experiences. As a result, if people believe that democracy improves their personal economic condition and that of their nation, then popular support for democracy increases. Similarly Russell Dalton in *Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies* (1994) also discovered that people's attitudes towards democracy in the former East Germany were strongly associated to their evaluations of their national economy.

These findings emphasising the economic basis for popular support for democracy was challenged by Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield. In their article titled *The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies* (1995) the authors by analysing survey data from eight post-communist countries in the early 1990s found that there is miniscule association between economic experience and democratic support when the perceived responsiveness of the electoral system and support for marketisation are controlled for. Similarly Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer *in Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (1998) studied public opinion in nine former East Bloc countries, and also warned against reductionist

theories that treat all political attitudes as if they were simply derivative of economic conditions. They found that both economic and political factors determine levels of popular support for democracy, but politics matters more.

Subsequently, results from others regions of the world prompted scholars to question the conventional wisdom that governments in new democracies legitimise themselves mainly through economic performance. Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton in *Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?* (2001) found that Africans support democracy even while being discontented with its achievements in both the political and the economic realms. This implies a measure of intrinsic support that supersedes instrumental considerations. They also found that approval of democracy remains performance-driven, though approval hinges less on the delivery of economic goods than on the government's record of securing basic political rights.

Analysing data from the multiyear Latino barometer survey, Marta Lagos in *Latin America's Lost Illusions: A Road with No Return?* (2003) found that when many Latin American countries were hit by severe economic crises around the turn of the millennium, satisfaction with market-based policies and the actual workings of democratically chosen governments began to drop even as support for democracy as a regime type went up. This suggests that Latin Americans are learning to distinguish between democracy as a system and other forms of government which they may like or dislike. Working with the same data, Carol Graham and Sandip Sukhtankar in *Does Economic Crisis Reduce Support for Markets and Democracy in Latin America? Some Evidence from Surveys of Public Opinion and Well Being* (2004) also corroborated Lagos's findings.

Studies on Indian Politics and Democracy

For a long time, Indian democracy was considered a puzzle, a paradox and an enigma, especially by Western political scientist interested in Indian studies. However over the decades, people who were sceptical of the chances of survival of Indian democracy, began to recognise it as a democracy by stating that they have now discovered answers to the paradox or solved the puzzle. For instance Arend Lijphart at first did not include India in his book called *Democracies* that was published in 1984. It was only at a later stage that he thought he had solved the puzzle by saying that India was an impressive confirming case for his 'consociational model' and included India among the notable democracies of the world in his revised book, *Patterns of Democracy* (1999). Similarly, Robert Dhal in his landmark book, *Democracy and its Critics* (1989) mentioned India only twice to say that it was not modern, dynamic, pluralistic society like other Western nations where polyarchy and dynamic pluralistic society coexist. However, on his later book *On Democracy* (2000), he calls India an improbable democracy and includes it in the group of nations considered to be democratic. Still sceptical of India's democracy, he says that democracy survives in India only because there is no realistic alternative to it.

Now most analysts of Indian politics acknowledge that India has been a successful story and seek explanations to it. Kohli in his book *Democracy and Discontent: India's crisis of Governability* (1991) suggested that India was suffering from governability crisis because political institutions had declined to such an alarming rate that they were unable to contain proliferating demands made on the polity and that India had too much of wrong kind of democracy and not enough of the right kind. Nine years later Atul Kohli brought out an edited volume called *The Success of*

India's Democracy (2001), mostly with contributions from political scientists based in the Western academic institutions. He continued to believe that India was suffering from poor governance but also conceded that democracy has taken root. He says that several factors contributed to the establishment of India's democracy, such as the role of Indian nationalist leaders. He points out an important lesson from India's success: within the framework of a centralised state, moderate accommodation of group demands, especially demands based on ethnicity, and some decentralisation of power strengthens democracy.

Sumit Ganguly et al. in *The State of India's Democracy* (2007) argue that there are both structural and contingent factors that are responsible for the sustenance of India's democracy. The structural factor being that the dominant strand of the nationalist movement was democratic and the framers of the constitution adopted a democratic structure that sought to represent the views of the many rather than the opinion of the few. The contingent factor is that independent India was fortunate to have leaders who got rid of colonialism and fostered political elite that have shunned authoritarian tendencies.

Stepan et al. in *Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies* (2011) argue that certain specific institutional and contextual features are responsible for India's success as a democracy. India has a relatively strong and usable state with a government, an army, a judiciary and a bureaucracy and above all democratic institutions that enjoy considerable legitimacy. Struggle for independence and the democratic institutions created at that time legitimated a sense of Indian nationhood and a conception of the nation open to pluralism.

Sunil Khilani (1997) in his book *The Idea of India* suggested that India's despite problems of poverty, cultural and religious distinctions have became a democracy without knowing how or what it meant to be one. He says that it is clear that the democratic idea has penetrated the Indian political imagination and begun to corrode the authority of the social order and of a paternalistic state. Similarly Francie Frankel (1999) in the book *Transforming India* held that the preservation of democratic governance in India has presented a standing challenge to theorists of historical and comparative development. In the second edition of her book *India's Political Economy* (2005) Frankel accepted that among the new nations, it is only India that retained a deep commitment to principles of parliamentary democracy in the three decades after Independence.

Indian democracy can be unjustifiably proud of the success of many of its institutional arrangements. State institutions have certain roles and responsibilities that are indispensable for the smooth conduct of democratic politics and in institutionalising democratic norms. It has a vigorously free press, political parties, a free judiciary and an apolitical military. It is only from the late 1990s that attention has again come to be significantly focussed on state institutions and their role in shaping the polity. This has happened in a context when the constitution and state institutions were facing challenges from extra constitutional and non electoral entities which questioned the validity of the rule of law and its due processes.

Democracy's success depends on vibrant competition among political parties. In the post independence era the Congress system emerged as the centrepiece of Indian

politics. Rajni Kothari's *Politics in India* (1970) represented the general thrust of the dominant Indian political science understanding of Indian politics during 1960-1976. The work still remains the only one of its kind by an Indian political scientist on India with a macro theorisation of Indian politics and its party system. Kothari has classified the Congress System of the Indian party system to be composed of two kinds of parties: a party of consensus (the Congress) and parties of pressure. The latter functioned on the margin or periphery of power whereas the former consisted of various factions that constituted the Congress. One of the reasons for the strength of the Congress was the patronage links that it forged with regional satraps and chieftains of different castes and communities and ethnic groups. Because the Congress managed to be in power continuously and there was no united or effective threat to its authority, the country's political process gained incomparable advantages of continuity and unity.

The 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of the non Congress opposition which forged alliances and formed governments in eight major states in the 1967 elections. Rajni Kothari in *India: The Congress System on Trial* (1967) saw the emergent situation and commented that the one party dominance model was giving way to a more differentiated structure of party competition. Similarly Morris-Jones in *The Government and Politics of India* (1967) emphasised that the new situation brought a number of opposition parties fully into the marketplace and competition that had previously occurred within the Congress was now brought into the realm of inter party conflict. The fragmentation of the party system, from the dominance of the Congress party to multiparty system says Rajeev Gowda and E. Sridharan in *Parties and the Party System 1947-2006* (2007) has not undermined the basic power-sharing

character of the system and has thus helped to consolidate democracy. While during the days of Congress dominance power sharing took place within an internally democratic and federal Congress, it now takes places through the politics of group presence in large multiparty coalitions in which regional and religious or caste group based parties share power.

Analysing the changed nature of political participation in the 1990s Yogendra Yadav in *Understanding the Second Democratic Upsurge; Trends of Bahujan Participation in Electoral Politics in the 1990s* (1999) writes that this decade saw a participatory upsurge among all groups suffering from social deprivation and backwardness, which he called the 'second democratic upsurge'. He argues that in the social and political churning that India went through in this decade, several dormant social identities had acquired a new salience in the context of electoral competition. He termed this 'third electoral system'. It heralded a new pattern of party competition in what he called 'post-Congress polity'. The political space he says was now occupied by three forces namely the Congress, BJP and others. The third space became the spring of political alternatives. Javeed Alam (2006) in *Who wants Democracy* says that despite voters having less confidence in either the political leadership or in the parties they have voted for in the past, they continue to vote in large numbers. This Alam suggest because people want democracy; because it grounds democratic institutions and because it compels practices to conform to democratic norms. He says that struggles within democracy are primarily for equality and ordinary people are in the business of protecting democracy from those who seek to subvert it. Political equality flattens hierarchies, brings about a sense of equality, enables the disadvantaged to transcend

their social location and gives them a sense of power that they never experience in social life.

With regard to the study of political institutions, Davesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (Eds.) *Public Institutions in India* (2007) is the first comprehensive book which assesses the design, performance and adaptability of the important political institutions of governance like the police, judiciary and parliament in India. The book analyses the institutional set-up and its functioning in the context of growing politicisation and also points out the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions.

A robust civil society which most theorist of democracy consider a vital component of the workings of a viable democracy appears to be thriving in India. Niraja Gopal Jayal's (2007) *The Role of Civil Society* identifies the important work of three distinct genres of civil society organisations namely environmental movements, organisations focussed on the rights of the dispossessed and those seeking more responsive government. She also emphasises on those groups that have sought to act as a counterweight to overweening state power. Similarly Rob Jenkins (2007) *Civil Society and Corruption* argues that increasing anti corruption movement groups fighting against corruption is the fruit of a yearning for deeper democracy on the part of the electorate. The actions of such groups along with growing participation are gradually resulting in a political system that is more accountable to the people. However though the success rate of such group may be less, Jenkins contends that they have hit upon innovative methods to improve governmental accountability and state responsiveness to public needs.

No discussion of Indian democracy and society would be complete without some attention to the vital role of the free press. Praveen Swami (2007) *Breaking News: The Media Revolution* addresses this critical component of India's democracy. Swami provides a sweeping overview of the evolution of the Indian press and mass media from the colonial times to the present day. He notes that during the emergency, most of the press failed to maintain its independence, but argues that this subsequently contributed in an ironic fashion to a dramatic interest in and expansion of the mass media. He also says that journalists are now far more resistant to official sallies aimed at curbing their autonomy. These positive developments notwithstanding, Swami sounds the tocsin about the rise of anti secular sentiments in certain segments of the press as well as its growing commercialisation. These tendencies, if left unchecked could prove deeply corrosive of democratic values and practices.

Throughout India's life as a democracy, many commentators were either sceptical of its survival or talked of its exceptionalism. For a long time it was believed that democracy was possible only in economically developed society. Seymour Martin Lipset famously formulated his proposition that the more developed a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. In his famous article *Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimiacy* (1959), he was able to confirm a correlation between democracy and development on empirical grounds. Yet, India with lower per capita income levels than many nations remained a democracy. Moreover scholars were also sceptical and subscribed authoritarian model because democratic politics would give rise to increased aspirations among people where governments do not have the capacity to meet these aspirations. Some also thought that democracy would not survive in India because of

its diversity. Fortunately many of these precondition theories and prediction proved to be wrong.

Over the past seven decades, India has passed through testing times and political storms. But somehow India has overcome through these difficult times and weathered many a political storm. Over these decades it has made great strides in different areas be it social, economic and political. The most impressive aspect as K. C. Suri says in *Introduction: India's Democracy- An Exception or a Model* (2013) is that today, political freedom and social equality is recognised as two cardinal aspects of our life. The democratic principles, institutions and practices have transformed most people of the country from the status of subjects to the status of citizens'. Reservation policies based on caste provided the socially disadvantaged sections of society access to education and employment opportunities making big differences in their lives

Despite the progress the nation has made, many while acknowledging the success of Indian democracy, the shortcomings and certain political tendencies that we observed over the years has also raised concern. Scholars who have assessed the state of Indian democracy reflect this view. Suhas Palshikar (2017) in *Indian Democracy* calls India's democracy a 'work in progress' and draws attention to the central paradoxes of India's democracy. He also warns against tendencies of becoming majoritarian and points out the challenges of democracy's distortions and weakening of diversity. The challenge before Indian democracy is how to deepen democracy in India. As observed by the team of *State of Democracy in South Asia* (2008) deepening of democracy means institutionalisation of democratic practices and processes that guarantee rights and meaningful choices to people. It involves democracy's expansion without

allowing itself to be appropriated by the elites, criminal elements or vested interest. It is a condition that guarantees resilience of democratic institutions in the face of deviations towards concentration of power.

1.4: Statement of the Problem

Democracies are not resistant or durable without trust and participation of their people and therefore institutional trust is a vital ingredient for the success of a democratic system. Trust in political institutions is one of the key elements which make representative democracies work. Trust creates a connection between citizens' and representative political institutions. The level of trust citizens' have in their political institutions is an intuitive measure of the congruence between their political preferences and the outputs of the representative political institutions.

Nagaland since its statehood has developed into a complex governance system with its own institutional arrangements whose scope and structure continue to evolve. Here institutional arrangements refer to formal government organisational structures as well as informal norms which are in place in the state for arranging and undertaking its policy work. These arrangements are crucial as they provide the government with the framework within which to formulate and implement policies. However these institutions have faced their own challenges over the years. Assessing people's level of institutional trust becomes important since it has major implication on the future of democracy in the state.

There is also broad consensus that citizens' support for democratic rule is a valuable attribute for any democratic system. Democratic regimes rely on the citizens' willing

support for their survival and effective functioning. Citizens' orientation towards the democratic state is changing in fundamental ways that are likely to have equally important implications for policy making and the future of democracy itself. Thus assessing levels of democratic support and studying the conditions under which citizens' develop and maintain positive attitudes towards democratic rule becomes important. The present study will therefore make an attempt to reveal the current state of democratic support among the people of the state.

On the whole, the present study will aim to provide valuable information regarding the level of trust that people place on their political institutions and extent of democratic support. This issue is considered extremely important and deserves to be carefully studied, because the trust that a society places in the political institutions exerts great influence on the satisfaction with the democratic development of the state and is a necessary condition for the long term stability of the political life.

1.5: Significance of the Study

The significance of the study is twofold. First based on the cultural and institutional theoretical perspectives, this study will examine people's trust in political institutions. Secondly since support for democracy is one of the important concepts in understanding the dynamics of democratic consolidation, the study will attempt to analyse the patterns and dynamics of democratic support.

1.6: Objectives

1. To examine institutional trust from the point of view of culturalism and institutionalism.

2. To assess the level of democratic support.

3. To examine the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support.

1.7: Hypotheses

1. The better the political institutions are considered to perform, the more people will trust them.

2. The higher people's preference for democratic regime is, the higher will be their support for democracy

3. Higher level of institutional trust translates into greater support for democracy.

1.8: Research Design

This section highlights a review of the research design.

Universe: The universe of the study includes eligible voters in the age group of 18 years without upper age cut off.

Sampling Method

The sampling design adopted is Multi stage random sampling. Firstly out of 60 Assembly constituencies 10 assembly segments of the state is selected using the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) sampling method. Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling includes a number of sample selection methods in which the probability of selection for a sampling unit is directly proportional to a size measure. Secondly from each of the sampled Assembly segment three polling stations are selected using the Systematic Random Sampling (SRS) technique. Finally from each

of the selected polling station, 15 respondents are selected using the same method (SRS) from the latest electoral rolls of the sampled polling stations making it a total of 450 respondents. However only 411 respondents could be approached and interviewed during the field work.

Data Collection

The use of materials for the thesis was drawn from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected using standard structured questionnaire administered as face-to-face interviews. The survey employed structured questionnaire from the fourth Asia Barometer Survey though some modifications were made keeping in mind the context of the study. Secondary data has been gathered from published and unpublished academic texts, journals, articles, official records, statistical documents and seminar papers located in relevant government departments, libraries and other institutions in Nagaland as well as in other parts of India.

Data Analysis

For data analysis, the quantitative data from the survey has been analysed using simple technique of calculation such as averages and percentages and also multiple correlation and regression analyses. In the correlation analysis, the statistical relationship between the dependent and independent variables are measured. The analyses indicate the degree of the correlation between the variables, but do not infer causal relations since independent variables cannot be considered causes of the dependent variables. The correlation coefficients (between -1 and 1) show the strength and the positive/negative direction of the dependence. The statistical significance (p-

value) measures to what extend the result are likely to have occurred purely by chance. The lower its level is, the stronger the results are. In contrast to the correlation analysis, the regression analysis gives information about the causal relationship between two or more variables and is a useful tool when quantifying the influence of several independent variables on a single dependent variable. The standardised regression coefficient Beta allows comparison of the predictive power of the independent variables and the R^2 is the variation in the dependent variables that could be explained by all independent variables.

CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AREA AND RESPONDENTS PROFILE

2.1: Introduction

Nagas' are an indigenous people, with their homeland stretching along the north eastern Indian states of Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and north western Myanmar (Burma). Nagaland was created out of the Naga Hill areas of Assam and North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1963 becoming the 16th state of the Indian Union. The state was created out of a political agreement between the Centre and Naga leaders. Hence, the state has been put under a unique and special category in Indian constitution, provided in Article 371(A). This is in order to safeguard culture, tradition and ways of life of the Nagas'. The state has a distinct character both in terms of its social composition as well as in its development history.[46] The state covers an area of 16, 579 sq.Km and lies between 25°6' and 27°4' latitude North of Equator and between the longitudinal lines and 93°20' and 95°15' East. On the eastern boundary of Nagaland lies the international border that India shares with Myanmar. The southern end of the state is bordered by the state of Manipur. The state of Assam borders Nagaland in the western and the north western sides. The state of Arunachal Pradesh borders Nagaland on the north.[47]

Nagas' belong to the Indo-Mongolian stock, consisting of 16 major tribes namely the Angami, Ao, Chakhesang, Chang, Khiamniungan, Kuki, Konyak, Kachari, Lotha,

[46] Department of Planning & Coordination. (2004). *Nagaland state human development report*, p. 14. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/state_human_develop_report_nagaland_full_report_2008.pdf

[47] Directorate of Economics and Statistics. (2014). *Statistical handbook of Nagaland*. p. 1

Phom, Pochury, Rengma, Sumi, Sangtam, Yimchungru, Zeliang and many other sub tribes who inhabit the different parts of the state as well as beyond the boundaries. Each of the 16 odd tribes and the sub-tribes has their own customs, language and dress. It has a rich oral tradition, which has been handed down from generation to generation. It is a land of songs and music where one can hear folk songs praising the brave deeds of ancient warriors and folk heroes; love songs in most ailing tragic love stories, gospel songs and modern tunes.[48] The state is blessed with rich biodiversity, and is part of the Indo-Burma global biodiversity hotspot. The rich diversity of flora and fauna in the state has, however, not yet been fully documented.[49] Nagaland is also referred to as the Switzerland of the East; the exquisitely picturesque landscapes, the vibrantly colourful sunrise and sunset, lush and verdant flora, this is a land that represents unimaginable beauty, moulded perfectly for a breath taking experience.

2.2: Topography and Climate

Nagaland is almost entirely hilly, except along the foothills bordering Assam plains. The Naga Hills are located in the northern extension of the Arakan -Yoma ranges. The general elevation of the Naga Hills increases towards the east, the highest peak Saramati (3826.15 metres) belongs to the easternmost hill ranges of the state, bordering Myanmar where it merges with the Patkai ranges of the Arakan mountain system. The Barail hill range, in the southwest corner of the state runs approximately due northeast almost upto Kohima, which has a height of 1465 metres. Near Kohima, it merges with the hill ranges extending up to Manipur border which swings

[48]A Lanunugsang Ao & Athungo Ovung. (2012). *Nagaland the land of festivals*. Dimapur: Heritage Publishing House, p. 2
[49] Government of Nagaland. (2012). *Nagaland state action plan on climate change*. p. 56

northernly. Between Mao and Kohima, there are several high peaks including Japfu. Barail and Japfu ranges of the Naga Hills and their extensions in Mokokchung and Tuensang mark a prominent water divide separating Brahmaputra and the Chindwin river systems. The hills of Nagaland, and the North-East India, are also sometimes taken as part of the Eastern Himalayas. Geomorphologically, the terrain can be broadly grouped into four topographic units - alluvial plains (150 to 200 meters above m.s.l.), low to moderate linear hills (200 to 500 meters above m.s.l.), moderate hills (500 to 800 meters above m.s.l.) and high hills (800 meters and above). The main rivers that flow through the state are Dhansiri, Doyang, Dikhu, Tizu and Melak. The narrow valleys of the many streams and rivers, the varying climate and the rich forest cover in the state provide a profusion of habitats, supporting rich biodiversity with high degree of endemism.[50]

Nagaland has a monsoon climate. The state enjoys a salubrious climate. Annual rainfall ranges around 70-100 inches (1,800-2,500 mm), concentrated in the months of May to September. Temperatures range from 70 °F (21 °C) to 104 °F (40 °C). In winter, temperatures do not generally drop below 39 °F (4 °C), but frost is common at high elevations. Summer is the shortest season in the state that lasts only for a few months. The temperature during the summer season remains between 16 °C (61 °F) to 31 °C (88 °F). Winter makes an early arrival and bitter cold and dry weather strikes certain regions of the state. The maximum average temperature recorded in the winter season is 24 °C (75 °F). Strong north-west winds blow across the state during the months of February and March.[51]

[50] Nagaland state action plan on climate change, Op.cit., pp. 10-11
[51] Retrieved from http://www.nagenvis.nic.in/Database/Climate_884.aspx

2.3: Administrative Set Up of the State

The state of Nagaland was created by an act of Parliament in 1962 and was inaugurated on 1st December 1963 by the then President of India, Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan as the sixteenth state of the Indian Union. The state has a unicameral legislature and the strength of the house is 60. It sends one representative to each house of the Indian parliament i.e Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The Governor of Nagaland is the constitutional head of the state, the representative of the President of India. The election to the first state Legislative Assembly was held from 10th to 16th January 1964.[52] The state consists of twelve administrative districts, namely, Kohima, Dimapur, Mokokchung, Wokha, Zunheboto, Longleng, Kiphire, Tuensang, Mon, Peren Phek and Noklak, with 144 sub-divisions, 26 towns and 1428 villages as per 2011 Census. [53]

In Nagaland, Village Councils (VC) is an important component of the modern governance system set up for the purpose of facilitating grassroots administration. Under the Nagaland Village and Area Council Act, 1978, every recognised village in the state shall have a Village Council. The Village Council is empowered to deal with the internal administration of the village and to act as the court of appeal within the village.[54]A separate Village Development Board (VDB), without displacing the traditional Village Council was first experimented and adopted in Phek district, in 1976 and later in 1980-81 extended to other villages across the state. As is provided for in the Nagaland VCs Act, it is the VC, which forms the VDBs. The VDBs are

[52] Directorate of Information & Public Relations. (1988). *Nagaland: 25 years of progress and development*. p. 3
[53] Department of Planning and Coordination. (2016). *Nagaland state human development report*. p.10
[54] Robert Angkang Simray. (2014). Decentralization from below: A case study of Nagaland, India. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 4(3), p. 2

involved in all phases of developmental activities as part of their responsibilities. These include receipt of allocation of funds, selection of beneficiaries or schemes, monitoring of progress of works and expenditure and completion of schemes. The book keeping of accounts of all VDB is mandatory, open, and subject to any audit of its account, including by an independent committee appointed by the VC on a regular basis.[55]

2.4: Demography

According to 2011 census, the population of Nagaland is 19,78,502. During 2001-2011, the state witnessed a negative growth rate of -0.58 percent which was a first in the history of census in Nagaland. The state's population declined from 1,990,036 in 2001 to 1,978,502 in 2011, a decline of 11534 persons. This unusual pattern may be attributed to the inconsistencies in the successive censuses. "The 2001 census was related to the expected loss of political representation due to impending delimitation, whereas deflation of population in the census of 2011 is related to the inflation in the preceding decade".[56] 71.14 per cent of the population reside in rural areas and 28.86 per cent in urban areas. Among the districts, Dimapur has the largest population with 19.14 per cent, followed by Kohima at 13.54 per cent. The least populated district is Longleng with 2.55 per cent. The density of population in Nagaland is 119 per sq. km against the country's average of 382 per sq. km. In 2011, the sex ratio in Nagaland was 931 as compared to 940 of India. In Nagaland the literacy rate is better than the country's average. The literacy rate for Nagaland, which was 61.65 per cent in 1991,

[55] Nagaland state action plan on climate change, Op.cit., p. 18
[56] Agrawal & Kumar cited in Department of Planning and Coordination. (2016). *Nagaland state human development report*, p.12

had increased to 79.55 per cent in 2011 as compared to country's average of 72. 98 per cent.

Table 2.1: Demographic Profile of Nagaland

Description	2011 Census
Population	19,78,502
Male	10,24,6490
Female	9,53,853
Population density/sq. km	119
Population Growth (%)	-0.58
Sex ratio	931
Literacy (%)	79.55
Male literacy (%)	82.75
Female literacy (%)	76.11
Urban Population (%)	28.86
Rural Population (%)	71.14

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, 2017

2.5: Economic Development

2.5.1: Nagaland Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP)

Despite the tremendous strides made in more than five decades of statehood, the economy of Nagaland is still confronted by many developmental challenges. Lack of infrastructure, hilly terrain of the state and continued insurgency has held back the state towards growth and development.

As per the Advance Estimate of Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) 2018-19 at current prices, the GSDP is estimated to grow at 10.55 per cent as against 12.13 per cent achieved in 2017-18(Q.E). In absolute figures, the GSDP at current prices is estimated to have increased from Rs.24095 crores in 2017-18 (Q.E) to Rs.26637

crores in 2018-19 (A.E). At constant price estimates, the GSDP 2018-19 (A.E) is estimated to increase to Rs.17147 crores from Rs.16182 crores in 2017-18 (Q.E) achieving a growth of 5.97 per cent.

Table 2.2: GSDP current and constant at market prices (Rs. In crores)

GSDP	2017-18 (Q.E)	2018-19 (A.E)
Current	24095	26637
Constant	16182	17147

P-Provisional, Q.E-Quick Estimates, A.E- Advance Estimates
Source: Nagaland Economic Survey, 2018-19

Table 2.3: Growth Rate of GSDP current and constant at market prices

GSDP	2017-18 (Q.E)	2018-19 (A.E)
Current	12.13	10.55
Constant	4.32	5.97

P-Provisional, Q.E-Quick Estimates, A.E- Advance Estimates
Source: Nagaland Economic Survey, 2018-19

For the purpose of estimation of GSDP and to understand the sectoral contribution to GSDP, the economy of the state is divided into three sector; i.e Primary, Secondary and Tertiary sector. The Primary sector basically comprises of all occupation exploiting natural resources. It includes crops, livestock, forestry and logging, Fishing and aquaculture and mining and quarrying. The primary sector is generally dominant in less developed states and typical activities are undertaken to a smaller extent in industrialised states. As per the Advance Estimates of GSDP 2018-19 at constant prices, the growth in the Primary sector is estimated at 5.92 per cent as against the growth of 2.91 per cent achieved in 2017-18 (Q.E). The growth in the Primary sector

has mainly come from the sub-sector crops which is estimated to achieve a growth of 6.99 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E). In the other sub-sector livestock, there was sign of revival with the sub-sector sustaining its growth from a negative of -3.07 per cent in 2016-17 (P) to 1.33 per cent in 2017-18 (Q.E) and further up to 2.50 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E). During 2018-19 (A.E) the growth rate in the other sub-sector mining and quarrying, fishing and aquaculture, forestry and logging was estimated at 14.39 per cent, 4.70 per cent and 0.70 per cent respectively.

The Secondary sector comprises of all those economic activities which transform one goods into another goods. It includes manufacturing, electricity, gas, water supply and other utility services and construction. This sector generally takes the output of the primary sector and manufactures finished goods. The Advance Estimates of GSDP at constant prices has estimated the Secondary sector to grow at 6.02 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E) as against 10.43 per cent achieved in 2017-18 (Q.E). With regard to percentage contribution to GSVA at constant prices, the Secondary sector is estimated to marginally increase its share in the GSVA from 12.23 per cent in 2017-18 (Q.E) to 12.25 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E). Within the Secondary sector, while the share of electricity, gas, water supply and other utility services have been hovering around 1 per cent to 2 per cent over the years, construction has become the most robust sub-sector with its share in the GSVA increasing from 6.71 per cent in 2014-15 to 7.54 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E). With regard to manufacturing which comprises of both organised and unorganised manufacturing units, its share in the GSVA has consistently remained below 2 per cent.

The Tertiary sector comprises of all economic activities that provides services. It includes activities like transport, storage and communication; trade, repair, hotels and restaurants; banking and insurance; real estates etc. Over the years, the Tertiary sector has become the most prominent sector in term of percentage contribution to GSVA at constant prices. With growth spreading across the sub-sector of Tertiary sector, the Tertiary sector is estimated to achieve a growth of 5.88 per cent in 2018-19 (A.E) as against 3.64 per cent achieved in 2017-18 (Q.E). Amongst the sub-sector of Tertiary sector, public administration has become the most robust with growth sustaining an increasing trend since 2014-15. During 2018-19 (A.E), the respective growth rate in the sub-sector of Tertiary sector are: Public administration 8.58 per cent, transport, storage, communication and services related to broadcasting 7.09 per cent, other services 6.19 per cent, trade, repair, hotel and restaurants 3.65 per cent, financial services 3.31 per cent and real estate, ownership of dwelling and professional services 1.76 per cent.[57]

2.5.2: Per Capita Income (PCI) of the State

Per Capita Income (PCI) is an amount of income which is supposed to be received by each individual in the state if the total amount of state income is equally distributed among the total population of the state. Theoretically, PCI can be arrived at by dividing the state income by total population of the state. As per the latest Estimates of GSDP at current prices, the per capita income of the state is estimated to have increased from Rs.61,159 in 2011-12 to Rs.1,24,240 in 2018-19 (A.E). Over the seven

[57] Directorate of Economics and Statistics. (2018). *Nagaland economic survey, 2018-19*. pp. 2-4

years period from 2011-12 to 2018-19 (A.E), the state achieved a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.65 per cent.[58]

2.5.3: Sectoral Employment

In Nagaland, the total workforce constitutes 49.24 per cent of the total population while non- workers constitute 50.76 per cent. In 2011 the share of main workers in the total population was 37.46 percent while the share of marginal workers in the total population was 23.92 per cent. During 2011, among the workers, 59.76 percent were engaged in agriculture and allied activities, 1.28 percent in household industry and 38.95 per cent constituted other workers. Government employees constituted 9.37 per cent of the total workforce in 2011.These figures reflect the agrarian character of the state's economy. Yet agriculture in the state is still subsistence in nature.

Table 2.4: Sectoral Employment in Nagaland in 2011

Sl. No.	State	Cultivators	Agricultural labourers	Workers in household industries	Other workers	Total
1	Nagaland	4,20,379	22,571	9,525	2,88,704	7,41,179

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland 2014

[58] Nagaland Economic survey 2019-19, Op.cit., p. 5

2.6: Infrastructure

Infrastructure plays a key role in the process of economic growth and development of a nation. Slow pace of economic development is often associated with inadequacy of infrastructural development. Thus, the critical role of infrastructure, both physical and social is well-recognised in development planning of an economy.

2.6.1: Physical Infrastructure: The production sectors of an economy such as agriculture, industry, trade, etc. need adequate infrastructure and services like transport, communication, power etc. in order to produce its optimum level.

(i) Transport and Communication: One of the most important features of development is good infrastructure of transport and communication facilities. It is one of the primary services that are required for propelling economic activity as it links between production, processing and market centres. Inadequate development of transport and communication facilities has kept the state in isolation for a long time.

Road is one of the physical infrastructures that is required for transport and communication services. Development of road, at least all-weather road, linking the scattered villages is a prerequisite for economic development of the state. The total length of National Highway within the state of Nagaland is 1546.88 Km, out of which 1106.48 Km is under Nagaland PWD, 328.6 Km under BRO and 111.8 Km under NHIDCL. The National Highway Wing of the State Public Work Department takes the responsibility of supervising and monitoring construction and maintenance of the road.[59] The state is well connected with Assam and Manipur through National

[59] Nagaland Economic survey 2019-19, Op.cit., p. 65

Highway (NH)-61, NH-39, NH-36, NH-150 and NH-155. The state has only one railway station and one airport, both located in Dimapur.

Communication facility is one the most essential elements in the development of a society. In Nagaland, there were 331 post offices in 2016-17 including one Head office, 42 sub-post offices, and 288 branch post offices.[60]

Housing: The Nagaland PWD (Housing) undertakes the construction works of all government residential and non- residential building spread all over the state and beyond. The total number of government buildings constructed till 2018 was 6058 having a total plinth area of 6107486.29 sq/ft. The government maintains three different categories of building i.e, RCC with slab, Hill type and RCC with CGI sheet roofing.[61]

(*ii) Industrial infrastructure:* The industrial development in Nagaland is insignificant as there are no major industries established in the state. Industrial infrastructure such as industrial training institute, small scale industries, veterinary farms, hospital, etc, play a significant role in economic development of the state. Some of the industrial potential and strategy of the state include processing and value addition to agro-produce, horticulture, livestock and dairy product. Besides, various industrial training institutes are run by the government as well as Nongovernmental organisations to impart education and skills among the people.

[60] Directorate of Economics and Statistics. (2017). *Statistical handbook of Nagaland*. p. 235
[61] Nagaland Economic survey 2019-19, Op.cit., p.64

Nagaland Industrial Development Corporation (NIDC) is responsible for the development of industrial infrastructure in the state. Promoted by NIDC, the Export Promotion Industrial Park (EPIP) at Dimapur has received formal approval as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for agro and food processing in view of the vast potential in meat processing, and a proposed multi-product SEZ spread across 400 acres in Dimapur has received formal approval. An Industrial Growth Centre (IGC) has been developed in Dimapur. Kiruphema in Kohima has been identified for development as an Integrated Infrastructure Development Centre (IIDC). The Longnak valley in Mokokchung district is being considered for similar development. Urban haats have been set up in Dimapur, providing market outlets for various trades. Additionally, a mini tool-room and training centre has been set up at Dimapur. Other promising sectors in the state include paper and pulp processing, minerals and mining, and petrochemicals.[62] The Small Scale Industries plays a very important role in sustaining livelihood and uplifting economic development of the state. During 2013-14, there were 1114 registered SSI units with a total of 534 working units.[63] As on 2017 the state had 5 International Border Trade Centre and 1 Special Economic Zone.[64]

iii) Electricity and Power: One of the most important factors of economic growth is availability of energy. Power is an important element of modern infrastructure for overall economic development as well as human well-being. Among the various source of energy, Nagaland has great potential in hydro-electric power. The state has 24 MW Likimro Project and 75 MW Doyang power station. Nagaland stands at 31st

[62] Nagaland state action plan on climate change, Op.cit., p. 16
[63] Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, Op.cit., p. 104
[64] Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, Op.cit., p. 216

position with approximately 0.05% of total installed capacity in the country. Nagaland is yet to achieve 100% electrification and 141049 households are un-electrified in the state (both rural & urban) as of year 2015. The available capacity (installed as well as allocated share) for the state as on 31st March 2015 was 144.02 MW. The per capita consumption of power in Nagaland has been 311 units which is much lower than the national average of 1010 units during FY 2014-15.[65]

(iv) Banking: The growth of various sectors in an economy is strengthened by the banking activities. Banks play vital role in stimulating economic growth by way of funding and sponsoring various programmes, such as agriculture, industry and other self-employment activities. As on 2017, there were 175 both private and state owned banks operating across the state. Some major operating banks in Nagaland are State Bank of India (67 offices), State Co-operative Bank (21 offices) and Regional Rural Bank (10 offices).[66]

(v) Agricultural Infrastructure: Nagaland is a predominantly agricultural economy with 71.14 per cent of the population dependent on it. Agriculture is one of the significant contributors to the Gross State Domestic Product and is the largest employer of the workforce in the state. To facilitate agricultural development, the state has 1 (one) Indian Council of Agricultural Research centre at Jharnapani, Dimapur, 1 (one) State Agricultural Research Station at Yisemyong, Mokokchung and 9 (nine) Krishi Vigyan Kendra.[67]

[65] Government of Nagaland. (2016). *24x7 power for all (Nagaland).*p. 1
[66] Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, Op.cit., pp. 108-9
[67] Retrieved from www.icar.org.in/en/node/202

2.6.2: Social Infrastructure: The facilities such as education, shelter, health care, water and sanitation are important social infrastructures that enhance human well-being.

(i) Education is the basis for all round development of a person and society. It is also a strong factor for raising equality across regions, genders and many other areas. Besides, it is an important determinant in computation of Human Development Index (HDI). Hence, educational institutions form an important component of the social infrastructure as it helps in contributing in accessing to knowledge, dissemination of information and opportunities to higher earn income and productivity.

Table 2.5: Number of educational institutions of school level

Sl. No.	Type of Institution	2016-17				
		Central	State	Pvt.	Tribal and Social Welfare Dept	Total
1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*
1	Higher Secondary	12	42	118	Nil	172
2	High School	13	253	303	2	571
3	Middle School	1	625	187	1	814
4	Primary School	Nil	1146	128	Nil	1274
	Total	26	2066	736	3	2831

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, 2017

Table 2.6: Number of higher educational institutions

Sl. No	Types of Institution	2016-17
1	*2*	*3*
1	University	4
	College of General Education.	
2	(a) Government	13
	(b) Private	61
	Higher Professional Education.	
3	(i) Nagaland College of Teachers Education	
	(a) Government	2
	(b) Private	7
	(ii) Agriculture college	NR
	(iii) Theology	NR
4	Law College	3
5	Management	1
6	Information Technology	1

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, 2017

(ii) Health care is one of the most critical inputs for human well-being. A person's health is one of the main forces behind all human activities. Besides its conventional meaning, it is one of the most vital ingredients for measuring the happiness index.[68] Health condition of a society is supported by its infrastructural facilities such as hospitals, dispensaries, medical staff, etc. Hence, institutions such as Hospitals, Community Health Centres (CHC), Primary Health Centres (PHC), Subsidiary Health Centre (SHC), Dispensaries, Sub-Centre and medical personnel such as doctors, nurses and pharmacists play an important role in extending health care to the people.

[68]Department of Planning and Coordination .(2009). *Mon district human development report*. p. 59

Table 2.7: Number of Hospital/C.H.C/P.H.C/S.H.C/Dispensary 2016-17

Sl. No	Particulars	Total
1	*2*	*3*
1	District Hospital	11
2	Community Health Centre	25
3	Primary Health Centre	137
4	Subsidary Health Centre	1
5	Dispensaries	2
6	T.B. Hospital	2
7	Mental Hospital	1
8	Sub-Centre	554
9	S.T.D. Clinic	11
10	D.T.C	11
11	Post Mortum Centre	3
12	Para Medical Training Institute	1
13	School of Nursing (GNM)	3
14	School of Nursing (ANM)	1
15	State Health Food Laboratory	1

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, 2017

Table 2.8: Number of Medical Personnel, 2016-17

Sl. No.	Particulars	Total
1	*2*	*3*
1	Doctors (General)	216
2	Doctors (Specialist)	173
3	Dental Doctors	33
4	Ayush Doctors	6
5	Pharmacist	396
6	Lab Technician	68
7	Nurse Sister	99
8	Staff Nurse	346
9	ANM/FHW	854
10	LHV	59

Source: Statistical Handbook of Nagaland, 2017

(iii) Water supply: The main source of water in Nagaland is surface water from rivers, streams, ponds, natural springs and sub-surface water occurring as ground water. Water is mainly sustained by the heavy rainfall received in the state, which is about of 2000-2500 mm - one of the highest amongst the Indian states. In 2007-2008, the total number of habitats having piped water supply was 1108 which increased to 1500 in 2013-2014. In both rural and urban areas, there has been a gradual increase in the coverage of drinking water supply, under the stipulated norm of 40 litres per capita per day (LPCD). According to the survey carried out by the Nirman Programme for Rural Water Supply (NPRWS), for 2014-2015, the quality of water affected by iron contamination in the state was 38, with Dimapur as the highest at 29. With rapid urbanisation, the pressure on making potable water available to the citizens' has intensified. Therefore, integrated water resource management and conservation of water both above and below ground, rainwater harvesting, coupled with equitable and efficient management structures has become more critical.[69]

2.7: Culture and Tradition

Until the advent of the British in the 1830s, the Nagas' had little contact with the outside world apart from cultural contact with the Ahoms, who ruled Assam from the 13th to early 19th century. The British entered the Naga Hills after executing the Treaty of Yandabo with Burma (Myanmar) in 1826 through which Manipur, Assam and the Jaintia Hills became part of British India. Persistent raids carried out by Naga groups "on the new British subjects in the Assamese villages and the tea plantations in 1851, prompted a course of retaliation and ultimately, the successive capture of the Naga

[69] State Human Development Report, Op.cit., p.28

territories".[70] In 1918, the first political organisation 'the Naga Club' was established by the Nagas'. In 1929, it submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission stating that "the Nagas' be under the control of the British and be excluded from the proposed changes to the Indian Constitution".[71] By 1946, the Naga resistance movement evolved into the Naga National Council (NNC) which demanded that they should be allowed to have their own independence based on its unique history, cultural practices and ethos. After India's independence in 1947, the Indian Government, on the basis of "its right as inheritor of British colonial power, refused the Naga case".[72] However, demands for "a Naga sovereign homeland intensified after the Government of India launched a series of military operations around the early fifties".[73] Subsequently, Nagaland was declared the 16th state of the Indian Union in 1963.

The people of Nagaland have a rich cultural heritage and tradition. The state is unparalleled for the diversity of tribal culture it contains. Nagaland is home to a myriad of tribes. Most of these communities are ethically similar, having derived from an original common stock but their geographical isolation from each other has brought amongst them certain distinctive characteristics in language, dress, and customs. Folk songs and dances are essential ingredient of the traditional Naga culture. The oral tradition is kept alive through the medium of folk tales and songs.

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[70] Michael Oppitz. (2008).Preface. In Michael Oppitz, Thomas Kaiser, Alban von Stockhausen, Marrion Wettstien (Eds.), *Naga identities: Changing local cultures in the Northeast of India*. Gent: Snoeck Publishers, p. 1

[71] Charles Chasie & Sanjoy Hazarika.(2009).The state strikes back: India and Naga insurgency. *Policy Studies*, 52, p. 3

[72] Charles Chasie & Sanjoy Hazarika Op.cit., p.5

[73] Dolly Kikon. (2008). Cultural construction of nationalism: Myths, legends and memories. in Michael Oppitz, Thomas Kaiser, Alban von Stockhausen, Marrion Wettstien (Eds.) *Naga identities: changing local cultures in the Northeast of India*. Gent:Snoeck Publishers , p. 102

Naga folk songs are both romantic and historical, with songs narrating entire stories of famous ancestors and incidents. Every aspect of the Naga life is entwined with agriculture. The Naga rituals, ceremonies and festivals are associated with the different aspects of agriculture. Naga tribal dances give an insight into the inborn Naga reticence of the people. War dances of the Nagas' and other form of dances belonging to distinctive Naga tribes are a major art form in Nagaland. Nagaland is a land of festivals with each Naga tribe having their own festivals. Most of these festivals are connected with agricultural activities such as reaping, sowing and harvesting. To encourage inter-tribal cultural interaction and bringing together the festivals of the various tribes under one umbrella, the Government of Nagaland initiated an annual cultural festival called the Hornbill Festival, where one can witness a melange of Naga cultural display at one place. Organised by the State Directorate of Tourism and Arts & Culture Department every year in the first week of December in Naga Heritage Village, Kisama under Kohima district since 2000, the festival is intended to revive, protect and preserve the richness and uniqueness of the Naga heritage and also to attract tourists.

The Nagas' are a distinct community and village is considered as the basic social unit from where total life revolves. The primary consideration of Nagas' settlement culture was the hill-tops, for the purpose of defence. Traditionally Naga villages are invariably built on high elevation places, which are being built for strong defence of the village. Traditional Naga villagers were sovereign and independent institutions, governed by a powerful Chief whose office was hereditary. Monarchical and democratic forms of village government were found among the Nagas'. The monarchical forms of government was found among the Sumi and Konyak tribes,

whose chief was autocratic, while pure democratic or theocracy types of government based on meritocracy were found among the other Naga tribes.[74] The basic social organisation of the Naga society is the clan.[75] The clan organisation is the main pillar in Naga village system. The system existed in its own right and a child who was born into a family was born into a clan system. Without being a member of a clan no one could stand in the society and there was none who did not belong to a clan in the village. In effect, the clan was an extension of the family system based on paternal family linkings organised on the principle of primogeniture.[76] In Naga society, customary laws and practices reign supreme in all aspects of life. To safeguard the Naga customary laws a special provision in the form of Article 371 (A) has been made in the Indian constitution. According to Article 371 (A) "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, No act of Parliament in respect of: (i) religious or social practices of the Nagas, (ii) Naga customary law and procedure, (iii) administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law and (iv) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, shall apply to the state of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides".[77]

The traditional land ownership system in Nagaland is quite different and unique. The system of landownership among the Nagas' can be broadly classified into the village community land, clan or Khel land and family land.[78] Naga villages are divided into Khels (wards) and each Khel has a Morung (bachelor's dormitory). On attaining the

[74] A. Nshoga. (2009). *Traditional naga village system and its transformation*. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House, p. 4
[75] Achilla Imlong Erdican. (Ed.) (2013).*Tribal transformation: The early history of the Naga hills*.New Delhi: Prestige Books International, p. 33
[76]Achilla Imlong Erdican. (Ed.), Op.cit., p. 33
[77] V K Nuh. (2016). *The Naga chronicles.* New Delhi: Regency Publication p. 202
[78] Joseph S Thong. (2011). *Glimpses of Naga legacy and culture*. Kerala: Society of Naga Student's Welfare, p. 144

age of puberty, young boys and girls were admitted to their respective dormitories. The Morung was the most important social, political and religious component of the village. The Morung was the centre of social and cultural life of the Nagas' and had no individual existence apart from the community. It functioned as the guard-house and armoury, recreation club, centre of education, art and discipline. It was here where debates and discussions concerning the interests of the clan and village and economic and political rituals were held and the art of warfare, and skills such as woodcarving, basket making, songs, dances and folklore of the tribe was communicated orally from generation to generation.[79] However, with the onset of modernity, the Morung system is no longer in practice among the tribes.

Nagas' are also closely related to their environment and natural materials like bamboo, cane, orchid stems, stone, glass, red dyed goat's hair, claws, bones, teeth, horns, sea-shell beads, white Job's tears, natural dyes, feathers and even beetle wings found their way into their ornaments. Some ornaments can be worn by anyone, but most ornaments have particular meaning and they are therefore 'powerful'.[80] Naga society is very rich in its traditional cultural attire. The main dress is the ethnic shawl. These traditional shawls differ from one Naga community to another. In fact, the shawls of each Naga group possess their own distinctive peculiar colour and designs. With this shawl one can easily identify which community she or he belongs. Nagaland is also known for its exquisite handicrafts and craftsmanship. The best woodcarvings can be seen on the village gates and in the Morung. The figures generally carved are mithun head, hornbill, human figure, elephant, tiger etc. These figures are an

[79] Iris Odyuo. (2013). Thevarious aspects of Naga art. *IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)*, 9(4) , p. 16
[80] Julian Jacobs. (1990). *The Nagas: Hill peoples of North East India.*London: Thames and Hudson, p. 103

expression of an idea. The mithun head represents wealth; the hornbill, valour; the human figure, success in head-hunting; while elephant and tiger denotes physical prowess.[81]The Nagas' have a completely different way of life, its social setting being different from the rest of the communities even among the tribes in India.

Tremendous changes have taken place in the field of political, social, religious and economic institutions with the British occupation of Naga Hills. It has led to the transformation of traditional Naga villages into modernity and disrupted and ruined the village institutions. Collective village life based on common interests and outcomes of cooperative relations gave way to individual competition and struggle. The capitalist economy ruined the indigenous Naga village economy. Traditional Naga village systems were further liquidated with the introduction of western education and propagation of Christianity by the Christian missionaries. Morung, the vital organ of Naga social institution were replaced by Christian institutional hostels, while the traditional festival and feast of merit were replaced by Christian festivals.[82]

2.8: Socio Demographic Profile of Respondents

In social sciences research socio demographic characteristics of the respondents are important variables as they have important bearing on the attitudes and behaviour of the individuals. People belonging to different socio economic background are likely to perceive various social aspects differently and thereby their behaviour is bound to be different. In the present study socio-economic status is assessed on the basis of gender, age, marital status, education, occupation and income. These characteristics are highlighted below.

[81] Hargovind Joshi. (2001). *Nagaland: Past and present.*New Delhi:Akansha Publishing House, p. 150
[82]A. Nshoga, Op.cit, pp. 9-10

2.8.1: Gender

Gender is considered to be an important variable in analysing any phenomena. Hence the variable gender is investigated in the study. Data related to gender of the respondents is presented in table 2.9.

Table 2.9: Gender of the respondents

Gender	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
Male	208	50.60
Female	203	49.40
Total	411	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

The above table reveals that out of the total respondents investigated for this study, 50.60 per cent of them are males while 49.40 per cent are females.

Fig 2.1: Gender of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

2.8.2: Age

In the present study age of the respondents has been classified into three broad categories i.e youth, adults and senior citizens. Youth is defined as those persons who fall in the age cohort of 15-29 years. This definition of youth is based on the Governments of India's National Youth Policy 2014 in which youth is defined as those persons in the age group of 15-29 years.[83] But since in the present study only eligible voters are part of the sample, those in 18-29 years age group are taken to constitute the youth. The second age cohort includes the middle aged adults falling in the age group of 30-59 years. Middle age is the period of age beyond young adulthood but before the onset of old age.[84] Lastly the third age group include the senior citizens' who are in the age category of 60 and above. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior citizens' Act 2007 defines senior citizens' as any person who is a citizen of India and has attained the age of 60 years and above.[85]

The distribution of the respondents in the three age categories is shown in table 2.10.

Table 2.10: Age of the respondents

Age (Years)	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
18-29	135	32.85
30-59	262	63.75
60 and above	14	3.40
Total	411	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

[83] Ministry of Youth Affairs and Youth. (2014). *National Youth Policy*. p.10
[84] The Oxford English Dictionary. (1989). New York: Oxford University Press, p. 743
[85] Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. (2007).*Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior citizens Act.* Retrieved from wbja.nic.in/wbja_adm/files/The%20Maintenance%20and%20Welfare%20of%20Parents%20and%20Senior%20Citizens%20Act,%202007.pdf

A vast majority of the respondents are middle aged adults with 63.75 per cent followed by youth with 32.85 per cent while senior citizens' constitute 3.40 per cent.

Fig 2.2: Age of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

2.8.3: Marital status

Marriage is one of the most important social institutions. According to the marital status, respondents are classified into three categories, that is, married, unmarried and divorced/separated/widowed. The details of the marital status of the respondents are presented in table 2.11.

Table 2.11: Marital status of the respondents

Marital status	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
Married	258	62.78
Unmarried	148	36
Divorced/separated/widowed	5	1.22
Total	411	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

The above table shows that overwhelming number of the respondents are married (62.78 per cent) while 36 per cent are unmarried. The remaining 1.22 per cent of the respondents falls in the category of divorced/separated/widowed.

Fig 2.3: Marital status of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

2.8.4: Education

Education is one of the most important characteristics that bring about transformation in people's attitudes and helps in understanding any particular social phenomena. In a way, the response of an individual is likely to be determined by his/her educational

status and therefore it becomes imperative to know the educational background of the respondents. Education has a great impact on individual's status in the society.

The educational level of respondents has been classified into five broad categories such as non-literate, under matriculation, matriculation, higher secondary and graduation and above. Non-literate are those who are unable to read and write. Those who have not completed class 10^{th} in school come under the category of under matriculation. Those who have cleared class 10^{th} in school come under the matriculation category. Those who have cleared 12^{th} class in school and pursuing undergraduate courses come under the category of higher secondary and finally those who have cleared their bachelor's degree and pursuing higher studies are placed under the category of graduation and above. The distribution of the respondents has been shown in table 2.12.

Table 2.12: Educational qualification of the respondents

Level of education	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
Non-literate	36	8.76
Under matriculation	164	39.90
Matriculation	42	10.22
Higher secondary	53	12.90
Graduation and above	116	28.22
Total	411	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

The distribution of the respondents in table 2.12 indicates that majority of the respondents i.e 39.90 per cent are under matriculate followed by 28.22 per cent of the respondents who fall in the educational category of graduation and above. 10.22

per cent of the respondents fall in the educational category of matriculation and 12.90 per cent of the respondents fall in the educational category of higher secondary. Lastly non-literate constitutes 8.76 per cent of the respondents.

Fig 2.4: Educational qualification of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

2.8.5: Occupation

The occupational status of the respondents has been classified into five broad categories such as unemployed, self employed, government service, cultivator and student. The distribution of the respondents according to the type of their occupation has been shown in table 2.13.

Table 2.13: Occupational status of the respondents

Occupation	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
Unemployed	179	43.56
Self employed	76	18.49
Government service	54	13.14
Cultivator	63	15.33
Student	39	9.48
Total	411	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Majority of the respondents (43.56 per cent) are unemployed followed by 18.49 per cent of the respondents who fall in the occupational category of self employed. The number of respondents engaged in agriculture and government services are 15.33 per cent and 13.14 respectively. Lastly 9.48 per cent of the respondents are students.

Fig 2.5: Occupational status of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

2.8.6: Income

In the present study income as a variable is investigated since it is considered to be an important factor in determining the socio-economic status of an individual. Income of a person plays an important role in shaping the economic conditions of an individual which in turn is likely to have bearing on the responses about a problem posed to that person. The respondents have been divided into three income categories. The first group constitutes those respondents whose monthly income is up to Rs. 1000-10,000; the second category with income of Rs. 10,001-20,000 and the third category with income above 20,001. The distribution of the respondents in this regard is presented in table 2.14.

Table 2.14: Monthly income of the respondents

Monthly income (Rs.)	Distribution of respondents	
	Frequency	Percentage
1000-10,000	96	58.89
10,001-20,000	25	15.34
20,001& above	42	25.77
Total	163	100

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

179 respondents were unemployed and 39 respondents were students, so they were engaged in no occupation and earning no income. Moreover 30 respondents refused to divulge their income. Thus leaving aside the unemployed, student and those who refused to reveal their income, the remaining 163 respondents was classified in the above table according to their monthly income.

Fig 2.6: Monthly income of the respondents



Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

From the above socio demographic characteristics of the respondents it was found that male and female constituted more or less equal representation in the sample with 50.60 per cent and 49.40 per cent respectively. Majority of the respondents were married (62.78 per cent) while the unmarried constituted 36 per cent. Middle aged adults constitute 63.75 per cent while youth constituted 32.85 per cent and senior citizen constitute 3.40 per cent. The educational qualifications of the respondents was found to be diverse with majority of them (39.90 per cent) being under matriculate while 28.22 per cent of the respondents fall in the educational category of graduation and above. The occupational status of the respondents showed that majority of them (43.56 per cent) was unemployed while 18.49 per cent were self employed and 15.33 per cent were engaged in agriculture.

2.9: Conclusion

Nagaland since statehood has made considerable progress in all major areas of human development extending to issues like gender disparity, educational improvements and provision of basic amenities. Yet, in a number of directions, there is scope for substantial improvements. The major challenges that confronted the state in the beginning still remain. The State Human Development Report 2004 and 2016 has both identified that while economic and social progress has been substantial it has not equally benefitted all sections of the society. Thus, the regional disparities in economic development between the eastern districts and the rest have been increasing in areas like income generation, employment, education opportunities and modernisation of agriculture.

Moreover the figures and statistics even though impressive do not reveal the real picture. For instance, while the literacy rate is impressive, the quality of education is dismal and the unemployment rates especially of educated youth are a real cause for concern. Problem of infrastructure still persists and also the question of mobilisation of internal resources especially through exploitation of the state's natural resources. Finally, and possibly most crucial, the structure of the state's economy has evolved very slowly and subsistence agriculture, dominance of government employment and lack of a vibrant private sector are still the dominant themes. In a modern society, this is not sustainable. Change in the structure of the economy seems to be the way ahead.

CHAPTER THREE
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: IMPACT OF CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

3.1: Introduction

Representative democracy is realised through a labyrinth of institutions which not only represent the state but theoretically distribute power along a set of institutions and mediate the realisation of democratic ideals. These independent yet interconnected institutions are loosely divided among those that perform legislative, executive, judicial and bureaucratic functions. These institutions legitimise the state power and are important pillars of democracy. In a democratic set up, these institutions act in public interest and are popularly known as public/political institutions. Trust in these institutions is considered inevitable for continuous and stable support for democracy.[86]

Like all modern societies in the world, India too has managed to erect an impressive institutional edifice. Being a federal nation, there are political institutions both at the central and the state level. At both levels, in addition to political institutions[87] such as parliament/state assemblies/ legislatures and cabinets or bureaucracy, judiciary and the police, the nation has also over time created new civil institutions that govern

[86] Lokniti, Op.cit, p.54

[87] Political institutions can be further subdivided into elected and non-elected institutions. Elected institutions like the central government, state government, political parties are the government's interface with the people and regain the mandate from the people frequently. They form the core of the democratic design. Non-elected institutions like courts, police, judiciary are those institutions that are not elected by the people and do not have to seek their renewed mandate.

social and political life with the expectation that their functioning will earn goodwill and legitimacy and help strengthen democratic norms in society.[88]

Nagaland since its statehood has witnessed the spread of government machinery across the length and breadth of the state. However in recent years political institutions such as state government and political parties are slowly losing the central positions that they once enjoyed while civil institutions like Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and mass media have been gaining salience. In the process, while some institutions seem to be gaining the trust and popularity others are being viewed with cynicism and distrust.[89]

This state of affairs raises certain sets of concerns which will be examined in this chapter. The first relates to the generalised institutional trust in institutions which is considered crucial since higher trust provides government the leeway from the need to enforce compliance, thus allowing them to spend limited resources on other activities to which they are committed. It also leads to more cooperation with the government in providing essential services resulting in better working of the democratic system. Most important, cooperation helps create an active citizenry which in turn is grounded in and produces a rich associational life based on trust and reciprocity which has implications for political institutions, nurtures civic values, improves the functioning of institutions and adds to collective welfare.[90]

The second set of concern relates to the differential response of citizens' to elected and non-elected institutions. In Nagaland, the most visible political institutions are the

[88] SDSA Team, Op.cit., p.54
[89] see Kuotsu & Amer (2016), Patton (2017) and Amer (2017)
[90] SDSA Team, Op.cit., p. 54

state government, political parties, police and bureaucracy while NGOs and mass media (which can be both civil and political) constitute the civil institutions. Thus it becomes imperative to examine respondents' level of trust towards these institutions.

3.2: Concept of Institutional Trust

In order to correctly use the term institutional trust and empirically measure this concept, it should be systematised more precisely. According to Easton there are two types of support namely specific and diffuse support. While specific support is directed toward the political authorities, diffuse support is directed primarily toward the regime. The diffuse support for the regime and authorities is further sub divided into two categories i.e political legitimacy and political trust. This study will focus only on the second subtype of diffuse support i.e political trust. The referents for this type of political trust will be the political institutions. Although the terms political and institutional trust are used synonymously, to avoid repetition, the term institutional trust will be used for the present study. This is done so as to prevent any conceptual confusion and specify explicitly the object to which the trust of the public is directed.

The concept of institutional trust has been central to the study of public opinion for decades. The foci of a large number of these studies have been public orientations toward political institutions and the political system. In recent years, institutional trust has gained increased scholarly traction benefiting from the growing interest in social trust and social capital, which are thought to indirectly affect the functioning and, ultimately, the trustworthiness of political institutions. The concept of institutional trust is however at the same time simple but complex. It is used in everyday language

and the social sciences have attempted to incorporate it to explain a broad range of social phenomena.

Some scholars consider institutional trust to be a commodity that helps political actors achieve their goals[91] while others consider it as people's willingness to follow the political leadership of others.[92] Still others define institutional trust more broadly as a sense of shared moral community, both political and social, with an agreement on what values a society ought to pursue suggesting that institutional trust depends on how much people trust each other in a society.[93] Those living in more trusting societies tend to trust their government more as opposed to those living in less trusting societies. However the problem with this definition is that institutional trust and social trust are two different concepts. Indeed as an empirical matter, measures of institutional and social trust are positively but only weakly correlated, further suggesting vast conceptual differences.[94] Furthermore institutional and social trust is related to different things. Robert Putnam have demonstrated that social trust affects whether individuals vote or participate more actively in politics[95], while others posit that institutional trust does not.[96]

For the present study the focus will be on those definitions provided by empirically minded scholars. According to Miller, institutional trust can be regarded as an "evaluative orientation of citizens' toward their political system, or some part of it

[91] Niklas Luhmann. (1979). *Trust and power*. Chichester: John Wiley
[92] Mark E Warren. (1999). *Democracy and trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[93] Francis Fukuyama. (1995). *The social virtues and the creation of prosperity*. New York: Free Press
[94] W. Mishler & R. Rose. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(1), pp. 30-62
[95] R. Putnam. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster
[96] Jack Citrin. (1974). Comment : The political relevance of trust in government. *American political Science Review*, 68(3), 973-988

based upon their normative expectation".[97] It is a "summary judgement that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny".[98] These conceptual definitions are in line with findings that suggest changes in trust are most often a function of changes in perceived performance on important problems like the economy[99] and the incidence of scandals[100] although some longer-term factors, namely social trust, have also contributed to fluctuations in institutional trust as well.[101]

3.3: Importance of Institutional Trust

A democratic political system cannot survive for long without the support of a majority of its citizens'. Trust links ordinary citizens' to the political system that is intended to represent them thereby enhancing both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government.[102] The waning away of such support promotes discontent and the potential for revolutionary alteration of the political and social system is increased.[103] Trust is important, as Gamson argues because it serves as the 'creator of collective power' enabling government to make decisions and commit resources without having to resort to force or obtain approval of citizens' for every decision. When trust is extensive, governments are able to make new

[97] A. H. Miller. (1974a). Political issues and trust in government:1964:1970. *American Political Science Review*, 68(3), p. 952
[98] A. H. Miller & O Listhaug. (1990). Political parties and confidence in government: A comparision of Norway, Sweden and the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, 20(3), p. 358
[99] M. J. Hetherington. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. *American Political Science Review*, 92(4), pp. 791-808
[100] Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph & Wendy M. Rahn. (2000). The origins and consequences of public trust in government: A Time series analysis. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 64(3), pp. 239-56.
[101] Luke Keele. (2007). Social capital and the dynamics of trust in government. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2), pp. 241-54.
[102] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op. cit., p. 30
[103] A. H. Miller, Op.cit., p. 951

commitments on the basis of it and, if successful, increase support even more[104] creating in effect, a virtuous spiral. However when trust is low, governments cannot govern effectively, which undermines trust further and a vicious cycle is created.[105]

Trust is especially important for democratic governments because they cannot rely on coercion to the same extend as other regimes[106] and because trust is essential to the representative relationship.[107] In modern democracies where citizens' exercise control over government through representative institutions, it is trust which gives representatives the leeway to postpone short term constituency concerns while pursuing longer term national interest. For instance during periods of economic turmoil democratic stability requires citizens' to have sufficient trust in economic and political institutions to accept temporary economic straits in return for the promise of better conditions in some uncertain future.[108]

Trust, however is also double edged. This double edged element inherent in institutional trust has been succinctly summarised by Mishler and Rose: "Democracy requires trust but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy scepticism of government and willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government- at a minimum by replacing the government of the day".[109] Moreover insufficient trust signals the disintegration of civil society,

[104] W. Gamson. (1968). *Power and Discontent*. Homewood IL: The Dorsey Press, pp. 45-46
[105] W. Mishler & R. Rose. (1997). Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies. *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2), p. 419
[106] G. Catterberg & A. Moreno. (2006). The individual bases of political trust: Trends in new and established democracies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 18(1), p. 32
[107] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op.cit., p. 419
[108] G. Catterberg & Moreno, Op.cit., p. 32
[109] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op.cit., p. 419

excessive trust cultivates political apathy and encourages a loss of citizens' vigilance and control of government both of which undermine democracy.[110]

An erosion of confidence in the major institutions of society, especially those of representative democracy, is a far more serious threat to democracy than a loss of trust in other citizens' or politicians. Trust in leaders or public administrations are subject to greater short-term fluctuation than confidence in institutions. Dissatisfaction with them within a society at any one point in time does not necessarily however signify a decaying of the social and political order. On the contrary, in a democracy such discontent may lead to political and social change or may result in the electoral practice of 'throwing the rascals out'.[111] However public estimation of the institutions is less immediately affected by particular news items or specific events. Thus loss of confidence in the institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society. For all these reasons trust in institutions is regarded as the central indicator of the underlying feeling of the general public about its polity.[112]

3.4: Theoretical Approaches to Institutional Trust

The theories offered for explanation of the origins of institutional trust in particular are best given by Mishler and Rose. Cultural theories view trust as exogenous, a basic character trait learned early in life, whereas institutional theories view trust as endogenous, a consequence of institutional performance. Within both cultural and institutional theories, important distinctions exist between the macro and micro

[110] W. Gamson, Op.cit., pp. 46-48
[111] A. H. Miller, Op.cit., p. 951
[112] K. Newton & P. Norris. (1999). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance. Paper for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1-5th September, p. 2

variants. Macro theories of both types emphasise that trust is a collective or group property broadly shared by all members of a society. By contrast micro theories hold that trust varies among individuals within a society based on differences in socialisation and social background, political and economic experiences or individual perceptions and evaluations.[113]

Macro cultural theories emphasise the homogenising tendencies of national traditions and make little allowance for variation in trust among individuals within societies. Trust in political institutions is hypothesised to originate outside the political sphere in long-standing and deeply seeded beliefs about people that are rooted in cultural norms and communicated through early life socialisation. From a cultural perspective institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust, learned early in life and much later projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities.[114]

On the other hand micro cultural theories focus on differences in individual socialisation experiences as sources of significant variation in institutional trust within as well as between societies. Micro level cultural theories emphasise that socialisation into a culturally homogenous society nonetheless allows substantial variation among individuals based on gender, family background, education, and so forth. Not all families in kinship-based societies are equally close knit and mutually supportive. Rather, micro theories emphasise that the impact of culture on individual trust is likely to vary with the specific nature of the socialisation process and the face-to-face experiences of each person. Even studies cast broadly within a cultural framework,

[113] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op.cit, p. 33
[114] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op.cit., p. 31

such as the World Values Survey, report substantial within country differences in values linked to differences in gender, age, education, and income, among other correlates.[115]

To an even greater extent macro and micro institutional theories are distinct. Macro institutional theories emphasise the aggregate performance of institutions in such matters as promoting growth, governing effectively, and avoiding corruption. The outputs of institutions are assumed to determine individual responses. According to institutional perspective, institutional trust reflects the rational judgement of the citizenry based on its direct experience with the performance of the institutions. It is the expected utility of institutions performing satisfactorily and is a consequence, not a cause, of institutional performance. In short, from the institutional perspective, trust in political institutions is politically endogenous and is rationally based; it hinges in citizen evaluations of institutional performance.[116]

The main assumption of the institutional theories is that institutions of regimes are trusted to the degree that they satisfy the expectations of the people. Consequently if the citizens' satisfaction with the institutional performance decreases, then institutional trust will decrease too and vice versa. The performance thesis assertion is that levels of institutional trust depend on the performance of the institutions and that the influence of this performance assessment will outweigh the effect of early life socialisation.

[115] W. Mishler & R. Rose Op.cit., p. 35
[116] W. Mishler & R. RoseOp.cit., p. 31

In contrast micro-institutional theories recognise that evaluations of performance reflect not only the aggregate performance of government but also individual circumstances and values. Individuals who are unemployed or whose personal finances have suffered from what they believe to be government policies are likely to be less trusting of political institutions than are those in better or improving economic circumstances. Differences in individual values also can be important. Individuals who value freedom highly can be expected to trust newly democratic institutions despite economic hardships, whereas those who give priority to economic growth may react more negatively in similar circumstances. [117]

The discernment of these two theoretical perspectives is a necessary condition for understanding and studying the determinants of institutional trust. Moreover, it is also important for the implications of these approaches.[118] If the results of this empirical research prove that the institutional trust in Nagaland is predetermined by the interpersonal trust, then the task of the institutions to generate sufficient trust will be much more difficult and time consuming because cultural values such as interpersonal trust are among the long term determinants of institutional trust. On the contrary, if the findings of the study show that the institutional trust is a result of short term factors such as the evaluation of their economic and political performance, then the institutions could generate public trust either by improving their political performance or providing economic development.

[117] W. Mishler & R. RoseOp.cit., p. 36
[118] W. Mishler & R. Rose. (1998). Trust in untrustworthy Institutions: Culture and institutional Performance in Post- Communist Societies. *Studies in Public Policy*. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde

3.5: Debate on Institutional Trust Index

Since institutional trust is based on people's trust in the institutions governing the country, its measurement has been a major source of academic debate and conflict. Following Easton's thesis that trust is a form of support for the political regime, D. E. Stokes in 1962 developed a battery of questions designed to measure trust in the regime known as the Trust in Government Index from the American Nation Election Survey (NES).[119] These questions were originally designed to measure whether respondents evaluated the government favourably. These basic evaluative orientations towards the National government were measured using criteria such as honesty, ability and efficiency of authorities. While Stokes did not use the concept of institutional trust but later on scholars started to use this scale in institutional trust research and the result that was generated from this index generated a wide and known controversy over whether it is measuring support for the regime or the incumbent authorities.

The controversy between Miller (1974a, 1974b) and Citrin (1974) over the meaning of the Trust in Government Index is widely known and needs more mention here. Miller (1974a) argued that declining levels of trust in government in the United States signalled a pervasive and enduring discontent with government "thereby increasing the potential for radical change".[120] However Citrin in his response to this article argued that this decline in the level of trust expressed no more than discontent with current governments and politicians actions therefore indicating short term attitudes that cannot be associated with crisis of legitimacy or the potential for radical change

[119] M. Levi & L. Stoker. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), p. 476
[120] A. H. Miller, Op.cit, p. 951

of the regime. According to Citirn, there is need "to distinguish, operationally between the following attitudes: dissatisfaction with current government policy positions, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of ongoing events and policies, mistrust of incumbent officeholders and rejection of the entire political system".[121]

The first hint on how to interpret these questions is provided by the researchers who developed this set of measures. According to Stokes, "the criteria of judgement implicit in these questions were partly ethical, that is, the honesty and other ethical qualities of public officials were part of what the sample was asked to judge. But the criteria extended to other qualities as well, including the ability and efficiency of government officials and the correctness of their policy decisions".[122] Several scholars have joined this controversy attempting to assess the meaning of this index. Even Easton who defines trust as a form of diffuse support, acknowledges that the Trust in Government Index may indeed be related to specific support more than diffuse support.[123] The core of the problem is on how the questions are asked.

The Trust in Government Index is composed of the following four items:

1. Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste much of it?
2. Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?

[121] J. Citrin, Op.cit, p. 987

[122] . E. Stokes. (1962). Popular Evalautions of Government: An Empirical Assessment. In H. Cleveland & H. D. Laswell (Eds.), *Ethics and Business: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military*. New York:Harper & Brothers , p. 23

[123] David Easton, Op.cit.

3. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right-just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?
4. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interest looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?[124]

A closer examination of the above mention questions gives rise to two problems. Firstly these questions ask people to evaluate 'the people in government' and not the institutions. That is, the focus is on the authorities and not the regime's institutions. Secondly these questions make references to how the government acts, that is, they ask respondents to evaluate authorities in terms of their performance. Thus, these questions better represents support for authorities in terms of their performance or in the framework of Easton, specific support rather than support for the regime's institution.[125] Thus what is required to measure support for the regime's institutions is another set of questions that first, do not refer to authorities and do not ask respondents to evaluate their performance.

3.6: The Institutional Trust Scale

As discussed, the traditional battery of questions used to measure trust or support for the regime's institution is in fact measuring support for incumbent office holder. These measures directly ask respondents to evaluate authorities in terms of their performance. Thus what is required is the need to construct a measure of institutional

[124] Carolina Segovia Arancibia. (2008). Political Trust in Latin America (Ph.D Thesis). University of Michigan, Michigan, USA, pp. 16-17
[125] E. N. Muller & T. O. Juckam. (1977). On the Meaning of Political Support. *American Political Science Review*, 71(4), pp. 1561-1595

trust in political institutions. The need to provide a reliable and valid measure of trust in the regime's institution becomes important. This measure should have the following properties. First, it needs to specify the object of trust unambiguously, in other words it needs to name the institutions to be included in the index. Second, a measure of institutional trust should be distinguishable from measures of support for other objects of the political system.

In the present study, trust in institutions is measured by using the following battery of questions available in the Fourth Asia Barometer Survey: "Iam going to name a number of institutions. For each one please tell me how much trust do you have in them". The response categories are coded on a Four point Likert scale ranging from 4 (A great deal of trust) to 1 (None at all). A Don't know option was also provided for those who did not want to reply or didn't have an opinion. Since the present study concerns with assessing the level of trust in the state of Nagaland, political institutions of the state has been included. The institutions included are the state government, political parties, courts, police, civil service, mass media, NGOs and election commission.

Here state government, political parties, police, courts, civil service and election commission constitutes the political institutions. Although political parties are not formal institutions, in the modern state, politics is carried out by the parties irrespective of the party system that exist in a particular state. On the other hand mass media including the press and electronic media and Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) constitute the civil institutions. A simple composite index, named the Generalised Institutional Trust Index was constructed by taking the mean values of

the above eight indicators. Moreover it is to be noted that distinction between political and civil institutions, is likely to vary from country to country depending on the functions and roles that those institutions perform in society.

Important characteristics of these question are that trust in institutions firstly is asked without any reference to the performance of institutions and secondly without any reference to specific leaders or roles within those institutions. Thus this battery of questions satisfies one of the requirements discussed that is they explicitly specify the political object to which trust is directed. Lastly using this set of questions allows a researcher to be part of the tradition of measurement of institutional trust in comparative research, where different versions of the same index have been used to measure and compare levels of trust in political institutions across different countries.

3.7: Measurement of Variables

Evaluations of institutional performance: Institutional performance was divided into two categories: economic and political. To assess the impact of economic performance on trust, respondents were asked to rate the present economic condition of the state. The response categories for economic evaluation were coded on a Five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very bad) to 5 (Very good). To assess political performance respondents were asked; "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the present state government?" The response categories for political performance were coded on a Five-point Likert scale ranging from 1(very dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied)

Interpersonal trust: To assess the impact of interpersonal trust (cultural theories) on trust respondents were asked to give their views on the following statement: "Most people are trustworthy?" The response categories were coded on a Five- point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5(strongly agree). The higher the score is, the greater the degree of interpersonal trust.

3.8: Level of Institutional Trust

Table 3.1 lists the mean values and standard deviations of the trust that people have in the two civil and six political institutions. The overall mean value of the institutional trust index is 2.22 which is below the scale midpoint of 2.50. It indicates that the level of institutional trust is low in the state. Political institutions were ranked according to their individual mean value score. Those with higher mean value has better ranking in the table.

Table 3.1: Level of institutional trust

Trust in	Mean	SD	Ranking
Political parties	1.73	0.93	8
State government	1.85	1.09	7
Courts	2.33	1.27	4
Police	2.20	1.31	6
Civil service	2.21	1.34	5
Mass media	2.56	1.34	1
NGOs	2.46	1.22	2
Election commission	2.44	1.33	3
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.22		

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Although most institutions are distrusted, the levels of distrust are generally moderate. Out of the eight institutions only mass media enjoyed positive level of trust with mean value of 2.56. NGOs comes in the next place with mean value of 2.46 followed by election commission with 2.44, courts with 2.33, civil service with 2.21 and police with 2.20. Political parties generate the greatest distrust with mean value of 1.73 followed by state government with 1.85.

3.9: Socio Demographic Factors and Institutional Trust

The impact of socio demographic factors on institutional trust has been mixed. Most studies done in industrialised democracies and new democracies in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe have found the impact of socio demographic variables on trust in institutions to be weak or non-existent. As Levi and Stoker notes, "whether citizens' express trust or distrust is primarily a reflection of their political lives, not their personalities nor even their social characteristics".[126]

While some studies have found women to be more trusting than men[127] others have found them to be less trusting.[128] Furthermore there is evidence that trust varies over the life cycle[129], with some findings suggesting that trust increases with age[130] while other studies established a curvilinear relationship.[131]Again some studies have found positive associations between ability, education and occupational status on

[126] M. Levi & L. Stoker, Op. Cit., p. 481
[127] L. Paterson. (2008). Political attitudes, social participation and social mobility: A longitudinal analysis. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 59(3), pp. 413-434.
[128] A. Leigh. (2006). Trust, inequality and ethnic heterogeneity. *Economic Record*, 82(258), pp. 268-280.
[129] R. Putnam, Op.cit.
[130] W. Mishler & R. Rose, Op.cit.
[131] J. Hudson. (2006). Institutional trust and subjective well-being across the EU. *Kyklos*, 59(1), pp. 43-62.

institutional trust[132] others have found negative associations.[133] Discrepancies in findings are due to different approaches regarding measurement (single item measures or use of scales), sampling (cross-sectional or longitudinal, whereby most longitudinal studies were either relative short-term or retrospective studies), or focus on specific developmental periods (young age, age-varied groups, or older age group) and highlight the need for further research to clarify the determinants of institutional trust. Differences in findings might also be due to differences in period effects, which are not yet well understood.[134]

Nevertheless, in the present study standard measures for age, gender, education, marital status, occupation and income are included. It is done so in order to investigate the possible influence that these socio demographic variables have on trust.

[132] J. I. Deary, D. G. Batty & R. C. Gale. (2008). Bright children become enlightened adults. *Psychological Science*, 19(1), pp.1-6.
[133] H. Doring. (1992). Higher education and confidence in institutions. *West European Politics*, 15(2),pp. 126-146
[134] I. Schoon & H. Cheng. (2011). Determinants of political trust: A lifetime learning model. *Developmental Psychology*, 47(3), p. 5

Table 3.2: Gender and trust

	Mean		Ranking	
Trust in	Men	Women	Men	Women
Political parties	1.77	1.68	6	8
State government	1.67	1.75	7	7
Courts	2.33	2.33	4	3
Police	2.33	2.07	4	6
Civil service	2.25	2.17	5	5
Mass media	2.53	2.60	2	1
NGOs	2.44	2.48	3	2
Election commission	2.69	2.18	1	4
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.25	2.15		

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Table 3.2 shows that the overall mean value for all the eight institutions is 2.25 among men while it is 2.15 among women. While men exhibited positive trust only towards mass media and election commission with mean values of 2.53 and 2.69 respectively, women exhibited positive trust only towards mass media with mean value of 2.60. Political parties and state government generated the greatest distrust with mean values of 1.77 and 1.67 for men while it is 1.68 and 1.75 for women.

Table 3.3: Age and trust

Trust in	Mean		Ranking	
	Youth	Middle aged adults and senior citizens	Youth	Middle aged adults and senior citizens
Political parties	1.84	1.67	7	8
State government	1.88	1.83	8	7
Courts	2.4	2.3	6	4
Police	2.81	2.17	1	5
Civil service	2.42	2.1	5	6
Mass media	2.65	2.52	2	1
NGOs	2.57	2.4	3	3
Election commission	2.44	2.44	4	2
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.37	2.17		

Source: Field work,June 2017-January 2018

Table 3.3 shows that the overall institutional trust mean value is 2.37 among the youth while it is 2.17 among middle aged adults and senior citizens'. Youth showed more trust in the police (2.81) followed by mass media (2.65) and NGOs (2.57). On the other hand middle aged adults and senior citizens' have higher trust only on mass media (2.52). Overall here also political parties and state government generated negative trust with mean values of 1.84 and 1.88 among the youth and 1.67 and 1.83 among the adults and senior citizens'.

Table 3.4: Marital status and trust

	Mean			Ranking		
Trust in	Married	Unmarried	Divorced/separated /widowed	Married	Unmarried	Divorced/separated /widowed
Political parties	1.68	1.81	1.8	8	8	5
State government	1.84	1.85	2	7	7	4
Courts	2.32	2.37	1.4	4	4	7
Police	2.15	2.31	1.6	5	6	6
Civil service	2.05	2.49	2	6	3	4
Mass media	2.54	2.6	2.8	1	1	1
NGOs	2.43	2.51	2.2	3	2	3
Election commission	2.49	2.35	2.6	2	5	2
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.19	2.28	2.05			

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018.

Across the three marital status categories the overall institutional trust is below the scale midpoint with mean values of 2.19, 2.28 and 2.05 respectively. Those who are married has higher trust only in mass media with mean value of 2.54 while on the other hand mass media and NGOs enjoyed higher trust among the unmarried with mean values of 2.60 and 2.51 respectively. Divorced/separated/widowed category exhibited distrust in all of the institutions. Here also political parties and state government generated distrust across the three marital status categories (Table 3.4)

Table 3.5: Education and trust

Trust in	Mean			Ranking		
	Non-literate	Under matriculation & matriculation	Higher secondary & graduation & above	Non-literate	Under matriculation & matriculation	Higher secondary & graduation & above
Political parties	1.61	1.76	1.71	7	8	7
State government	1.66	1.87	1.86	6	7	6
Courts	2.22	2.36	2.31	4	4	3
Police	1.75	2.22	2.28	5	5	5
Civil service	2.27	2.16	2.26	3	6	4
Mass media	2.36	2.57	2.6	2	1	1
NGOs	2.36	2.45	2.49	2	2	2
Election commission	2.52	2.39	2.49	1	3	2
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.09	2.22	2.25			

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018.

Table 3.5 shows that overall institutional trust is below the scale midpoint across the three educational categories. Those with higher education have more trust with mean value of 2.25 as compared to those with lower education and non-literate with mean values of 2.22 and 2.09 respectively. Respondents belonging to higher secondary and graduation and above exhibited higher trust only towards mass media with mean value of 2.60. Non-literates showed higher trust only towards the election commission with mean value of 2.52 while under matriculate and matriculate respondents have higher trust only towards mass media with mean value of 2.57. Here also across the three educational categories political parties rank at the bottom with mean values of 1.61, 1.76 and 1.71 respectively followed by state government with mean values of 1.66, 1.87 and 1.86 respectively.

Table 3.6: Occupation and trust

Trust in	Mean					Ranking				
	Government employees	Self employed	Cultivator	Student	Unemployed	Government employees	Self employed	Cultivator	Student	Unemployed
Political parties	1.59	1.87	1.63	2.05	1.42	7	7	8	6	8
State government	2	1.87	1.87	1.92	1.64	6	7	7	7	7
Courts	2.4	2.36	2.15	2.74	2.13	4	3	6	2	4
Police	2.64	2.04	2.38	2.38	2.05	2	6	4	5	6
Civil service	2.16	2.16	2.36	2.48	2.07	5	5	5	4	5
Mass media	2.64	2.58	2.65	2.79	2.28	2	1	3	1	2
NGOs	2.59	2.41	2.66	2.53	2.51	3	2	2	3	1
Election commission	2.98	2.31	2.69	2.38	2.19	1	4	1	5	3
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.33	2.2	2.3	2.41	2.04					

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018.

Table 3.6 shows that overall level of institutional trust is below the scale midpoint across different occupational groups. The unemployed displayed the least trust with mean value of 2.04 followed by self employed with 2.20, cultivators with 2.30 and government employees with 2.33. Across the five occupational categories, political parties and state government generated the greatest distrust.

Table 3.7: Income and trust

	Mean			Ranking		
Trust in	1000-10,000 (Low income)	10,001-20,000 (Middle income	20,001& above (High income)	1000-10,000 (Low income)	10,001-20,000 (Middle income	20,001& above (High income)
Political parties	1.53	1.48	1.52	7	8	8
State government	1.8	2.08	1.83	6	6	7
Courts	2.22	2.48	2.19	5	4	4
Police	2.39	2.2	2.42	3	7	2
Civil service	2.34	2.36	1.88	4	5	6
Mass media	2.79	2.64	2.33	1	2	3
NGOs	2.79	2.48	2.02	1	3	5
Election commission	2.53	3.12	2.64	2	1	1
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.3	2.35	2.1			

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018.

Table 3.7 indicates that the overall institutional trust is below the scale midpoint across different income categories. Those with higher income were found out to be significantly less trusting of political institutions with overall mean value of 2.10 than either the low or the middle income group with mean values of 2.30 and 2.35 respectively. Those with low income had higher trust towards mass media, NGOs and the election commission with mean values of 2.79, 2.79 and 2.53 respectively while those with middle income had higher trust towards mass media and election commission with mean values of 2.64 and 3.12 respectively. Those with higher income had higher trust only towards election commission with mean value of 2.64. Here also political parties and state government ranks at the bottom across the three income categories.

From the above results certain inferences can be drawn. Prior studies on trust conducted in Nagaland have also found that political parties and state government were the least trusted institutions in the state. Kuotsu and Amer in their study done in Kohima, Mokokchung, Peren and Tuensang districts of Nagaland found that political parties and state government were the least trusted institutions.[135] Similar results were also obtained by Patton in his study carried out in Mokokchung district where political parties and the state government were found to be the least trusted institutions.[136] Again a study conducted by Amer on youth political participation in Nagaland found political parties to be the least trusted institution among the youth.[137]

[135] Kikruneinuo Kuotsu & Moamenla Amer. (2016). Political trust and democratic institutions in Nagaland.*International Journal of Research in Social Sciences,* 6(12), pp. 689-700

[136] Benrithung E. Patton. (2017). A validation of voter's political trust in Mokokchung district (Nagaland).*IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS*), 22(6), pp. 44-49

[137] Moamenla Amer. (2017). The dynamics of political trust among youth. *Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities*, 7(8), pp. 300-310

In all of the three studies, the authors attributed respondent's dissatisfaction with the performance of the government and corruption to be the factors behind their low level trust in them. In line with previous studies, the present study asked respondents to evaluate the performance of the present state government and also indicate the most important problem/issue facing the state. It has been done so with the purpose to understand whether similar perception still exist among the people and whether these factors are indeed contributing to low level of trust especially in political parties and the state government.

Table 3.8: Satisfaction with performance of state government

Performance of state government	Frequency	Percentage
Very satisfied	22	5.36
Somewhat satisfied	119	28.96
Somewhat dissatisfied	108	26.27
Very dissatisfied	162	39.41

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

From table 3.8 it is clear that majority of the respondents are dissatisfied with the performance of the state government (65.68 per cent). Moreover in order to understand the reasons behind their dissatisfaction, respondents were asked to indicate the most important problem/issue facing the state which the state government should address.

Table 3.9: Important problem/issue facing the state

Important problems	Frequency	Percentage
Unemployment	72	21.88
Lack of Infrastructure/roads	54	16.41
Corruption	83	25.22
Political instability	64	19.45
Others	56	17.04

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

For majority of the respondent's corruption is the major problem plaguing the state (25.22 per cent) followed by unemployment (21.88 per cent), political instability (19.45 per cent) and lack of Infrastructure/roads (16.41 per cent). The results are not the least surprising but on expected lines.There is widespread agreement among scholars that bad governance and corruption represent daunting threats to new democracies and developing countries. At a conference held in 2007 celebrating the 25thanniversary of the establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy, Larry Diamond, one of the most prominent scholars in democratisation studies, stated that:

"There is a specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is bad governance-governance that serves only the interests of a narrow ruling elite. Governance that is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power. Governance that is not responding to the massive and long-deferred social agenda of reducing inequality and unemployment and fighting against dehumanising poverty. Governance that is not

delivering broad improvement in people's lives because it is stealing, squandering, or skewing the available resources".[138]

Corruption has become an endemic problem in the state. A number of empirical studies have shown the negative impact of corruption on trust in political institutions. Corruption has become the new normal in the state. It has become so rampant that people are no longer shocked by exposure of corruption cases. Even the present Nagaland State Vigilance Commissioner (SVC) Mayang Lima acknowledged that corruption did lot of damage to society by destabilising communities, hindering economic growth and destroying ethics of democracy and political development.[139]According to the Periodic Labour Force Survey 2017-18, Nagaland has the highest unemployment rate among the states at 21.4 per cent.[140] The alarming part is that there has been a huge spike between 2018 and 2019 with 90584 applicants registered in the life register of employment exchange in the state.[141] With regard to political instability, the year 2017 was marked by constant internal fighting within the ruling Naga Peoples Front (NPF) party creating in effect a negative perception among the people. Finally according to Nagaland's Economic Survey 2016 the state faces problems of low quality infrastructure. For instance, despite a road density of 95 per cent access remains a problem as many roads are dilapidated and prone to landslides, affecting transportation of people and goods and services, especially during

[138] Larry Diamond cited in Jonas Linde (2011) Why feed the hand that bites you? Perceptions of proceduralfairness and system support in post-communist democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 5(3), p. 410
[139] Corruption has hampered overall growth: Nagaland Vigilance Commissioner. (2018, October 30). *Northeast Today*
[140] State divide in unemployment: Nagaland 21.4%, Meghalaya 1.5%, Indian express, (2019, 26 June 26). *Indian Express*
[141] 90584 a daunting figure. (2020, February 11). *Morung Express*

monsoons.[142] In addition to the discussed problems and issues respondents also identified problems related to government services such as education, electricity, health and water supply.

In the present study political parties, state government and the police are found to be least trusted institutions while mass media and Nongovernmental organisations are the most trusted institutions. As such discussion will be limited only on these institutions. For more than a century, political parties have played a central role in the theory and practice of democratic government. As Schattschneider famously asserted, "the political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties".[143] To be sure, classical philosophers conceived of democracy as a kind of unmediated popular sovereignty in which 'the people' rule directly, but they had in mind the context of a small city-state and never imagined that democratic government could function in societies as large and complex as today's nations. This hurdle of scale was overcome by the greatest modern political innovation-representative democracy-which required intermediary institutions to link citizens' to their government, to aggregate the increasingly diverse universe of conflicting social and economic interests into coherent public policies, and to ensure the accountability of rulers to the ruled. With the advent of universal suffrage, these functions came to be performed by political parties throughout the democratic world.[144]

Political parties considered being an important link between the political system and the people enjoy very low trust in the state. The phenomenon of constant defections

[142] Nagaland outranks rich states in health, gender equity, but jobs a concern. (2018, February 27) *Business standard*
[143] E. E. Schattschneider. (1942). *Party government*. New York: Rinehart and Winston, p. 1
[144] Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner (Eds.) (2001). The global divergence of democracies. Baltimore. John Hopkins University Press, p. 300

and mergers among the different political parties is pervasive in the state.[145] This phenomenon has been attributed by Amer in part to the non-ideological character of the parties.[146] It has been a recurring feature since statehood and continues till date. It is also widely believed that elections in Nagaland are considered among the most expensive in the country.[147] Election trade is one dominant problem infesting Naga electoral process. It is noteworthy to mention that staggering amount of money is being expended during elections in the state. A Post Election Watch report 2018 released by an NGO named YouthNet in the state found out that a staggering amount of Rs.1061,09,25000 (one thousand and sixty one crores, nine lakhs and twenty five thousand) was approximately spent in the election to the 13th Nagaland Legislative Election held in 2018. The report further revealed that each candidate on an average shelled out Rs. 5,41,37,372 (five crore fourty one lakh thirty seven thousand and three hundred seventy two). The report stated that the trend of heavy expenditure in Nagaland for buying vote during election skyrocketed in the last two decades. The same organisation had in their Post Election Watch study revealed that during the 2008 state Assembly election an approximate amount of Rs 569, 96,00000 (five hundred and sixty nine crores and ninety six lakhs) was spend by candidates which increased to Rs. 937,82,67,500 (nine hundred and thirty seven crores, eighty lakhs, sixty seven thousand and five hundred) in 2013 assembly election.[148]

[145] For more details on the history of defections and mergers in the state see Amer (2014) & Sumi (2015).A study of emergence and role of regional political parties in Nagaland (Ph.D. Thesis). Nagaland University, Nagaland, India.
[146] Moamenla Amer. (2014). Electoral Dynamics in India: A Study of Nagaland. *Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR,* 3(4), pp. 6-11
[147] M. Amer, Op.cit., p. 9
[148] Cost of one election in Nagaland: A cool figure of over Rs 1061 crore. (2018, December 18). *Morung Express*

Such low trust in political parties is not only confined to Nagaland but similar trend have been found across the country. The findings of State of Democracy in South Asia (2008) and Democracy in India: A Citizens' Perspective (2015) found political parties to be the least trusted institution followed by the police in India. Similarly a study conducted by Azim Premji University (APU) and Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) (2018) covering eight Indian states found political parties to be the least trusted institution.

The police as an institution is important in a democratic society because they provide security and dignity to the citizens' which enhances civic trust and also impact upon the social, economic and political situations and thereby contribute to the development and integrity of the nation.[149]A defining characteristic of police is their mandate to legally use force and to deprive citizens' of their liberty. This power is bound to generate resistance from those who are subject to it. It also offers great temptations for abuse. Law enforcement requires a delicate balancing act. The conflicts between liberty and order receive their purest expression in considerations of democratic policing. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Professor Emeritus Gary Marx notes, "It is ironic that police are both a major support and a major threat to a democratic society". On one hand, police enhance democracy by exemplifying one of its central tenets, the rule of law, while also suppressing crime. On the other hand, police are granted by government the exclusive power to use force, which can be abused to undermine democracy. In either case, they play a prominent role in the success or failure of a democratic society.[150]

[149]Arvind Verma. The Police in India: Design, Performance and Adaptability. In Davesh Kapur & Pratap Bhanu Mehta (Eds.) (2005), *Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design*(2005). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 195

[150] Gary T. Marx. (n.d) *Police and Democracy*. Retrieved from web.mit.edu/gtmarx/www/poldem.html

In 2018 non-profit organisation Common Cause and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in their report titled the 'Status of Policing in India Report 2018' found that the police enjoy a fairly high degree of trust, while explicit expression of high distrust was somewhat limited. However, in relation to other public institutions such as the Army and the judiciary, the police is less trusted and only fared better when compared to other government officers. In the context of the functioning of the police in India, it is widely believed that they do not always cater to the interests of common citizens' and suffer from a systemic lack of accountability. As a result, a perceptible trust deficit has developed over the years.[151] The report mentioned that the police face a critical test today. As an institution, in most states of India, people are not exactly happy with the police but as the report findings show, people have still not given up on the institution. If the dissatisfaction and distrust increase it would have deep impact not merely on the police but on the legitimacy of the Indian state. It would adversely affect not merely popular perceptions of police but also the ability of democratic institutions to exercise authority with care and efficiency.[152]

In the present study police was also found to be one of the least trusted institutions after the state government and political parties. The Status of Policing in Report 2018 revealed that Nagaland ranked a miserable 19 out of 22 states surveyed both in terms of performance and trust in local police. Such distrust in the police is fuelled by public perception of the police being a corrupt institution where incidences of bribe taking and rampant backdoor appointments in the police department are being exposed by civil society groups. Moreover, in 2018 the state government removed the acting

[151] Common Cause and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). (2018).Status of policing in India report , p.134
[152]Common Cause and the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Op.cit., p.139

Director General of Police (DGP) Rupin Sharma from his post despite huge public campaign launched against his removal. Widely considered an honest police officer and often given the credit for initiating reforms within the police department and halting backdoor appointments, his removal created public outcry and resentment with the consequence being that the institution itself suffered from credibility crisis.

In the success story of any democracy and especially India, the role of civil society is self-evident as an element in the political framework of liberal-democratic institutions, a vigorous public sphere, a tradition of public debate and a free press. However, the same civil society is also part of the narrative of failures of Indian democracy. When political parties fail to perform the sort of interest aggregating functions that they do in established democracies, large sections of citizens' remain outside the scope of organised civil society. More often than not particularly with respect to development oriented Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) these citizens' becomes object of civil society action rather than participants in civil society.[153]

In Nagaland, people seem to repose more trust in the civil institutions than the political institutions as is evident from the findings of the study. Mass media and Nongovernmental organisations are playing the role of watchdogs against governmental wrong doings by consistently exposing incidences of corruption and bringing forth the issues and grievances of the people in public domain. These institutions other than playing the role of watchdogs are also involved in a plethora of

[153] Niraja Jayal, N. (2007). The role of civil society. In S. Ganguly et al. (pp. 143-160). *The state of India's democracy*. Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press, p.143

other activities such as participating actively in the Indo-Naga peace process, reconciliation process to bring about unity among the different underground factions, combating the menace of drug and alcohol abuse etc. Over the years these institutions especially the Nongovernmental organisations have stepped in those areas and filled the gaps where political parties has withdrawn by giving voice to issues and groups not attended to by competitive politics.

However there is also no denying that the challenges confronting these two institutions in the state are formidable. Deep political divides, tribal polarisation, fake and paid news, transparency and accountability to name just a few. No doubt maintaining public trust and addressing these complex challenges is a daunting task, which require well-defined strategies and smartly executed solutions on behalf of the common good. If these challenges are addressed then public trust in these institutions will only gain in popularity and will augur well for the society at large.

3.10: Explaining Trust by Institutional and Cultural Factors

One of the primary concern of this study is to assess the connection between institutional trust, institutional theories and cultural theories. Analyses on trust are based only in the six political institutions. Toward this end, a composite measure of institutional trust is created by averaging individual scores across the six political institutions.

Table 3.10: Level of institutional trust

Trust in	Mean	SD	Ranking
Political parties	1.73	0.93	6
State government	1.85	1.09	5
Courts	2.33	1.27	2
Police	2.20	1.31	4
Civil service	2.21	1.34	3
Election commission	2.44	1.33	1
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.13		

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

In order to examine the independent effect on institutional trust of the evaluations of economic performance, political performance and interpersonal trust, both correlation and multiple correlation analyses was done. Institutional trust is treated as the dependent variable while the three other variables namely economic performance, political performance and interpersonal trust as independent variables.

It is found that both measures of institutional performance indicate dissatisfaction among the respondents. The mean scores for both economic and political performance are 2.10 and 2.48 respectively indicating that people are dissatisfied with the present state of economy and with the performance of the government. On the other hand the mean score for interpersonal trust is 2.17 indirectly confirming that societies with low levels of trust in people manifest low levels of institutional trust.

Table 3.11 presents the results of correlation and multiple regression analysis.

Table 3.11: Explaining institutional trust

Variables	*Correlation*		*Regression*				
	r	R^2	*a*	*B*	*t*	*P*	*S.E*
Institutional trust and economic performance	.501	.251	1.441	.520	12.302	.000	.027
Institutional trust and political performance	.446	.198	1.539	.422	9.408	.000	.025
Institutional trust and interpersonal trust	.358	.128	1.659	.363	7.870	.000	.028

According to micro-institutional theories, the institutional trust depends on the capacity of the institutions to meet society's preferences and is caused by a gap between people's expectations and perceptions of the institutional performance. Consequently if the citizens' satisfaction with the institutional performance decreases, the institutional trust should decrease too. Basing on these assumptions and consistent with H1 it is to be expected that: the better the political institutions are considered to perform, the more people will trust them.

Consistent with the institutional hypothesis, the correlation coefficients between the variable institutional trust and the two institutional performance variables economic and political performance are moderate and positive. This means that there is a positive relationship between institutional trust and the indicators of their performance. The strongest is the dependence between institutional trust and economic performance with correlation coefficient of .501. On the other hand the dependence between institutional trust and political performance is .446.

However the casual relationship between the responding variable and its predictor variable is still an empirical question, which can be addressed through a multiple

regression analysis. The Beta coefficients represent the relative contribution of each of the independent variables to the prediction of the dependent variable. As shown, the indicator of "satisfaction with the present state of economy in the state" has the greatest single influence on the dependent variable with Beta:.520 and exceeds the relative impact of the indicator political performance "satisfaction with the state government"(Beta: .422). The correlation of determination i.e R^2 is .251 which means 25.1 per cent of the variation in institutional trust has been explained by economic performance. On the other hand the correlation of determination i.e R^2 is .198 which means 19.8 per cent of the variation in institutional trust has been explained by political performance. Moreover the calculated value of 't' for both variables (12.302 and 9.408) is higher than the table value and is statistically significant at 1 per cent. Thus it can be said that institutional trust depends on the level of citizens' satisfaction with the economic and political performance of the institutions and an increase in these levels is accompanied by an increase in the level of institutional trust.

Next the correlation analysis indicates that the relationship between institutional trust and interpersonal trust is also moderate and positive. The correlation coefficient shows that the relationship between institutional trust and interpersonal trust is .358. But since this statistical correlation is not sufficient indicator of the presence of a casual relationship between the variables regression analysis was done. The regression analysis shows that the indicator of interpersonal trust influence on the dependent variable was found to be weaker as compared with the variables of institutional performance with Beta: .363.The correlation of determination i.e R^2 is .128 which means 12.8 per cent of the variation in institutional trust has been

explained by interpersonal trust. The calculated value of 't' came out to be 7.870 which is higher than the table value and is statistically significant at 1 per cent. Though the results do not contradict the claim of the cultural theories i.e the more people trust each other, the more they will trust the political institutions its explanatory power is weaker as compared with the institutional theories.

3.11: Conclusion

One of the major objective of this study was to present the theoretical debate over the origins of institutional trust, to develop plausible hypotheses and empirically test them, thereby answering the given research questions. In brief, the one hypothesis formulated for this chapter has been corroborated by the results of the empirical research and found the superiority of the institutional theories in explaining institutional trust. This is certainly consistent with the findings of some previous research. It also affirms the importance of institutional performance in strengthening institutional trust in societies. Nevertheless it will not be prudent to hastily conclude that cultural explanations are irrelevant since it has been found in the study that there is positive relationship between interpersonal trust and institutional trust, though its impact on trust is weaker as compared with the institutional performance variables.

With regard to the policy implications of this study it can be inferred that in order to increase citizens' trust, political institutions need to function effectively and efficiently by improving their political performance, providing economic growth, avoiding corruption and providing clean governance. Higher level of institutional trust is beneficial not only for the incumbent authorities and governmental institutions, but

also for representative democracy as a whole. However if the problems are left unaddressed for a long period of time, the state faces the possibility of the citizens' losing faith in the core institutions of representative democracy which will result in the undermining of the regime's legitimacy.

Since the theoretical and empirical discussion of this study has been reduced to a dispute over the relative explanatory power of only two theories, namely the cultural and institutional perspectives, arguments can be put forth that there are also other predictors of institutional trust. Secondary factors such as media effect and political interest that can be considered as individual bases of institutional trust can be incorporated in further research. The inclusion of these concepts in the empirical analysis may be a very useful tool for better understanding of trust in institutions and its determinants.

The next obvious question that arises is whether there has been a spill over of low trust in the regime's political institutions to its principles, norms and procedures and whether institutional trust influence citizens' support for democracy? These are some of the questions which will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR
SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY: ITS NATURE AND DETERMINANTS

4.1: Introduction

This chapter examines respondents support for democracy. People's support for democracy is one of the most important pillars for democratic consolidation.[154] The chapter will analyse the following questions: how the people of Nagaland understand the idea of democracy? To what extend people support it as a preferable form of government? How firm and deep is their support for it? How support for democracy is related to satisfaction, political participation and economic wellbeing. Without people's support for democracy the functioning of democracy is exposed to various risks, including backsliding towards authoritarianism. Therefore, public support for democracy is important for the sustainability of democratic regimes.

Since the beginning of the political culture paradigm, evaluation of support for democracy has been present in the literature and more generally, seems to be at the core of political science research. Moreover, increased emphasis has been given to it as a result of the process called the "third wave of democratisation."[155] which gave rise to Fukuyama's well known thesis that democracy appeared to represent the endpoint of human history.[156] Popular support for democracy is an important and frequent variable, given its status as a prior condition for democratic consolidation

[154] Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press:
[155] Samuel P. Huntington. (1991). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press
[156] Francis Fukuyama. (1992). *The end of history and the last man*. New York: Free Press

and its ability to promote increases in political and civil liberties.[157] Due to this critical function in democratic development, political scientist have developed theories of democratic support and identified its various sources such as economic, social, cultural, political and cognition.

Popular public support is a necessary and prerequisite condition for not only the survival but for effective functioning of democratic regimes. The trajectory of support over time, the distribution of support across significant societal subgroups, the rules and institutional mechanisms by which support is aggregated, and the number, nature and severity of the problems or stresses facing the regime are among other important consideration.[158] Popular support for a political regime is the essence of its consolidation. By voluntarily endorsing the rules that govern them, citizens' endow a regime with an elusive but indispensable quality: political legitimacy. The most widely accepted definition of the consolidation of democracy equates it squarely with legitimation. Linz and Stepan speak of democratic consolidation as a process by which all political actors come to regard democracy as 'the only game in town.'[159] In other words, democracy is consolidated when citizens' and leaders alike conclude that no alternative form of regime has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to their allegiance.[160]

If the end of the twentieth century was characterised by the triumph of democracy all over the world, the beginning of the twenty first century has been characterised by an

[157] Pippa Norris. (2011). *Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited*. New York:Cambridge University Press , pp. 233-34.
[158] William Mishler & Richard Rose. (1996). Trajectories of fear and hope: Support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 28(4), p. 554
[159] W. Mishler & R Rose, Op.cit., p. 5.
[160] M. Bratton & R. Mattes. (2001). Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsc or Instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), p. 447.

anxiety about the extend, depth and implications of this very triumph. As democracy becomes the preferred form of political system in more and more countries around the world, the idea of democracy has also acquired a currency that it may not have had at any other point in human history. Yet this global march of democracy does not by itself mean popular support for it.[161] As documented in the large volume of empirical literature, the creation of a stable and fully democratic state depends on a variety of conditions and forces, including class structure, culture, economy, political history and international environment. Of these conditions and forces, the quality of the mass citizenry is the ultimate determinant in struggles for democracy. Although all other conditions can facilitate or hinder the process of democratisation, ordinary citizens' eventually determine whether or not viable democracies are established and maintained. As Russell Dalton states "popular support is essential for democracy to survive".[162]

In order to create and sustain a viable democracy, it is imperative that the citizens' demonstrate more than a passion for the idea of democracy. A tremendous gap exists between people's passion for democracy as a political ideal and their ability to carry out democratic politics. A wide gap also exists between their democratic political aspirations and their actual behaviour as citizens' of democratic states.[163] As Inglehart observes "a long term commitment to democratic institutions among the public is also required in order to sustain democracy when conditions are dire".[164]

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[161] Peter R DeSouza., Suhas Palshikar & Yogendra Yadav. (2008). The democracy barometers: Surveying South Asia. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(1), p. 84.
[162] R. J. Dalton. (1988). *Citizen politics in Western democracies*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, p. 299
[163] Doh C. Shin. (1995). The quality of mass support for democratization. *Social Indicators Research*, 35(3), p. 240
[164] Ronald Inglehart. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 24.

4.2: Defining Democracy

Democracy is a disputed term.[165] Firstly, and perhaps the most widely used scholarly definitions of democracy focus on the procedures and institutions of democratic governance. For instance, Robert Dahl's influential writings largely equate democracy with the institutions and processes of representative government. In this case if people are able to participate equally in free and fair elections and if elections direct the action of government then it is said that the quality of democracy are met.[166]. Moreover democracy-building activities of governments and international NGOs give attention primarily on democracy's institutional and procedural aspects. These democracy advocacy groups advise governments on constitutional reforms like funding public education programmes to educate on the nature of electoral politics and other democratic procedures; observe elections; and provide aid to create political organisations. Thus, as a result what can be expected is that people might think of democracy in institutional and procedural terms, and to cite free and fair elections, multiparty competition and majority rule as democracy's defining elements.[167] Indeed, it has been found from surveys that when respondents were presented with a list of items to define democracy, voting and elections was found to be the common responses. [168]

Secondly people might also conceptualise democracy in terms of its results. Democracy value freedom and liberties as its essential goals, with democratic

[165] M. Bratton & R. Mattes, Op.cit, p. 451
[166] Robert Dahl. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition*. New Haven: Yale university Press
[167] R. J Dalton , D.C Shin & W. Jou. (2007). Understanding democracy: Data from unlikely places. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(4), pp. 143-44
[168] Dieter Fuchs & Edeltraud Roller. (2006). Learned democracy? Support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *International Journal of Sociology*, 36(3), pp 70-96

institutions being the medium to achieve them. Scholars like Larry Diamond consider political liberties, citizen's participation rights, equality before law, and equal rights of women as four of the core democratic values. Even if people are unable to comprehend the institutional procedures of democracy, their desire for freedom and liberty may foster support for democracy as a means to these goals.[169] Earlier survey done in developing countries have found that references to freedom, liberties and rights were the most common answers in defining democracy. For example, in South Asia most people associated freedom with democracy[170] while Janson Simon found that liberty and basic rights were the first answer given by a majority of the people in four of the five East European nations he studied.[171]

Finally, besides the political conceptualisation of democracy, there also exists a social aspect which gives importance to social rights such as social services, providing for the poor and ensuring overall welfare of the masses. Some proponents of this view argue that the democratic principles of political equality and participation are not worthwhile unless individuals have necessary resources to meet their social needs. Such orientation would lead people to cite economic improvement, social welfare and economic security as key elements of democracy. For instance, Claude Ake argued that 'Africans view democracy in economic and instrumental terms. To him, Africans are seeking democracy as a matter of survival', he further posits that 'the democracy movement in Africa will emphasise concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political rights; it will insist on the democratisation of economic

[169] Larry Diamond. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press

[170] SDSA Team, Op. Cit.

[171] Janos Simon. (1998). Popular conceptions of democracy in postcommunist Europe. In Samuel H Barnes & Janos (Simon Eds.), *The postcommunist citizens*. Budapest: Erasmus Foundation

opportunities, the social upliftment of people and a strong welfare system'.[172] In this formulation democracy is valued not so much for what it is but for what it can do.

4.3: Nagas' Experience with Democracy

Earlier, the White colonisers thought no form of governance existed among the Nagas'. No doubt, a form of government equivalent to that of the West did not exist. However the Nagas' were not without any form of governing system or unable to govern themselves. To understand the indigenous history of democratic ideas and practices of the Nagas' it first requires a critical appreciation of the prototypical Naga 'village republic.'[173] In Nagaland, the village was historically the locus of Naga politics.[174] The Nagas' lived in individuated village polities, each with its own society, economy and demarcated territory.[175] It was characterised by communitarian ethos, a time when 'the collective life took precedence over the individual'.[176]

The cultures and values among the Naga tribes are distinct from each other. Moreover the traditional systems of governance range from autocratic to pure democracy. For instance one can mention the autocracy of the Konyak tribe where the Angh (king) was supreme. Next one could mention about the chieftainship of the Sumi (Sema) tribe where the Ato Kukau (chief) word was considered law. Republican system in the form of putu menden/ shamen menchen (village council) can be found among the Ao

[172] Claude Ake. (1996). *Democracy and development in Africa*. Washington D:The Brookings Institution , p. 138

[173] Jelle JP Wouters. (2107) Land tax, reservation for women and customary law in Nagaland. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 52(9), pp 20-23

[174] R. Khutso. (2018). Shifting democratic experiences of Nagas. In Jelle JP Wouters, Jelle JP & Z. Tunyi (Eds.), .*Democracy in Nagaland: Tribes, tensions and traditions*. Kohima: The Highlander Books, p. 145

[175] V Elwin. (1961).*Nagaland*.Shillong: Government Press, p. 7

[176] H. Sema. (1986).*Emergence of Nagaland*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, p.10

tribe where the decision taken by the village council was binding and finally there is the pure democracy of the Angami tribe where emphasis on consensus was the norm. Such variations within the Naga fold makes it analytically impossible to speak about a common Naga political ethos.[177]

Nagas' experience with democracy as Charles Chasie writes has been 'complex, difficult and painful'.[178] It is 'complex' because of the disparate nature of the tribes.[179] In addition, statehood introduced formal democratic institutions, yet it did not erase the past Naga political practices and principles. These practices and principles include the traditional customary laws and traditional institution of governance which still continues to exert considerable influence over the life of the Nagas'. Nagas' experience has also been 'difficult' because of the unresolved 'Naga Political Issue', with simultaneous insurgency operating during the entire period.[180] The experience has further been 'painful' because the arrival of democratic institutions and elections caught Nagas' in a transition from the traditional to the modern. In less than a century, Naga society has had to shift from nomadism and headhunting to settled agriculture, from barter system to money and war economies, to attempts to organise the different complex tribes into a people, to cyber age and globalism making it perhaps only among a few societies that has witnessed social change at such rapid pace.[181]

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[177]Jelle JP Wouters. (2018). Introduction: Exploring democracy in Nagaland. In Jelle JP & Z. Tunyi (Eds.), *.Democracy in Nagaland: Tribes, tensions and traditions*. Kohima: The Highlander Books, p. 7

[178] Charles, Chasie. (2001). *Nagaland-land and people*, p. 247. Retrieved from http://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Download/Jrp/pdf/133_9.pdf.
[179] ibid
[180] ibid
[181] ibid

In Nagaland the democratic process has always coexisted with the politics and violence of insurgency and counterinsurgency, including the enactment of draconian laws such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) that are deemed deeply undemocratic[182] and turned Nagas' from citizens into subjects, and later, from 1997 onward, with a volatile ceasefire. Nagas's experience with formal democracy and elections has politically witnessed all the major tendencies of the Indian electoral scene, such as, one party dominance, factionalism, defection politics, formation of coalition government, etc with the phenomenon of constant defection and mergers among different political parties being a dominant feature owing to the non ideological character of political parties.[183] One plausible reason for the apparent absence of a clear party ideology can, in important parts, be located in the makeup and workings of Indian federalism in North-east India, and the routine politicisation of state-centre relations. As a small state with limited revenues of its own, Nagaland depends heavily on central funds, as well as on the occasional special financial package. Enacted in 1963 as an envisaged (but failed) political compromise to the Naga struggle for the right to self-determination, Nagaland was created out of political necessity, and this political imperative surpassed economic and fiscal considerations.[184] Right from the beginning, Nagaland was 'not economically viable'[185] Consequently, the relationship between Nagaland and the central government is one of extreme dependency, and there exists a clear local conviction that fiscal and economic support from the centre, so essential to the survival and functioning of Nagaland, may well diminish were the Nagaland government to take

[182] Dolly Kikon. (2009). The predicament of justice: 50 years of armed forces special powers act. *Journal of Contemporary South Asia,* 17(3), pp. 271-82.
[183] M. Amer, Op.cit.,p. 6
[184] Jelle JP Wouters & Roderick Wijunamai. (2019). The cultural politics of proxy-voting in Nagaland. Retrieved from https://www.theindiaforum.in/article/cultural-politics-proxy-voting-nagaland
[185] Alemtemshi Jamir. (2002). Keynote address. In D. J. Thomas & G. Das (Eds.), *Dimensions of development in Nagaland (*pp. 1-8). New Delhi:Regency Publications , p. 4

up a role in the opposition within Parliament. Dolly Kikon therefore, sees the position of Nagaland within the pan-Indian dispensation as exposing 'cleavages and strains within state-centre relations'. She observes thus: "even solemn affairs as electoral alliances and political ideologies are undermined or determined by an omnipresent need to continue with the economic packages extended from the centre to the states".[186]

When it comes to participation in elections, Nagaland has experienced huge voter turnout.[187] In democracy voting expresses the will of the people and for that will to be expressed elections must be free and fair. 'Free' and 'Fair' here means that those eligible to vote are genuinely registered and are completely free to make their choice of candidate without intimidation or inducement. Perhaps this cannot be said of elections in Nagaland, where the inducement of voters by parties and politicians has somewhat become the order of the day. Going by the voter turnout numbers any person would likely conclude that the electors are willing to participate in the electoral process and that they value their vote. However behind such robust turnout conceals the bigger picture of electoral malpractices with vote buying and proxy voting being the dominant ones. It has been widely observed, to start with, that the unit of voting among Nagas' is seldom the autonomous individual but variously the family, clan or village, and that the roots of this particularistic voting pattern must be sought in the complex intermingling of contemporary electoral politics and the logic and workings of traditional Naga village polities.[188] Such patterns of voting, importantly, are not considered aberrations locally, but are mediated and endorsed by

[186] Dolly Kikon. (2005). Engaging Naga nationalism. Can democracy function in militarized societies? *Economic and Political Weekly,* 40(26),p.2835
[187] For more detail on voter turnout figures from 1964-2013 see Amer (2014)
[188]Jelle JP Wouters & Roderick Wijunamai. (2019). Op.cit.

locally powerful village councils.[189] The village council is the highest decision making body and hold sway over any matter pertaining to the governance of their respective villages. During elections, village councils and political parties comes to a pre-arranged agreement to select the consensus candidate to be supported by the entire village. The village council openly declare their support for a particular candidate through local dailies in the form of 'declaration of support' and also issues threat of excommunication to those who opposes their decision. On account of such undemocratic actions of the village council, Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Nagaland Abhijit Sinha during the 2018 state Assemble election issued a directive informing that stern action will be taken against those village councils that passed resolutions in support of some candidates and that even candidates being favoured through such resolutions would also be held accountable.[190]

During elections huge amount of money is being expended by candidates in providing feasts, alcohol and buying of votes. Incidences of genuine voters not being able to cast their votes as someone else had already voted in their name comes up regularly in local dailies. Such practice is also encouraged by the fact that the state electoral list includes many bogus voters more so in the villages. Each and every village tries to inflate their respective voters list so that they can play a dominant and deciding role in the constituency. During election rates are fixed for proxy vote. Individuals especially the youngsters see this as an opportunity to earn extra money. To curb this

[189] The Nagaland Village and Area Councils Act, 1978 empowers village councils to administer their respective villages.

[190] Nagaland Elections 2018: Can the Election Commission clamp down on money, muscle power? (2018, February 23). *The Naga Republic*

malpractice and make the state's electoral roll authentic and clean around 2 lakh proxy voters were deleted from the electoral roll.

Another feature of state politics is the non existence of women representatives. The participation of women and their engagement in electoral process is an important marker of the maturity and efficacy of democracy in any country. It can be defined not only in terms of the equality and freedom with which they share political power with men, but also in terms of the liberty and space provided for women in the democratic framework of electoral politics.[191] Nagaland presents a very grim picture when it comes to women's political representation. Nagaland being a patriarchal society, age-old customary laws and culture have hindered the empowerment of women in the Naga society. Though women constitute almost half of the electorate of the state (49.22)[192] and participate equally at the ballot box with men yet their political representation is dismal. So far not a single Naga woman has been elected to the state Assembly.[193] Women's participatory behaviour and representation in the state remain constrained by many factors. Some of these are cultural whereby the traditional institutions around which the Naga social and political life revolves have never recognised the rights of women as primary decision makers. While on the other hand some of the barriers are self-imposed wherein women simply lack the confidence, and interest to engage in politics. The other impediments are time and

[191] Praveen Rai. (2011). Electoral participation of women in India: Key determinants and barriers. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XLVI, No 3, p.47

[192] Election Commission of India-State Election 2018 to the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland Electors Data Summary

[193] For more detail analysis of women voting turnout and seat contested from 1969-2013 see Amer (2013) Political Status of Women in Nagaland. Journal of Business Management & Social Sciences Research (JBM&SSR), 2(4), pp. 91-95

economic constraints and the prevailing political environment which has deteriorated in terms of ethics and values over the years.[194]

Another pertinent issue that needs mention is the involvement of Naga insurgent groups in the election process. . From the 1950s onward, the Naga National Council (NNC) and later the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) along with its other splinter groups resisted and rebelled their being a part of postcolonial India. As part of their struggle, independent India's first two general elections (1952 and 1957) were boycotted locally. Though after the creation of Nagaland state elections became regular, Naga underground groups continued to boycott them formally-even if not always in practice as "Indian elections imposed on Naga soil".[195] Reports of insurgent groups having influenced the outcome of electoral politics have dominated popular discourse in the state. The Naga insurgent groups are often hand in glove with political parties and candidates in advancing their interest during elections. Another case in point where mainstream politics and insurgent movement overlap is that solution to the Naga political problem is pursued by both. So long as the political issue is not settled both politicians and some insurgents stand to benefit from the persistence of the conflict.[196]

Sustained violence and conflict have become a part of Naga history. The installation of representative form of government and adoption of modern economic system has opened the floodgates of opportunities. Yet despite progress, corruption, money and muscle power, lack of transparency or accountability to the people has become all too

[194] M. Amer, Op.cit., p. 7-8
[195] Jelle J.P. Wouters. (2018). *In the shadows of Naga insurgency: Tribes, state, and violence in Northeast India.* New Delhi:Oxford University Press, pp. 43-48.
[196] M. Amer, Op.cit., p.10

pervasive which has percolated down to every sphere of Naga society. Politically the state has experienced all the major trappings of the Indian electoral system. Dismal representation of women and the failure to chalk out its own separate autonomous political identity is an indictment of Naga customary law and patriarchy which excludes women from decision making process. Electoral malpractices have been ingrained into the Naga electoral process and unless its stranglehold is loosened and released, through electoral literacy and most importantly as state Chief Secretary Temjen Toy stated individuals decide to change. Unless people change democracy is not going to be strong and effective in the state.[197]

4.4: Measuring Public Understanding of Democracy

Democracy has become a universal idea and a preferred political system. Its understanding has also become multifaceted and has evolved in response to philosophical and theoretical arguments seeking to answer fundamental questions regarding who governs, how government should be formed and how the people can best control their government. This progression has resulted in the association of democracy with multiple of understandings like freedom, liberty equality etc that remain relevant to contemporary discourse on democracy and thus underscores the complexity and multidimensionality of current understandings of democracy.[198]

Statehood introduced formal democracy in Nagaland and over the decades the idea of democracy has come to be associated with different meanings and images in the minds of the people and expressed through a wide variety of dialects in the state.

[197] Electoral literacy for stronger democracy. (2020, January 25). *Morung Express*
[198] D. Canache.(2012). Citizens' conceptualization of democracy: Structural complexity, substantive content, and political significance. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(9), p.3

These differences in the meaning and images also arise due to the variation in the historical experience that the people of the state have accumulated, the socio-economic environment in which they live, and the necessity as perceived by the citizens'. Due to the interplay of these multiple meanings and images and their articulation as well as the continuous change the society has been undergoing, the idea of democracy is itself subject to alteration and modification. Any research survey while recognising the need to adhere to certain universal norms and standards to measure or assess the particular reality cannot overlook the conditions and environment in which the particular exists. After all, the universal is made up of the common features that particular object possess.[199]

To ascertain how the people of Nagaland understand the meaning of democracy an open-ended question was posed to the respondents. The question was: "Democracy is understood differently by different people. According to you what is democracy?" The value of the open-ended format is that it allows and requires respondents to define democracy in their own words. This is a more rigorous test of democratic understanding than providing a list of items which respondents rate as important. It is significant that substantial number of people (65.69 per cent) in the state do offer some definition of democracy. Moreover, awareness of the term 'democracy' and a willingness to express a definition are initial indications of the depth of contemporary democratic understanding.[200]

[199] K. C. Suri, P. R. DeSouza, S. Palshikar & Y. Yadav. (2008). *Support for democracy in South Asia*. The Asian Barometer Conference on the State of Democratic Governance in Asia, June 20-21, Taipei, p. 4

[200] R. J Dalton , D.C Shin & W. Jou, Op. cit., p 146.

Altogether 141 respondents (34.31 per cent) could not understand the word democracy or could not express a meaning or did not articulate, if they have one. Among those who gave a response, there is wide variation in the way they understood the meaning of democracy. Since there was wide variation in their responses, all the responses were grouped under six broad categories, namely popular rule, periodical elections, freedom, rule of law, justice and welfare and peace and security. Responses associating democracy with features that speak ill of democracy or ill-effects of democracy are grouped under negative responses.

Table 4.1: Meaning of democracy

Meaning	Frequency	Percentage
Popular rule	67	24.82
Election	48	17.77
Rule of law	38	14.07
Freedom and liberty	83	30.75
Justice and welfare	30	11.11
Peace and security	2	0.74
Negative meanings	2	0.74

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

From table 4.1 it can be seen that Freedom and liberty, popular rule and election are the most commonly associated meanings of democracy in the minds of the citizens' of the state. Only a minuscule 0.74 percent of the respondents had negative associations with democracy. It can be said that a basic understanding of democracy has apparently diffused widely in the state. Though it is agreed that the depth of democratic understanding has its own limits, the responses themselves indicate the idea that contemporary public associate with democracy. However, one should be cautious about reading too much into public definition of democracy, because

democracy requires more than an understanding of the term.[201] Given the positive image 'democracy' has today around the world, there is the danger that such questions end up capturing little more than mere 'lip service'[202] It is also to be noted that popular conception of the 'D-word' have been so contaminated by competing public discourses and socialising mechanisms that the word 'democracy' has lost much of its conceptual clarity and sematic consistency across borders.[203] Moreover, social desirability bias may also contribute to over-supportive attitudes to democracy. Social desirability refers to the social pressures a participant may feel in an interview setting and the impact this dynamic might have on their responses.[204] However, it will be wrong to conclude that democracy is a concept understood only by affluent and well-educated citizens' in established, advanced industrial democracies. These patterns suggest that democracy personifies human values and that most people understand these principles.[205]

Those who could not give any reply to the open-ended question on the meaning of democracy could choose one from the answer categories provided for the questions on the essential element of democracy.

[201]R. J Dalton , D.C Shin & W. Jou., Op.cit., p.152
[202]R. Inglehart. (2003).How solid is mass support for democracy and how can we measure it? *Political Science and Politics,* 36 (1),p. 52
[203] Yun-han Chu & Min-hua Huang. (2010). Solving an Asian puzzle. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(4), 121
[204] Helena Schwertheim. (2017). Measuring public support for democracy: A resource guide, *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance*, Stockholm, pp.5-6
[205] Op.cit., 2007,p.147

Table 4.2: Essential element of democracy

Essential element	Frequency	Percentage
Opportunity to change government through elections	41	29.08
Freedom to criticize those in power	13	9.21
Equal rights to everyone	53	37.59
Basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter, etc for everyone	34	24.12

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Emphasis on equal rights becomes more pronounced in responses to the question on the most essential element of democracy with 37.59 per cent followed by opportunity to change government through elections with 29.08 per cent.

4.5: Substantive and Procedural democracy

Prior studies on the meaning of democracy in Latin America, Africa, East European and East Asian countries identified a critical differentiation between substance based versus procedure based conception of democracy. Theoretically the concepts of social equality and economic development form the substance-based conception of democracy and emphasise government performance in various aspects, giving emphasis on the instrumental value of democracy. So long as this substance-based understanding of democracy is widely shared, perception about democracy even among people living in a mature democracy may turn negative once the government's performance deteriorates. While on the other hand if most citizens of an authoritarian regime have internalised this substance-based conception of democracy, their

government ability to provide continuous and stunning economic growth and good governance may result in maintaining positive views of the practise of democracy despite the conspicuous absence of some fundamental democratic institutions or muzzling of citizens basic fundamental rights.

On the contrary, procedural conception of democracy includes the concepts such as rule by the people, elections, majority rule, freedoms, civil rights and liberties which directly taps the gist of liberal democracy and underscores the indispensability of institutions and procedures for running a society, making decisions and ensuring the dignity and some unalienable rights of individuals. Though this conception of democracy does not speak directly to the substantive outputs of a political system, there is a hidden assumption that some decent life can be secured for most people once such institutions and procedures are in place and followed. Moreover, besides the instrumental value of democracy as a means toward good governance, this procedure based understanding of democracy also emphasises the intrinsic value of freedom and liberty, which should be protected and defended for their own sake through democratic institutions and procedures. Once this procedure based understanding of democracy is widely shared, even those living in an authoritarian regime with a stunning record of delivering quality governance are unlikely to view the practise of democracy in their society positively, due to the lack of some indispensable institutions and procedures that can protect their rights and ensure their dignity. Similarly, even confronted with some short term turbulence in government performance, the citizens' of a mature democracy who has internalised the procedure based democracy may still approve the practise of democracy in their society, as long

as the key institutions and procedures are well maintained and their rights are effectively protected against possible government infringements.[206]

Table 4.3: Substantive and procedural democracy

Conception of democracy	Frequency	Percentage
Procedural	345	84.35
Substantive	64	15.65

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

In order to distinguish between substantive and procedural conception of democracy, the present analysis takes into account the responses provided by the respondent to the open-ended question on the meaning of democracy and essential elements of democracy. Table 4.3 makes it clear that procedural based conception of democracy is the predominant mode of democratic understanding in Nagaland (84.35 per cent). This finding is quite contrary to what was found in Democracy in India: A Citizens' Perspective where majority of the respondents associated democracy with its substantive aspect.[207]

4.6: Explaining Procedural Understanding of Democracy

Most political scientist defines democracy in procedural terms.[208] Since majority of the respondents identifies democracy in procedural terms it would be insightful to know their socio demographic profile through the prism of modernisation theory.

[206] Yun-Han Chu, Min-Hua Huang & Ji Lu. (2013). Understanding of democracy in East Asian Societies, Working paper series No. 84, p. 35
[207] Lokniti, Op.cit, p. 24
[208] Yun-Han Chu, Min-Hua Huang & Ji Lu., Op.cit, p. 36

The modernisation theory explains how political attitudes are shaped and evolved. It contends that the factors associated with economic development would change people's view in concord with the procedural understanding of democracy. Modernisation theory expects men to have greater probability to recognise the procedural meaning of democracy. The same expectation also applies to those who are better educated because school education should increase their knowledge of democracy. On the other hand younger people are believed to be more supportive of this conception since the concept of procedural democracy is more ideological. Lastly modernisation theory also predicts that people with better socio economic condition tend to uphold the procedural conceptions of democracy since their interest has transcend the material benefits into the fulfilment of ideological goals.[209]

[209] Yun-Han Chu, Min-Hua Huang & Ji Lu.,Op.cit., p. 37

Table 4.4: Procedural understanding of democracy

Procedural conception of democracy		Percentage
Gender	Male	63.10
	Female	60.10
Age cohort	Youth	65.18
	Middle aged adults and senior citizens	59.85
Education	Under matriculation, matriculation and higher secondary	58.84
	Graduation and above	67.63
Occupation	Self employed	65.34
	Cultivators	61.90
	Unemployed	59.56

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Table 4.4 shows that male respondents (63.10 per cent) have higher probability to conceive democracy in procedural terms than women (60.10 per cent). Younger cohorts indeed are more likely to identify democracy in procedure based conception (65.18 per cent) than adults and senior citizen combined (59.85). This finding is in accordance with our expectation that young people are more idealistic than older people. This finding may be related to the modernisation of Naga society. Older people who were socialised at an earlier stage in the modernisation of their society are more likely to understand democracy in substantive terms than young and middle-aged people whose socialisation took place under different social and economic conditions.

Moreover college educated respondents (67.53 per cent) also have greater probability to have procedural understanding of democracy than those who are high school and

elementary school educated (58.84). This finding is consistent with our expectation that more educated people are more likely to be socialised into an understanding of democracy that is consistent with the Western definition of liberal democracy. This finding may also be related to the different economic opportunities available to the different groups, since the less educated are also more likely to be economically disadvantaged, and therefore pay more attention to the substantive dimensions of democracy such as social equality.

Meanwhile those engaged in economic activity like the self employed (65.34 per cent) and cultivators (61.90 per cent) think of democracy in procedural terms than those who are unemployed (59.56). Thus the above findings are quite consistent with modernisation theory. The results once again demonstrate and perhaps are a testament to the positive attraction of democracy that citizens' understand democracy by its political benefits.

4.7: General Support for Democracy as an Idea and Form of Government

It has been shown that democracy has different meanings and connotations in the minds of the people and that procedural understanding of democracy is the predominant mode of democratic understanding in Nagaland. Similarly democracy as an idea and institution enjoy different levels of support among the people. From the literature it can be found that popular support for democracy varies from country to country and depends on different factors, the important ones being economic and political. Those who favour economic factors argue that democracy must earn its legitimacy mainly by delivering the goods. If people are satisfied that there has been

improvement in their economic conditions under democracy, they will support it. For instance, Adam Przeworski stressed that the most relevant factor is the gap between subjective expectations and real economic experiences. If citizens' believe that democracy improves their personal economic situation and that of the nation, then their support for democracy will increase.[210] Russell Dalton discovered that citizens' attitude toward democracy in the former East Germany is strongly linked to their evaluations of the national economy.[211]

On the contrary proponents of political explanations caution against economic reductionalism and argue that citizens' sense of commitment to democracy may be less a function of how they think the market is working than to how they experience democracy itself. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield in their study found that there is very little link between economic experience and support for democracy.[212] Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer also warned against reductionist theories that treat all political attitudes as if they were simply derivative of economic conditions. In their study they found that though both economic and political factors determine levels of support for democracy, it was the political factors that mattered more.[213] Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton found that in Africa support for democracy remains performance driven, though approval hinges less on

[210] Adam Przeworski. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
[211] Russell Dalton. (1994). Communists and democrats: Democratic attitudes in the two Germanies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(4), pp. 469–93.
[212] Geoffrey Evans & Stephen Whitefield. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(4), pp. 485–514.
[213] Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, (1998).*Democracy and Its Alternatives:Understanding Post-Communist Societies.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

the delivery of economic goods than on the government's record on securing basic political rights.[214]

In order to unravel whether economic or political factors exerts more influence over people's support for democracy the present study bases the analysis on a survey item that is widely used to gauge popular support for democracy as a preferred political system. Typically respondents are asked to choose among three statements:"Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government"; "Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one"; "For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime."

Table 4.5: Preference for democracy/authoritarianism

Form of government	Frequency	Percentage
Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government	252	61.31
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one	65	15.82
For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime	94	22.87

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

[214] Robert Mattes &Michael Bratton, Op.cit.

For 61.31 per cent of the respondents, democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. Only 15.82 per cent preferred an authoritarian government while 22.87 per cent remained indifferent. Moreover comparable measurements to examine the impact of both the "sociotropic" consideration (how people think their state's economy is doing) and the immediate egocentric evaluations (how their own household is doing) were used. The goal here is to find out whether there is a discernible relationship economic performance and democratic legitimacy.[215] To evaluate the current condition of the state economy, respondents were asked "How would you rate the overall economic condition of our state today?" The response categories for economic evaluation were coded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very bad) to 5 (Very good). For assessing current personal economic condition respondents were asked "As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today?" The response categories for economic evaluation were coded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Very bad) to 5 (Very good). It was found that the mean scores for economic evaluations (sociotropic and egocentric) were 2.10 and 2.45 respectively indicating that despite people economic evaluations being low the extent to which they believe that democracy is the best form of government is high.

To further substantiate the claim that economic performance plays a secondary role in shaping people's attitude towards democracy, correlation analysis was applied so that the strength at the individual level can be more precisely gauged. Moreover to assess the relative importance of economic performance in explaining people's normative

[215] Yun-han Chu, M. Bratton, M. Lagos, S. Shastri &M. Tessler. (2008). Public opinion and democratic legitimacy. *Journal of Democracy*, 19(2), p. 77

commitment to democracy, a measure of how many people believe that democracy of an acceptable quality is being supplied in their state was included. This study contains two sets of indicators that reveal essentials regarding how the political system looks in citizens' eyes. The first set gauges how much people trust the key political institutions. Here the same set of six political institutions is used and created a composite measure of institutional trust and the second indicator used gathered data regarding citizens' overall satisfaction with the way that democracy works in their state.

Table 4.6: Level of institutional trust

Trust in	Mean	SD	Ranking
Political parties	1.73	0.93	6
State government	1.85	1.09	5
Courts	2.33	1.27	2
Police	2.20	1.31	4
Civil service	2.21	1.34	3
Election commission	2.44	1.33	1
Generalised Institutional Trust Index	2.13		

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

Table 4.6 lists the mean values and standard deviations of the trust that people have in the six political institutions as well as the mean value of the Generalised Institutional Trust Index. The overall mean rating for the six institutions was found to be 2.13 which is below the scale midpoint of 2.50. It indicates that there is very little positive trust in any political institutions in the state. Although most institutions are distrusted, the levels of distrust are generally moderate. Political parties generate the greatest distrust (1.73) followed by state government (1.85).

Table 4.7: Satisfaction with democracy

Satisfaction with democracy	Frequency	Percentage
Very satisfied	68	16.54
Fairly satisfied	123	29.93
Not very satisfied	175	42.58
Not at all satisfied	45	10.95

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

From table 4.7 it can be seen that 53.53 per cent of the respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy is working in their state while 46.47 are satisfied.

Table 4.8: Sources of popular support for democracy: Correlation analysis

Variables	Nagaland (r)	*P*
Current state economic evaluation	.231	0.01
Current personal economic evaluation	.099	0.05
Institutional trust	.366	0.01
Satisfaction with democracy	.265	0.01

In table 4.8 the correlation coefficients between support for democracy and the two economic indicators with the two political indicators are juxtaposed. It was found that the correlation coefficients are not strong for any of the four explanatory variables. Citizens' economic evaluation of the state's economy had the strongest impact on support for democracy than assessment of their own personal economic condition with correlation coefficients of .231 as compared with .099. But neither exerts the kind of influence on attitudes towards democracy than the political factors do. Among the two political indicators, institutional trust exerts the strongest influence on people's normative commitment to democracy with correlation coefficient of .366 as

compared with satisfaction with democracy which had a correlation coefficient of .265 and also matter more than does the perception of state's economic condition and perception of personal economic conditions. The results clearly suggest that economic evaluation exerts no direct impact on people's belief in democratic legitimacy rather it exerts only an indirect effect that is mediated through people's level of trust in political institutions.

The results so far underscore three important points. First democracy has become a preferred idea for most people of Nagaland. Secondly economic evaluation exerts no direct impact on people's belief in democratic legitimacy. Thirdly it would be wrong to hastily write off economic performance as a factor in democratic consolidation. Democratic governments are always under pressure to produce robust economic growth and are subjected to the harsh likelihood of economic fluctuations especially in the age of globalisation as Non-state actors increasingly restrict the ability of democratically elected governments to manage their own economies and protect their citizens' economic interest. Moreover, democracies are also subject to the likelihood that prolonged economic stagnation may result in snapping popular support for democracy by obliterating the sense of satisfaction with democracy's performance that is essential to its legitimation.

In order to understand how firmly and deep rooted is support for democracy more analysis is required. This question is important because in several cases approval of democracy or democratic government does not necessarily lead to the disapproval of authoritarian alternatives.[216]

[216] SDSA Team, Op.cit., p.6

4.8: Funnel of Support for Democracy

In order to measure the depth of support for democracy the funnel of democracy[217] is used with a view to ascertain whether those who affirm the representative form of democratic government reject its various real-life alternatives. This funnelling is important as support for democracy and non-democracy co-exist in the realm of ideas.[218] The shape of the resultant funnel captures the depth of support for democratic government: the wider the base of the funnel, the more robust the support for the institutional form of democratic government.

[217] The funnel of democracy is a technique used in SDSA (2008) to ascertain both the width and depth of support for democracy. This means that the funnel proceeds from the most acceptable tenents of democracy to the tenents which can subvert support to democracy. Re- arrangement in the different stages has been made in this study.
[218] SDSA Team, Op.cit., p. 8

Table 4.9: The funnel of support for democracy in Nagaland

Different stages	Frequency	Percentage
1.Includes all those who support government elected by leaders	387	94.16
2. Excludes those who want an army rule	361	87.83
3. Exclude those who support one party rule	315	76.64
4. Excludes those who want a strong leader who does not have to bother about elections	181	44.03
5. Excludes those who prefer authoritarian government sometimes or are indifferent between democracy and authoritarianism	252	61.31

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

In analysing the data an attempt is made to identify the supporters of democracy and authoritarianism by their consistency in approving or disapproving the democratic and authoritarian forms of government. With a view to identify the strong democrats among the respondents, in the first stage all those respondents who support government by elected leaders were included. In this stage it was found that support for democratic government is very widespread. In the second stage, a resounding majority of the respondents are against army rule. Such disapproval of army rule should come as no surprise in a state that has witnessed the excesses committed by the army on the people and continuation of the draconian laws like the Armed Forces

Special Powers Act. In the third stage also majority of the respondents are against one party rule. In the fourth stage the idea of a strong leader who does not have to bother about election is supported by more than half of the respondents. This is the only stage where respondents prefer an authoritarian alternative. Finally in the last stage more than one third of the respondents are ambivalent between democracy and authoritarianism.

4.9: Democrats and Non-democrats

Another way of measuring the depth of support for democracy is by identifying the supporters of democratic government, supporters of authoritarian forms of government and a third category of those who are not and those who are neither in the sphere of democracy nor in the sphere of authoritarianism. In this analysis a person is considered a strong democrat if he/she (a) supports rule by elected representatives and (b) prefers it to any other form of government and (c) is opposed to the rule by the military. Thus strong democrats are consistent in their support of democracy and rejecting authoritarian forms of government. The second category is the non-democrats. Non-democrats are those who are consistent in their preference for an authoritarian form of government. They are those who (a) prefer authoritarian government or are indifferent to democracy and authoritarianism and (b) disapprove rule by elected representatives and (c) support army rule. The rest are treated as weak democrats. They are democrats because they support at least one key attribute of a democratic government but their support is weak because (a) they do not reject the non-democratic governments, or (b) support both democracy and its alternatives or support neither, or (c) support non-democracy options without quite negating the

democracy options. The weak democrats are the vaccinating ones, who can move in either direction depending on the situation, sometimes leaning towards democracy and sometimes towards non-democracy.[219]

The distribution of respondents classified in the three categories is given in table 4.10. 55.48 per cent of the respondents come in the category of strong democrats. 2.43 per cent come in the category of non-democrats while 42.09 per cent come in the category of weak democrats.

Table 4.10: Supporters of democracy

Supporters	Frequency	Percentage
Strong democrats	228	55.48
Non-democrats	10	2.43
Weak democrats	173	42.09

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018

In order to measure effective support for democracy in the state, Support for Democracy Ratio (SDR) was used.[220]An SDR of 1.0 would indicate a perfect balance between the two extreme categories. A higher SDR indicates greater support for democracy. Thus, an SDR of 22.8 for the state indicates that overall strong democrats outnumber non-democrats and is also more robust than India's overall SDR of 2.67.[221]

[219] The categorisation of respondents into strong, weak and non democrats has been made based on the work of Suri et al. (2008)
[220] This ratio is calculated as the proportion of strong democrats to non democrats. Don't Know including those who could not understand the questions have been treated as missing values.
[221]SDSA Team, Op.cit., p.9

4.10: Support for Democracy by Socio demographic Factors

A close examination of the distribution of strong, non-democrats and weak democrats according to gender, age, marital status, education, occupation and income shows all these attributes matter in determining the proportions of the three categories of the respondents. Men support democracy more than women and formal education is the strongest factor that determines the firmness of support for democracy. The higher the educational attainment of a respondent, the greater is the support for democracy. In this respect, completing school with matriculation degree is a crucial stage that leads to a leap in support for democracy. It was also found that support for democracy was robust among both age cohorts. The data also shows that support for democracy is widespread across different occupational status and income group (Table 4.11).

Table 4.11: Support for democracy by gender, age, marital status, education, occupation and income

	Nagaland	Strong democrats	Non-democrats	Weak democrats
Gender	Male	58.66	0.48	40.86
	Female	27.09	4.44	68.47
Age	Youth	60.75	0.74	38.51
	Middle aged adults and senior citizens	53.48	3.29	44.32
Marital status	Married	53.32	3.48	44.19
	Unmarried	60.82	0.67	38.51
	Divorced/separated/widowed	60	0	40
Education	Non literate	44.44	5.55	22.22
	Under matriculation	47.56	4.68	48.17
	Matriculation	64.28	0	35.71
	Higher Secondary	50.94	0	49.05
	Graduation & above	68.97	0	31.03
Occupation	Unemployed	52.52	3.35	44.13
	Self employed	53.95	5.26	40.79
	Govt employee	70.38	0	29.62
	Cultivator	53.96	0	46.04
	Student	53.85	0	46.15
Income	1000-10,000	58.33	1.05	40.62
	10,001-20,000	40	0	60
	20,001& above	73.80	0	26.20

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018
Note: All figures are in percentages

It was also found that support for democracy is higher among those who participate more in political activity. Items of political activity included participation in voting, attending election meeting/rallies, taking part in campaign activities and discussing politics with others (Table 4.12).

Table 4.12: Support for democracy by political participation

Political participation	Strong democrats	Non- democrats	Weak democrats
Voting	55.22	1.69	43.09
Attending election meeting /rallies	22.96	0	16.04
Taking part in the campaign activities	6.66	0	4.44
Discussing politics with others	26.41	2.22	21.23

Source: Field work, June 2017-January 2018
Note: All figures are in percentages

55.21 per cent of the respondents who had voted in the 2013 state general elections were strong democrats while only 1.69 per cent was non-democrats. Again respondents were asked as to whether they had attended election meetings/rallies, took part in campaign activities and discussed politics with others. Respondents were asked to choose only one item from the three. Here also 56.03 per cent were strong democrats and outnumbered non-democrats and weak democrats. From the results it can be said that it can be said that despite eliciting low trust, political parties have contributed significantly to an expansion in the participatory base of democracy in the state. Politics continue to be vibrant force shaping contemporary Nagaland. Citizens' participation in political activity is positively associated with support for democracy. However, a high level of political participation does not seem to translate into greater legitimacy of political institutions that are vital for democracy such as political parties

and state government. This is another challenge that the leaders of parties and state government must address in the state, so as to make democratic support more stable and robust.

4.11: Conclusion

For majority of the respondents, freedom and popular rule are among the most commonly associated meanings of democracy. Respondents also prefer democracy as the preferred political system with economic evaluation exerting no direct impact on people's belief in democratic legitimacy. Again democrats out numbers non-democrats but the number of weak democrats are also high indicating that many of them are ambivalent towards authoritarian governments or support both the democratic and non- democratic form of government. Men were found to support democracy more than women. Majority of the women come in the category of weak democrats. It was also found that with increase in formal education level of support also increased. Both age cohorts have significant support for democracy. Moreover support for democracy was also widespread across the different occupational groups. The data does not support the view that the level of support is inversely related to social status and wealth, where the poor support democracy more than the elites, who are disillusioned with democracy. It was also found that political participation is positively associated with support for democracy.

Thus the overall result underscores two important points. Firstly though there is broad popular support for democracy thereby validating the second and third hypotheses of the study yet on probing further a very sizeable number of respondents are ambivalent towards authoritarian governments or support both the democratic and non-

democratic forms of government. Secondly most people of the state are capable of imputing meaning to democracy in their own words implying that popular appeal of democracy lies in the freedom and liberty that democracy provides.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1: Summary of Findings

An important component for the sustenance and survival of democratic government is public trust in the political institutions and support for the political system. In general, an implicit assumption in democratic theory is that the greater the public trust in political system, the greater is the legitimacy of government, and the more sustainable hence is the democracy.[222] Institutional trust and democratic support can be seen as mutually reinforcing. Institutional trust has both direct and indirect effects upon support for democracy. The indirect effect being that it increases democratic values, which facilitate democratic support, and the direct effect being that it brings legitimacy, which strengthens support for the government.[223]

This study is a conscious effort towards deriving a deeper understanding of democracy by examining the opinions of the people in Nagaland, which essentially underpin the entrenchment and success of democracy in any democratic society. In doing so, it tries to revisit the foundational ideas of democracy through the learning's derived from India in particular and the global South on the whole. Each of the different dimensions explored in the preceding chapters offer something to cheer and something to worry about and provide an occasion for reflection. It is not for this

[222] Yen-Chen Tang. (2012). Institutional Trust and Democratic Support: From the Perspective of East Asia. *Journal of US-China Public Administration*, 9(6), p. 671
[223] W. Mishler & R. Rose (2005). What are the Political Consequences of Trust? A test of Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38(9), p.1053

study to offer a policy prescription on how democracy in the state can have a better future. Instead, this study can only reflect on a range of challenges and possibilities that lie ahead for democracy in the state. However before proceeding on that, let first recapitulate the key findings of the study that shape the many puzzles surrounding democracy in Nagaland.

Public attitudes toward democracy can be assessed at various levels of abstraction. This study found no evidence of declining commitment to the principles of democratic government or to the democratic regime in the state. Instead it found substantial evidence to celebrate the acceptance of democracy as a predominant preference among majority of the people as an ideal mode of governance (Ref. Table no. 4.5 and 4.9). However the support is not very deep and unwavering as many of the respondents are ambivalent toward authoritarian regime or support both the democratic and non-democratic regime (Ref Table no. 4.10). This throws in a real challenge in positively assessing the present status of democracy in Nagaland.

Politics continue to be a vibrant force shaping contemporary Nagaland. This study found that support for democracy, institutional trust and political participation are positively correlated thereby validating the claim of democratic theory that suggest that all these three attributes are important in the functioning and sustenance of democracy (Ref Table no. 4.8 and 4.12). However, a high level of political participation does not seem to translate into greater legitimacy of political institutions that are vital for democracy such as political parties and state government. This is a challenge which leaders must address in the state, so as to make support for democracy more stable and robust.

It was also found that support for democracy is widespread across different socio demographic groups confirming that democracy is not an elitist project in Nagaland and finds acceptance among different sections of the society and not only among the well off (Ref Table no. 4.11). People also conceive the idea of democracy in procedural terms. Presence of pro democracy orientation among the majority of the respondents and procedural based conception of democracy together form a combination that vouches for a strong presence of the idea of freedom and liberties in people's perception of what democracy should be (Ref Table no. 4.4).

Citizens' can also distinguish between the political and economic dimensions of regime performance. Many of them come to value democracy for the political goods that it produces even when its economic performance is perceived to be poor in the short term. More specifically, people's acceptance of democracy as legitimate hinges mostly on whether certain key political institutions command citizens' trust and on the political system's ability to meet such basic requirements of liberal democracy as free and fair elections, freedom and liberties and equality before law (Ref Table no. 4.8). In a nutshell, democracy needs to pay its way by delivering acceptable levels of citizen control and good governance.

Subsequent findings provide encouraging results that go on to assure about the stability of democracy as a preferred form of governance. What is true of popular conception of democracy is also true of practise of democracy. Respondents who admitted to have participated in political activities are also those who support democracy more re-affirming their confidence in the electoral process despite many

ills (Ref Table no. 4.12). The experience of Nagaland shows that democracy can be built in societies that have not attained a high level of economic growth or well being. The culture, practices and institutions of democracy have transformed the people of the state as bearers of rights and dignity but this at the same time gives rises to citizens' expectation that most of our regimes fail to meet.

Were the outcomes of democracy to be measured by the level of popular satisfaction with its functioning, the conclusion may not appear encouraging. Despite widespread support for the norms of democracy, people do express their reservations about the limitations and shortcomings of the outcomes of democracy. People understand the value of political rights but at the same time express only limited satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Ref Table no. 4.7). In fact, it is more of a split verdict with equal numbers being satisfied and dissatisfied with the working of democracy. It is easy to understand why people in the state are not satisfied with the working of democracy and may be related to a common abhorrence for power mongering, the amoral approach of the political class, scandals and corruption and other such negative factors (Ref Table no. 3.9).

At the other extreme, this study is not concerned with day-to-day evaluations of specific leaders, policies, and governments assuming that evaluations of this kind of governmental performance will rise and fall in any well functioning democracy. Rather, the concern is with popular confidence in the political institutions. Rothstein and Stolle in their study of 56 countries at the aggregate level illustrated the distinction between trust in political institutions on the representational side such as political parties and parliament and trust in political institutions on the

implementation side such as courts and police.[224] The basis for trusting the representational institutions is partisanship and political ideology and the foundation for trusting the legal and administrative institutions is their even handedness and efficiency. The present study reconfirms the varieties of institutional trust. Even if institutional trust is simplified into the categories of trust in the representational and implementation sides, the level as well as the cause of the people's trust in these institutions can differ greatly. Hence, researchers should in future give more attention to the multidimensionality of institutional trust and its effect on policy and theoretical formulations.

Citizens' dissatisfaction with an incumbent government routinely spurs voters to seek a change in administration at the next election and then extend support to the new incumbents. In that case, disaffection is a healthy part of the democratic process because citizens' have the power to 'throw the rascals out,' democracy has a potential for renewal and responsiveness that is its ultimate strength. Whatever the normal background level of public cynicism and censure of politics, citizens' in Nagaland are less trustful of their representative political institutions (Ref Table no. 3.1). It appears from the study that performance of the institutions is the key factor that explains the level of trust. People judge institutions on the perceived performance level of the institutions. This is certainly consistent with the findings of some previous studies. It also affirms the importance of institutional performance in strengthening institutional trust. Hence, in order to raise institutional trust governments should always respond promptly and effectively to public priorities such as promoting development and

[224] Bo Rothstein & Dietlind Stole. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. *Comparative Politics*, 40(4), pp. 441-459

growth. Nevertheless, it is also important here not to hastily conclude that cultural explanations are irrelevant (Ref Table no. 3.11).

Evidence of the decline in institutional trust has been especially apparent in two areas: disillusionment with state government and with political parties. Citizens' scepticism about politicians and political parties extends to the formal institutions of democratic government. It is one thing for citizens' to be sceptical of the president or the prime minister (or even the group of politicians in parliament); it is quite different if this cynicism broadens to other institutions of representative democracy. Political parties have taken root in the state generating high level of political participation and popular identification, yet their inability to offer meaningful choices to the voters or to be transparent and accountable and democratic in their functioning leads to low levels of citizens' trust. Nongovernmental organisations and movements have filled the gaps left by political parties by giving voice to issues and groups not attended to by competitive politics (Ref Table no. 3.1). However their functioning creates its own deficits of representation, transparency and accountability. The non-party sector strengthens democracy when it supplements party politics rather than substitute it as in the case of some NGOs and religious organisations and all manner of armed insurgencies.

The present study also shows that while in abstract terms certain factors may have more important influence on institutional trust, but in reality such an effect may vary sharply across societies. Hence, although social science research has a tendency to aspire to theoretical universalism, one should not forget that the determinants of institutional trust in each society are always context specific and can only be fully unfolded and understood in relation to the special institutional and cultural contexts of

that particular society. In other words, there is always a need for case studies in order to achieve an understanding of institutional trust in particular and of socio political phenomena in general.

5.2: Challenges

This study falls short of understanding and explaining the reasons for people's adherence to different orientations. Democracies studies in South Asia have tried to address this gap by introducing an open-ended question asking people what democracy means to them. While this has yielded rich data that gives a glimpse into how democracy is understood by people similar inter-disciplinary efforts are needed which aim to understand this in a bottom up manner, through colloquial idioms the reasons for people adherence to particular political orientation. This according to the study is the utmost challenge if one were to understand democracy in Nagaland in its own right, free from the received understanding and prescription emanating in established democracies of the global North.

The first report of State of Democracy in South Asia (SDSA) provided a very useful categorisation that summarised what the challenges to democracy were in South Asia. The report identified three challenges: foundational challenges, challenges of expansion and challenges of deepening democracy. The foundational challenge is the minimalist demand for instituting a democratic government in a manner such that it is not constantly vulnerable to authoritarian and other challenges. Given its minimalist nature, the foundational challenge lends itself to universal norms that more or less cut across regions and cultures. The challenge of expansion is about applying the basic

principle of democratic government across all social groups and sector of state institutional domain. Finally deepening of democracy involves expanding without allowing itself to be appropriated by elites, criminal elements or vested interest. It is also a condition that guarantees resilience of democratic institutions in the face of deviations towards concentration of power and authority in the polity. But more than establishing an institutional outline, deepening involves revitalising the emancipatory capacities of democracy to act as the means of self realisation.[225]

This categorisation is useful here as well in order to understand the findings of this study within its overall limitations. In the case of Nagaland, it can be claimed not only by inferring through its political trajectory but through systematic analysis of public opinion done in the present study that the first challenges that have to do with the establishment of democracy and its acceptance as the most preferred mode of governance have been successfully met. However the challenges at the subsequent levels exist. The challenges of expansion exist because there is deficit in representation. In the Legislative Assembly and the Village Councils, representation of the poor, the women, marginal tribes and communities is dismal. The state awaits greater and continuing democratisation in order to bring its institutions closer to the poor, especially those residing in rural areas and other groups excluded from sharing state power. To arrest this trend, political democracy needs a greater federalisation of state structures with necessary electoral reforms to ensure representation to women and marginal groups who may otherwise not have chances of representation because of their small numbers and customary laws. Lastly a key site for deepening of democracy is public-policy making. This aspect is found wanting as state government

[225] SDSA Team, Op.cit., pp. 150-152

rarely involve the people in policy making. The way in which representative democracy, the political party system and the legislature function in the policy-making process, has made exclusion of the people a necessary feature of so called democratic governance. The working of democracy has been unable to break up the hegemonic power of the privileged class. There is a feeling that the social transformation that should have been accompanied with political democracy has not really taken place. Instead it has only created an elite which serves as a bottleneck to a possible social transformation.

Appendix 1

AC **P.S Code**

Questionnaire on the topic: A Study of Institutional Trust and Democratic Support in Nagaland

A.C. name:_____

P.S. name:_____

Name of the respondent:_____

Respondent serial No. as in the electoral roll:_____

Address of the respondent:_____

Date of interview:_____

Name of the field investigator:_____

A. BACKGROUND DATA

A1. Gender

1. Male ( )

2. Female ( )

A2. What is your age? _____

A3. What is your marital status?

1. Married ( )

2. Unmarried ( )

3. Divorced ( )

4. Separated ( )

5. Widowed ( )

A4. What is your highest level of education?

1. Non literate ( )

2. Under matriculation ( )

3. Matriculation ( )

4. Higher secondary ( )

5. Graduation and above ( )

A5. Occupation

1. Government service ( )

2. Self employed ( )

3. Cultivator ( )

4. Student ( )

5. Unemployed ( )

A6. What is your monthly income? _____

B. ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS

B1. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our state today? Is it …

1. Very good ( )

2. Good ( )

3. So so (not good nor bad) ( )

4. Bad ( )

5. Very bad ( )

B2. What do you think will be the state of our state's economic condition a few years from now? Will it be

1. Much better ( )

2. A little better ( )

3. About the same ( )

4. A little worse ( )

5. Much worse ( )

B3. As for your own family, how do you rate the economic situation of your family today? Is it...

1. Very good ( )

2. Good ( )

3. So so (not good nor bad) ( )

4. Bad ( )

5. Very bad ( )

B4. What do you think the economic situation of your family will be a few years from now? Will it be ….

1. Much better ( )

2. A little better ( )

3. About the same ( )

4. A little worse ( )

5. Much worse ( )

C. TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

C1. I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them?

Items	A great deal	Quite a lot	Not very much	None at all	Can't say/no opinion
Political parties					
State government					
Courts					
Police					
Civil service					
Mass media					
NGOs					
Election commission					

D. INTERPERSONAL TRUST

D1. General speaking, would you say that "Most people can be trusted" or "that you must be very careful in dealing with people"?

1. Most people can be trusted ( )

2. You must be very careful in dealing with people ( )

D2. General speaking, would you say you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that "most people are trustworthy"?

1. Strongly agree ( )

2. Somewhat agree ( )

3. Undecided ( )

4. Somewhat disagree ( )

5. Strongly disagree ( )

E. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

E1. Did you cast your vote in the 2013 Nagaland State Assembly Election?

1. Yes ( )

2. No ( )

E2. Besides voting, did you participate in any of the election related activities?

1. Attending election meeting /rallies ( )

2. Taking part in the campaign activities ( )

3. Discussing politics with others ( )

F. POLITICAL INTEREST

F1. How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you

1. Very interested ( )

2. Somewhat interested ( )

3. Not very interested ( )

4. Not at all interested ( )

G. SATISFACTION WITH GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY

G1. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in your state. Are you …?

1. Very satisfied ( )

2. Fairly satisfied ( )

3. Not very satisfied ( )

4. Not at all satisfied ( )

G2. In your opinion how much of a democracy is Nagaland?

1. A full democracy ( )

2. A democracy, but with minor problems ( )

3. A democracy, with major problems ( )

4. Not a democracy ( )

G3 . How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the present state government? Are you …?

1. Very satisfied ( )

2. Somewhat satisfied ( )

3. Neither ( )

4. Somewhat dissatisfied ( )

5. Very dissatisfied ( )

G4. How suitable is democracy to our state?

1. Very suitable ( )

2. Suitable ( )

3. Not suitable ( )

4. Not at all suitable ( )

H. MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS

H1. In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing the state that government should address?

_____

_____

H2. How likely is it that the government will solve the most important problem you identified within the next five years?

1. Very likely ( )

2. Likely ( )

3. Not very likely ( )

4. Not at all likely ( )

I. MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

I1. Democracy is understood differently by different people. According to you what is democracy?

_____

_____

I2. People often differ in their views on the characteristic that is essential to democracy. If you have to choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential element of democracy?

1. Opportunity to change government through elections ( )

2. Freedom to criticise those in power ( )

3. Equal rights to everyone ( )

4. Basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter, etc for everyone ( )

I3. Different people give different answers about what they like about democracy. I will read out a few of these. Tell me which one of these do you like most about democracy?

1. Everyone is free to speak and act ( )

2. People have control over rulers ( )

3. The weak are treated with dignity ( )

4. Interest of minorities are protected ( )

I4. Now let me talk about anxieties that many people have about democracy. Tell me which one of these do you dislike most about democracy?

1. Too many parties divide people ( )

2. Rulers keep changing ( )

3. Corruption increases ( )

4. Those who have more votes dominate over others ( )

J. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND PREFERENCE FOR DEMOCRACY

J1. Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion?

1. Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government ( )

2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one ( )

3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime ( )

J2. Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view?

1. Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society ( )

2. Democracy cannot solve our society's problems ( )

J3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government."

1. Strongly agree ( )

2. Agree ( )

3. Disagree ( )

4. Strongly disagree ( )

J4. There are many ways to govern a state. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? For each statement, would you say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove.

Items	Strongly approve	Approve	Disapprove	Strongly disapprove	No opinion
We should have a strong leader who does not have to bother about elections					
Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office					
The state should be governed by the army.					
The state should be governed by those chosen by the people in a fair election					

Appendix 2

DETAILS OF SURVEY PROFILE

AC No.	AC Name	PS No. & Name	N
03	Dimapur-III	4 Purana Bazar (Padum Pokhuri) E/W	15
		17 Disagaphu	15
		30 Urra Village	14
	Total		44
06	Tening	1 Tening Town (N/W)	14
		21 Nchan	13
		41 Phaijol	13
	Total		40
12	Tseminyu	12 Tseminyu New Town-I	14
		26 Njophenyu	13
		40Thongsunyu	13
	Total		40
18	Chazouba	10 Chetheba Town	14
		24 Khutsami Village	14
		38 Chesezu Village 'D' Wing	14
	Total		42
25	Mongoya	3 Artang Ward	13
		11 Meyilong	13
		19 Tsusapang	14
	Total		40
35	Zunheboto	7 Old Zunheboto S/W-II	15
		18 Baimho	12
		29 Old Zbto N/W-II	13
	Total		40
40	Bhandari	15 Bhandari Village	15
		40 Soku	15
		65 Chandalashung-B	14
	Total		44
46	Mon Town	5 Mon Hq.	15
		13 Mon Hq.	15
		21 Totok ChingkhoVillage	14
	Total		44

53	Tuensang Sadar-I	6 High School 'B' E/W	14
		16 Post Office Sector ‘A’	12
		26 St.John School Sector ‘A’ S/W-II	14
	Total		40
60	Pungro Kiphire	1 Kiphire Town (N) ‘A’	12
		18 Pungro Town ‘A’	13
		35 Luthur Village	12
	Total		37

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